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Abstract summary 
 
 
An effective representative democracy requires the maintenance of both individual 
and collective political rights especially those of freedom of expression and 
association. Recognising the intrinsic value of political parties to modern 
representative democracy and identifying four basic principles of democracy, this 
thesis will examine the steps taken within several modern democracies to restrict 
political rights for the greater good with particular emphasis on freedom of 
association as exemplified by political parties. Looking at a number of case studies, it 
will examine the mechanics of restriction and more fundamentally assess their 
legitimacy against a template of four principles. These are Representation, Popular 
Sovereignty, Equal Respect and Changeability. The Thesis will argue that a 
satisfactory balance between these principles requires the facilitation of substantive 
disagreement as long as such disagreement does not both ideologically and practically 
pose a fundamental threat to the continuation of democratic government. Legislation 
and Jurisprudence will be analysed across jurisdictions with respect to issues ranging 
from racist parties to those espousing totalitarian ideologies as well as those at least 
symbolically committed to violence and/or political Islam. This Thesis will conclude 
that for a prohibition to be legally and morally justified, it should pass a high 
evidentiary threshold regarding both an ideological and practically feasible challenge 
to democratic government. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Intro:1 
 
“Freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a 
democratic society.”1 
 
The quotation above is representative of the notion that there exists both a clear and 
symbiotic relationship between the concept of democracy as a system of government 
and the political rights of freedom of expression and association. It encapsulates a 
belief that while a democratic system of government requires the maintenance of 
political rights, the effective operation of such rights is only possible in a democracy. 
Implicit within this relationship of interdependence is the notion that there should be 
very few, if any, permissible restrictions of these rights within a democratic polity. 
 
Such an idea is not without its critics. It has been evident that in the decade following 
9/11, vital questions have emerged within democracies concerning the advocacy of 
political violence and the subsequent response to such advocacies by democratic 
governments. Whilst acknowledging that terrorism is hardly a new phenomenon, 
Wojciech Sadurski has argued that recent events have amplified the relevance of such 
issues. 
 
“…it is undoubtedly true that since the attacks in the US on 11 
September 2001, the bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004 and in 
London on 7 July 2005, the gravity of the danger of terrorism and 
arising from possible (and sometimes real) responses to it is 
qualitatively different.”2 
 
Despite its contemporary resonance, the idea of permissible restrictions of political 
rights is neither new nor simply a function of a desire to protect public safety. As 
early as the inter-war years, proponents of a theory known as ‘militant democracy’ 
argued that restrictions on political expression and association (most notably the 
                                                 
1
 Lingens v Austria,(1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 407, article 42 
2
 Wojciech Sadurski (ed) Political Rights under stress in 21
st
 Century Europe, (Oxford University 
Press) 2006, 8 
2 
 
dissolution of anti-democratic parties) were necessary to protect the fledgling 
democracies of Europe from the seemingly inexorable march of the totalitarian 
ideologies of both Communism and Fascism.
3
 The subsequent collapse of the Weimar 
Republic into the Third Reich and the post-war Communist takeover of Eastern 
Europe seem in hindsight to provide at least a superficial credence to such analysis. 
As will become apparent throughout this thesis, debates surrounding the legitimacy of 
such restrictions have a relevance which is both contemporary and goes beyond the 
overt issues of violence and totalitarianism. While this thesis will within certain 
contexts allude to and discuss restrictions on political rights such as freedom of 
expression and the right to cast a meaningful vote, its primary emphasis will be on 
limitations to the right of freedom of association and more specifically on legal 
measures designed either to prohibit the formation of specific political parties or 
dissolve existing ones. The main goals of the thesis are twofold. The first is to 
establish a theoretical template against which both the existence and legitimacy of 
specific restrictions can be assessed. The second is to identify circumstances (if any) 
where such legal interventions can be properly justified on democratic grounds.  
 
Clearly, within any democracy, the existence and application of such measures have 
potentially profound repercussions and provoke unsettling questions. 
 
“The dilemma implied…is obvious: isn’t the medicine so strong that 
it will kill the patient? Or, if the remedy is not applied, will the 
patient still survive?”4 
 
A coherent assessment of the democratic legitimacy of any legal intervention requires 
at a basic level both an understanding why democracy is morally preferable to 
alternative systems of governance alongside an identification of the underlying 
principles that sustain and reinforce its normative validity. It is to these first tasks that 
this introductory chapter now turns.  
                                                 
3
 The term Militant Democracy was first coined in 1937. See Karl Lowenstein, ‘Militant Democracy 
and Fundamental Rights’ in American. Political Science Review Volume 31 (1937) it is a theory which 
allows for the restriction of individual democratic rights in order to ensure that democracy as a whole 
cannot be overturned. Its main arguments are examined later this chapter 
4
Sadurski, Op cit, 10 
3 
 
Intro:2 A moral justification of democracy 
 
Democracy, like any system of collective authority is based on a fundamental 
paradox.
5
 As a collective choice procedure, it produces coercive laws that individual 
citizens are expected to both obey and respect even if and when they disagree with 
them. Such coercion ‘requires justification’6 and legitimate questions therefore exist 
as to why recalcitrant citizens should abide by any collective decisions they dissent 
from. At a general level, such a question can only be answered by providing a moral 
justification for democracy itself. An appropriate basis for such a justification is, 
however, itself the subject of contention and debate between two differing approaches 
known as procedural and substantive democracy. The dispute between these 
approaches not only furnishes the quest for a moral justification of democracy but has 
fundamental implications for the more specific question of the legitimacy of party 
prohibition. 
 
Any moral justification of democracy must be at least partially dependent on a clear 
conception of what democracy actually is. A school of thought classifiable as the 
aggregative tradition ‘…has bequeathed a view of democracy in which competing for 
the majority’s vote is the essence of the exercise’7 and therefore the challenge for 
proponents of democracy is to design fair and just ‘rules to govern the contest.’8 From 
within this school, a justification for democracy has emerged which is consequently 
premised on its apparent procedural fairness. Alternatively, a competing conception 
known as deliberative democracy places its emphasis primarily on the ways in which 
the freedoms inherent in the democratic process
9
 help foster a collective deliberation 
which can be utilised ‘…to alter preferences so as to facilitate the search for a 
common good.’10 The significance attributed to the search for a ‘common good’ 
betrays a belief in desirable outcomes indicative of a moral justification of democracy 
premised on its ability to achieve substantive goals and policies. The dispute 
surrounding the validity of the two approaches can be presented as a modern day 
                                                 
5
 Richard Wollheim, ‘A paradox in the Theory of Democracy’ in P. Laslett & W. Runcimann (eds), 
Philosophy, Politics and Society, Second Series, Basil Blackwell, 1969, 84 
6
 Jules Coleman and John Ferejohn ‘ Democracy and Social Choice’ in Ethics, Volume 97(1), 1986, 7 
7
 Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory, Princeton University Press, 2003, 3 
8
 Ibid 
9
 Examples include freedom of expression and association 
10
 Shapiro, Op cit 
4 
 
version of Plato’s Euthyphro dilemma. Are outcomes good because they are 
democratically chosen or democratically chosen because they are good?
11
 
Intro:2:1 Procedural Fairness 
 
The procedural conception bases its justification of democracy on a notion of the 
fundamental equality of persons. In acknowledging the existence of a wide diversity 
of both interests and preferences within a polity, it asserts that the value of democracy 
lies in the fact that it allows each of its citizens an equal opportunity to contribute to 
the making of collective decisions. 
 
“Egalitarian theories attempt to derive a conception of democracy 
from a principle of equality among persons. They acknowledge 
fundamental conflicts of interests and convictions in society and 
assert that because of this lack of consensus, each person may 
demand an equal share in political rule.”12 
Democracy is thus defined as a procedure that allows for the equal expression of 
articulated and informed preferences. By facilitating an equal expression of 
preference, democracy ensures an equal consideration of interests. 
“That each person has a vote; has adequate means to acquire 
understanding of their interests and has the means for making 
coalitions with others as well as getting equal representation in a 
legislature is a publicly manifest phenomenon… The only publicly 
accessible way to implement equal consideration of interests is to 
give each citizen the means for discovering and pursuing his or her 
own interests.”13 
 
However, while such an approach is premised on the idea of human equality, its 
practical application may potentially have negative implications for that very same 
                                                 
11
 Plato, Euthyphro, first published in 380 BC translated by Benjamin Jowett and republished by 
Forgotten Books at www.forgottenbooks.org, 2008, 10-20- The dilemma portrayed by Plato as 
being framed within a conversation between Socrates and Euthyphro poses the question of 
whether ‘the pious are loved by the gods because they are pious or whether they are pious 
because they are loved by the gods.’ 
12
 Thomas Christiano, ‘Democracy as Equality’ in David Estlund, Democracy, Blackwell Publishing, 
2004, 31 
13
Ibid,, 43-44 
5 
 
principle. Firstly, while a formal commitment to one person, one vote and equal rights 
of expression and association suggest an equal consideration of interests, the existence 
of vast disparities of income and wealth as well as educational inequalities within 
democratic polities affects the ability of citizens to participate on an equal basis.
14
 
Next, while the complementary questions of who should participate in collective 
decisions and how much their preferences should count in an aggregative capacity are 
premised on equality, the question of how decisions are then reached has implications 
which at its core is premised on inequality. As will be discussed in more detail later
15
, 
the system of majority rule inevitably privileges the preferences of those in a majority 
over those residing in a minority. Finally, the privileging of the preferences of those in 
a majority may (if unchecked) lead to outcomes which are inherently unequal and 
even unjust. 
 
However, according to proponents of the procedural approach, the policies that are 
produced by democracies are irrelevant. To attempt to impose the achievement of 
substantive outcomes on the democratic process is to attempt to equally satisfy as well 
as to consider interests.  Thomas Christiano has argued that such a task is impossible 
because of a lack of knowledge regarding how to satisfy all interests and a 
corresponding lack of consensus on which interests are important.
16
  Such 
indifference towards outcomes is, as argued above, potentially troublesome. To justify 
democracy merely on the grounds of procedural fairness ignores the possibility that 
there may exist a potential ‘…distinction between a procedure being fair in itself and 
its being designed to produce fair or unjust legislation. An intrinsically fair procedure 
may well produce unjust laws and policies.’17 Consequently, opponents of a purely 
procedural approach argue that a comprehensive justification of democracy must be 
based on an assessment of its propensity to produce fair or just substantive outcomes 
as well as providing a basic equality of input. In other words, democracy should be 
defended not simply on a concern for procedural equality but also with reference to 
the substantive quality of the decisions that it produces. 
 
                                                 
14
 Fabienne Peter, ‘The Political Egalitarian’s dilemma’ in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Volume 
10, 2007, 374-75 
15
 See  Intro:3:2:4 
16
 Christiano, Op cit, 40-42 
17
 William Nelson, On Justifying Democracy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, 156 
6 
 
“It is often said that a democratic state, in order to be fully 
legitimate, must not only issue its laws in a procedurally correct way 
but must also ensure that they comply with certain substantive 
values. Democracy, it is said, not only requires designing and  
following the correct procedures but its laws must in addition 
comply with certain values, such as human dignity, liberty, equal 
concern for all etc., in order to be fully legitimate.” 18 
 
Proponents of such a view subscribe to what can be classified as a substantive 
conception of democracy. As we shall see, however, such a conception by itself fares 
no better than a purely procedural approach in furnishing democracy with an adequate 
moral justification for its existence. 
Intro:2:2 Substantive Democracy 
 
‘Democracy is not a good thing in itself. It is what makes good 
things possible.’19 
 
Those who advocate a substantive justification of democracy believe that democracy 
is a collective choice procedure which tends to produce fair and just outcomes. 
Arguments range from the modest claim that the accountability engendered by 
competitive elections can act as an incentive for governments’ to avoid catastrophes 
such as famine
20
 to the more grandiose assertion that the freedom of debate 
characteristic of a democratic polity is necessary for both the discovery of objective 
truth
21
and individual self-fulfilment.
22
 While these and other outcomes may indeed be 
measured as substantive goods, there are fundamental problems in basing a 
justification for democracy entirely on its ability to achieve specific outcomes. 
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Firstly, such an approach is ‘contingent upon the achievement of non guaranteed goals 
or policies.’23This has consequences for the long term viability of democracy. For 
example, if it can be ascertained that an alternative form of government is just as or 
more likely to produce what are temporally deemed to be desirable outcomes, 
(potential examples include the equation of Fascism with both law and order and a 
strong foreign policy or Communism with economic equality) then the moral basis for 
democratic governance becomes potentially very fragile. As Robert Dahl has argued; 
an insistence on substantive democratic outcomes can quickly degenerate into a 
‘deceptive label for what is in fact a dictatorship.’24 Secondly, to base a justification 
of democracy on its ability to achieve fair and just substantive outcomes ignores the 
existence of deep-seated disagreement concerning which outcomes or policies would 
be constitutive of justice and fairness. 
 
“…all contemporary constitutional democracies are pluralistic, 
meaning that individuals within them disagree over the good. In 
pluralist polities, therefore, politics and political rights are 
concerned not only with implementation of the common good but 
also with handling conflicts among proponents of competing 
conceptions of the good.”25 
 
Whilst acknowledging the existence of a plurality of values and interests within 
democratic polities, deliberative democrats such as John Rawls
26
and Jurgen 
Habermas
27
 have argued that it remains possible to achieve a rational consensus on 
the question of political institutions which are fair and just. 
 
“Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which  
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all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse 
in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common 
human reason.”28 
 
It is doubtful whether such a scenario is achievable. Chantal Mouffe has argued that a 
search for a rational consensus within a democratic polity is inherently flawed. Firstly, 
such a pursuit is exclusionary in that those views which coincide with the consensus 
will be accorded the definition ‘reasonable’ while those which do not will be placed 
outside an orbit of acceptability and deemed ‘unreasonable.’ Such a differentiation 
represents at the very least a dilution of the principle of equal respect. 
 
“For who decides what is, and what is not, ‘reasonable’? In politics 
the very distinction between “reasonable” and “unreasonable” is 
always the drawing of a frontier. It has a particular character and it 
is the expression of a particular hegemony.”29 
 
Secondly, the contention that a rational consensus can be achieved misunderstands 
both the existence and desirability of fundamental disagreement within a democracy
30
 
and consequently neglects the role of passions and collective identities as motivating 
forces for political participation. A consensus based on individual rationality does not 
represent the high point of politics but a limitation and dilution of its real nature. 
 
“What is misguided is the search for a final rational resolution. Not 
only [cannot it] succeed, but moreover it leads to putting undue 
constraints on the political debate. Such a search should be 
recognized for what it really is, another attempt at insulating politics 
from the effects of the pluralism of value, this time by trying to fix  
once and for all the meaning and hierarchy of the central liberal 
democratic values.”31 
 
                                                 
28
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It is contended, therefore, that neither a procedural nor substantive approach can by 
themselves provide democracy with a morally adequate basis for its existence. A 
purely procedural approach undermines its own commitment to equality and is as a 
consequence recklessly apathetic toward outcomes while a merely substantive view 
either conveniently ignores or attempts to transcend the existence of fundamental and 
legitimate disagreement within a democratic polity. Given these inadequacies, there 
exists a need for a more comprehensive and coherent rationalization for democracy 
which combines the principle of equality inherent in proceduralism with an 
explanation as to why such procedures are likely to produce outcomes which embody 
substantive goods. 
Intro.2.3 A balanced approach 
 
In a 2007 work,
32
 David Estlund attempts to steer such a course between the two 
differing approaches. Whilst acknowledging that democracy ‘does seem like a fair 
way to make decisions…’33 he contends that its ‘moral importance’ 34 cannot be 
simply attributed to fairness of procedure. Such attribution can, he argues, also be 
used to justify a coin toss to decide between two policy options or a system of lottery 
or rotation to select office holders. Such procedures are illegitimate because they fail 
to take any account of an ‘epistemic dimension’35 to decision making. Referencing the 
modern jury trial, Estlund contends that citizens accept jury verdicts because a jury 
trial contains ‘considerable epistemic virtues’36 including evidence, testimony, cross 
examination and collective deliberation. Whilst jury verdicts are clearly not infallible, 
their epistemic characteristics give them a moral value 
 
‘So its epistemic value is a crucial part of the story. Owing partly to 
its epistemic value, its decisions are …morally binding even when 
they are incorrect.’37 
 
Therefore, the moral basis for accepting the verdict of a jury is not that their decisions 
are always unquestionably correct but that both the fairness and epistemic dimension 
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inherent within the process makes reaching a correct decision more likely. Similarly, 
democratic decision making can be justified on the grounds that the procedural 
equality inherent in both rights of expression and association and the electoral process 
is not only intrinsically fair  but has a substantive epistemic dimension in that it 
facilitates both an airing of the substantive disagreement intrinsic to modern 
democracies and subsequently a form of collective deliberation which is likely to 
produce informed decisions rather than ones reached by the application of purely 
random procedure. 
 
“Democratically produced laws are legitimate and authoritative 
because they are produced by a procedure with a tendency to make 
correct decisions. It is not an infallible procedure, and there might 
even be more accurate procedures. But democracy is better than 
random and is epistemically the best among those that are generally 
acceptable in the way that political legitimacy requires.”38 
 
Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism succeeds, it is contended, in producing a 
justification for democratic governance which combines procedural fairness with a 
substantive epistemic dimension that acknowledges the existence and indeed 
desirability of open and fundamental disagreement. In doing so, it consequently 
avoids the ambivalence towards unjust outcomes and propensity towards artificial 
consensus characterized by the procedural and substantive approaches respectively. 
The following section of this chapter will build upon Estlund’s attempt to conceive of 
democracy in both procedural and substantive terms by identifying four principles 
which it will be argued are central to both the practical operation of modern 
democracies and the continuing existence of substantive disagreement and 
consequently themselves contain both procedural and substantive elements. 
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Intro.3 Four Guiding Principles  
As has just been argued; any convincing moral justification of democracy requires a 
balance to be struck between procedural and substantive elements which facilitates 
both the existence and continuation of fundamental disagreement. Similarly, an 
exposition of the processes of modern democracy unveils four principles containing 
both procedural and substantive elements which when aligned in a satisfactory 
balance contribute greatly to the maintenance of substantive debate essential to the 
epistemic virtue of democracy. Firstly, Representation can be presented both as a 
procedural response to the size and complexity of modern democracies but also a 
necessary mechanism for reflection of the substantive disagreement that subsequently 
exists therein. Secondly, Popular Sovereignty embodies a substantive commitment to 
the realization of a polity functioning according to the wishes of the people but is 
premised upon a competitive electoral procedure which recognises a diversity of 
interest and preference and consequently a lack of a settled democratic consensus. 
Next, while the principle of Equal Respect acts as a procedural prerequisite for the 
operation of representative elections, it can also be utilized to place limits on the 
substantive outcomes these procedures generate. Finally, the idea of Changeability 
while acting as a fundamental motivation for participation in democratic procedures 
can also be interpreted as a potential substantive threat to those same democratic 
procedures. These principles often complement and reinforce each other. However, 
they can also if applied without qualification pose a concomitant threat to not only 
each other but specific manifestations of themselves. Later in this introductory 
chapter, it will be argued that achieving a satisfactory equilibrium between these 
principles should inform both legislation and case law regarding the specific issue of 
banning political parties. Next, however, the remainder of this section will make a 
more general evaluation of these principles with the dual aim of explaining their core 
assumptions alongside identification of potential tensions and inconsistencies that 
reside both within and between them. 
 
 
Intro:3:1 Representation 
 
“In modern societies, government does not claim to rule the people; 
by electing politicians to act on their behalf, government is 
12 
 
representative of the people. Representative government should 
therefore be viewed as the method by which the people are able to 
govern themselves.”39 
 
Contemporary democracy is primarily representative in nature. Within this paradigm, 
elections are viewed as the predominant mechanism by which the populace can 
control the policies that governments follow. Rather than directly selecting the 
policies that a polity will pursue, voters choose which candidates (or more likely 
group of candidates in the form of political parties), they trust to legislate and/or 
execute laws. There exist various grounds on which voters can base their choice 
including perceptions of competence or ideological affinity. However, while 
representative democracy is increasingly recognised as the dominant mode of 
collective decision making, that does not imply either a historic or contemporary 
acceptance of its universal validity. Its original emergence challenged prevailing 
notions of democracy and its contemporary growth continues to pose questions as to 
what modern democracy is and what it represents. The following couple of sub-
sections will attempt to frame just what some of those issues are. 
 
Intro:3:1:1 A violation of democracy? 
 
The ancient form of decision making known as direct democracy was evident in early 
city states such as Athens.
40
 Such a system involved the making of collective 
decisions by the entire citizenry and subsequently is often perceived as being 
impractical in the large and complex modern states that exist today. The adoption of 
such a perspective while implying the necessity for some form of representative 
government is based on concerns related to convenience and efficiency rather than 
democratic principle. 
 
“It was seen as the practical expression of a simple reality: that it 
wasn’t feasible for all of the people to be involved all of the time, 
even if they were so inclined in the business of government.”41 
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The question that needs to be asked is whether representation is compatible with or 
supportive of democracy in substantive terms or is it simply a necessary and 
convenient procedural dilution of the principle of collective self government?
42
 
 
In terms of fundamental principle, the concept of representation has been criticized as 
a violation of democracy for two main reasons. Firstly, it has been contended that as 
democracy entails ‘choosing for oneself among alternative options for collective 
choice’ then the move from direct to representative government represents ‘the 
transformation of the citizen from direct legislator to conferrer of consent upon the 
choices of others.’43 Secondly, it is argued that as representative parliaments are 
‘arenas of contestation’, they impede the ‘homogeneity of values’ necessary for the 
effective formation of a democratic will.’44  
 
Both of these criticisms are based on invalid assumptions. Firstly, the idea that 
Athenian democracy offered a ‘perfect’ example of democracy in action is mistaken. 
Not only does it ignore the fact that both women and slaves were denied citizenship 
and were thus barred from the processes of collective deliberation
45
, but also that 
random procedures such as lottery and rotation were used to install holders to 
executive office. The existence of such procedures implies that the main difference 
between representative and direct democracy lies not in the number of people chosen 
to govern but their method of selection. As Bernard Manin has argued 
 
‘What makes a system representative is not that a few govern in the 
place of the people but that they are selected by election only.’46 
 
Consequently, representative democracy can be justified epistemically. Firstly, it can 
be argued that the electoral process underlying representation incentivizes responsive 
                                                 
42
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decision making in that those who make the decisions must take account of the wishes 
of their electorate. Also, and in minor qualification of the previous point, it can be 
contended that the more distant nature of representative government is more likely to 
produce responsible decisions as it allows a balance to be struck between decisions 
that are popular in the short term and those which are responsible in the longer term. 
 
“If political responsibility…is a virtue then it could be said that one 
of the functions of representation-and one of its advantages over 
direct democracy-is that it gives its political leaders the distance 
from immediate public pressures that is needed if they are to act in a 
consistent and prudent fashion.”47 
 
Next, the idea that any modern nation state has a single popular will that can be 
ascertained and implemented by government wilfully ignores the incontestable fact 
that contemporary societies contain a number of competing interests and preferences. 
Representative democracy constitutes a procedural recognition not only of the 
existence of substantive diversity but that the fundamental disagreements which are its 
inevitable consequence can only be accommodated and contained if they are given the 
opportunity to be expressed. 
 
‘ …democracy in representative form reject[s] the presumption that 
disagreement [is]undemocratic, that ideally its body politic should 
be indivisible…It [is] a type of polity that encourage[s] the public 
airing of differing interests and opinions, as well as their handling 
through leadership guided by merit.’48 
 
Such a system of government requires mechanisms that reflect and allow expression 
of the disagreements intrinsic to modern societies. One of the most vital of these 
mechanisms is the institution of the modern political party. The precise and detailed 
role that parties play facilitating representation will be discussed towards the end of 
this introductory chapter. However, their simple existence as ‘intermediate institutions 
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between the individual citizen and the state’49 throws up fundamental questions 
regarding the role and responsibilities of an elected representative. 
 
Intro:3:1:2 The Nature of Representation 
 
“Should a member of the legislature be bound by the instructions of 
his constituents? Should he be the organ of their sentiments, or of 
his own? Their ambassador to a congress, or their professional 
agent, empowered not only to act for them but to judge for them 
what ought to be done?”50 
 
The above quotation effectively encapsulates an inherent dilemma of representative 
democracy. This dilemma has been termed as the ‘mandate/independence 
controversy’.51 Effectively, the controversy is reducible to the question of whether 
‘elected representatives should function as ‘delegates’ or ‘trustees’ for those who 
elected them.’52 
 
Those who argue in favour of independence contend that the idea of a legal or moral 
mandate for legislators is misplaced for both instrumental and normative reasons. 
Firstly, in instrumental terms, such a mandate would hinder the quality of or even 
negate the need for deliberation within a legislative setting by effectively forcing 
elected representatives to vote in a way that either their constituents or party 
demanded.
53
 Secondly, it ignores the reality that the laws made by representatives are 
binding on all citizens within a polity and therefore at some level, legislators represent 
the entire polity and not just those who reside in the constituencies which elected 
them. 
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“…we cannot bypass the point of view of the “will of the people” 
and stress only the relationship between the representative and her  
constituency…the particular and the general are both constitutive 
of democratic representation.”54 
 
 This view contends that legislators should take into account the preferences of a 
variety of groups and individuals which include not only the constituents they 
geographically represent and the party on whose platform they were elected but also 
the wishes of the wider polity as well as their own independent judgement. This very 
existence of differing and competing preferences produces in epistemic terms a 
sharing of insights between the representative and the electorate that result in a more 
comprehensive and inclusive process of deliberation. 
 
“Political representatives recognize the existence of competing and 
general interests alongside those of their constituents. And they 
consider whether their constituents’ choices are the best way to get 
what those constituents want. In political representation dialogic 
elements between principal and agent expand, as does the latter’s 
room for manoeuvre.”55 
 
Such a view is not universal. Adherents to a mandate model such as Thomas 
Christiano, whilst acknowledging that elected legislatures should be arenas of 
deliberation, contend that such deliberation should be limited to ways in which the 
pre-determined goals of the electorate can be met. 
 
“Legislative representatives should engage in far-reaching 
deliberation about means to socially determined ends, but that with 
respect to ends themselves, they should act as citizens’ delegates.”56 
 
This raises the question as to which section of the citizenry a representative should act 
as a delegate for. Given the existence of fundamental disagreement within society,  
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any decision taken by elected representatives will inevitably privilege the views of 
one or some sections of society over others. Christiano believes that a representative 
should follow the wishes of those who directly voted for him or her. Political parties 
are in themselves an enhancing feature of such a representative role. 
 
“Assuming that it is clear what the mandated end is, it will also be 
clear…that representatives should be responsible to those who voted 
for them to carry out that mandate. This is feasible in practice…if 
people vote for political parties, each running on platforms that 
conform to alternative ends, and if seats allocated to a legislative 
assembly are proportional to the percentage of votes received by 
each party.”57 
 
The arguments surrounding the independence/mandate controversy are at least 
partially illustrative of the continuing existence of fundamental disagreement. Those 
who argue in favour of independence recognise that a diversity of interests and 
preferences continue to exist beyond their temporary expression at the ballot box and 
that individual legislators should take that diversity as well as their own conscience 
into account while engaging in deliberation. Conversely, those who align themselves 
with the mandate thesis argue that once an election has occurred, while the elected 
chamber should and will inevitably remain an arena of contestation and deliberation, 
the contribution of an individual legislator to that process is to faithfully represent the 
views of the section of the electorate that put them there. This latter argument views 
representative democracy as a modern expression of the wishes of the people and 
elected legislatures as vehicles of articulation of the popular will. As we shall see, it is 
doubtful whether the modern electoral form of democracy attains this goal to any 
effective degree. 
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Intro:3:2 Popular Sovereignty 
 
The principle of popular sovereignty is also intrinsic to contemporary notions of 
democracy. It envisages groups of ‘free and equal’ citizens uniting together to enact 
rules or laws which will advance or provide for the general welfare. These rules are 
legislated for and executed by the people through their representatives who are 
selected through a regular and competitive electoral process. It is this form of 
electoral accountability that ensures that the rules and laws enacted reflect the will of 
the people.
58
 
 
“The legal order…a structure of rules which imposes constraints and 
restrictions on what otherwise would be an individual’s unbounded 
freedom of action…is thus justified on the ground that to all intents 
and purposes, it is a set of laws that the people have given 
themselves.”59 
 
The conception of a ‘people’ as an entity that can express its collective will through 
the making of laws was famously articulated by Rousseau in the 18
th
 Century.
60
 
Rousseau argued that the incorporation of an individual into a collective identity 
would leave them ‘as free as before’61 as long as they had the opportunity to 
participate in the formation of the general will.
62
 However, while the formation of 
such a will may have seemed a relatively simple proposition in the small, 
homogenous communities idealised by Rousseau, it is an infinitely more complex 
undertaking in the vast, heterogeneous societies that exist today. Contemporary 
conceptions of popular sovereignty must therefore provide answers to two basic 
questions. Firstly, who are the people and secondly, what is it that they are actually 
deciding upon. 
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Intro:3:2:1 Who are the People? 
If democracy is to be at least partially defined in terms of popular sovereignty, in that 
the people rule, the idea of ruling implies both an object and a subject. 
 
“Hence, the rulers in a democracy, the people are also the ruled...So 
the meaning of the word ‘democracy’ can be given…as being that 
the people rule themselves.”63 
 
Defining who ‘the people’ are is not a simple task. As Sartori has pointed out, the 
simplest definitions are neither applicable nor desirable.
64
 For example, defining the 
people in terms of an entire polity ignores the reality that all democracies exclude 
specific groups of people such as minors and non-citizens from the right to vote.
65
 At 
the other extreme, to define ‘the people’ as simply a collective entity or an organic 
whole endangers the individual freedoms central to democratic government. 
 
“From the people as an organic whole it can easily be inferred that 
each individual counts for nothing; in the name of the whole, each 
and all can be crushed one at a time, and behind the formula “all as 
a single one” we glimpse the justification of totalitarian autocracies, 
not of democracies.”66 
 
Given the size and complexity of modern democracies and the corresponding 
existence of a myriad of competing interests and preferences, the idea of a unanimous 
popular will is utterly unworkable. A more nuanced and realistic approach entails the 
adoption of a collective decision procedure which recognises the existence of 
substantive disagreement but provides a mechanism for at least its temporary 
resolution. The procedural paradigm adopted by most democracies is to extol the 
principle of majority rule as expressed through the mechanism of regular and 
competitive elections. Majority rule is often justified on the basis of a conception of 
equal respect. Firstly, it is effectively neutral between persons in that everyone’s’ vote 
is counted equally irrespective of either their status or whether their motives are 
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selfish or ameliorative.
67
 Majority Rule is also neutral between change and status quo 
in that it is ‘positively responsive’ meaning that ‘a collective choice in favour of an 
alternative [is] more likely as opinion moves in favour of that alternative.
68
 Therefore, 
in attempting to answer the question ‘who are the people’, contemporary democracies 
define the popular in popular sovereignty as consisting of a temporal and therefore 
changeable majority. The next logical question which is left unanswered by such a 
definition is just what exactly do ‘the people’ have choice over? 
 
Intro:3:2:2 What are ‘the people’ choosing? 
 
Again in reference to the size and complexity of modern democracies, it is widely 
accepted that the general populace do not have either the time or capacity to make 
direct decisions on every issue of collective importance. Despite there being periodic 
occasions where specific issues, most notably those of constitutional significance
69
 are 
decided by the people directly through the use of referenda, the primary function of 
the electoral process in the modern era is the installation of candidates to executive 
and legislative office whilst providing the citizenry a degree of choice in doing so.
70
 
Two other inextricably linked roles that Richard Katz attributes to the electoral 
process are the conferral of legitimacy upon office holders and the fostering of 
popular representation. 
71
  These functions are clearly based upon the notion that 
officials are empowered by the public to act ‘for them, or in their place.’72 The 
centrality of this relationship is an essential component of democracy. 
 
“Unless officials are representative in this minimal sense, the 
resulting government can make no claim to be democratic. Elections 
are the institutions by which the represented authorize their 
representatives to act for them, so no system can be democratic 
without elections.”73 
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Political parties are unquestionably a necessary mechanism in this process and as is 
the case with their function of articulating a diversity of preference, their role in the 
aggregation of a ‘popular will’ will be discussed later. Despite the role played by 
parties in the aggregative process, or even partially because of it, modern 
representative elections are an imprecise mechanism. Rather than accurately reflecting 
the popular will over a range of issues, elections function ‘… merely to give the 
people a choice between alternative conceptions of the public interest.’74   The 
dominant contemporary institutional expression of popular sovereignty can therefore 
be characterized as merely a temporal view of the majority on which group of 
candidates in the form of a political party are offering policies and solutions consistent 
with their conception of the common good. However, the actual outcomes produced 
by modern elections cast fundamental doubts on whether even this diluted conception 
of the popular will can be consistently attained. 
 
Intro:3:2:3 The myth of Majority Rule 
 
As has already been indicated, the representative nature of modern democracies and 
the subsequent absence of direct referenda make it practically impossible to ascertain 
whether a specific policy has majority support at the time of implementation. Majority 
rule is therefore primarily defined in reference to the allegiance voters have to the 
‘highly aggregated alternatives offered by political parties’.75 Even within this 
qualified paradigm, it is doubtful whether majority rule is ever truly achieved. Even if 
one were to ignore the growing evidence of low voter turnout in elections
76
, it is 
doubtful whether modern elections even give an accurate translation of the party 
preferences of those who do bother to vote. Recent research shows
77
 that only rarely is 
a governing majority correspondent with the preferences of the majority of electors. 
For example, in the cases of countries with single member constituencies, governing 
majorities were produced by a plurality rather than a majority of voters by an almost 
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six to one ratio.
78
 Alternatively, in countries with more proportional systems, while a 
governing majority was produced by the preferences of the majority of the electors in 
more than half the cases; this was overwhelmingly in the form of coalition 
government. As coalition governments are almost always produced by ‘bargaining 
between parties’79 after the election, it is very likely that the subsequent governing 
majority is ‘not one created by the voter’s expressed preferences.” 80 The creation of a 
governing majority helps perpetuate the myth that the policies of elected governments 
represent an accurate barometer of the public will. It is contended, therefore, that the 
contemporary equation of popular sovereignty with rule by the majority is mistaken 
on an evidentiary basis. At a more fundamental level, it can also be argued that in its 
contemporary identification with the implementation of the preferences of an alleged 
majority that an unqualified commitment to popular sovereignty potentially threatens 
other values fundamental to democracy. 
 
 Intro:3:2:4 A threat to Democracy? 
 
At a fundamental level, the principle of majority rule inevitably places the interests of 
those in the majority ahead of those of the entire polity. Stanley Benn has argued that 
while a practical application of such a principle would oblige an elected government 
to legislate for the policies it promised the electorate at the ballot box,
81
  a more 
sinister corollary of such a view would be to infer that as a new government is 
representative of the popular will, then it would be undemocratic to oppose or attempt 
to impede their actions.
82
 Such a situation, it can be argued, threatens the rights of 
those who find themselves in a minority.
83
  
 
“…it is only a short step from proclaiming the sovereignty of the 
people to claiming the unlimited authority of its elected 
representatives, to proscribing opposition, and to denying 
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individuals any rights other then those which the government with 
majority support deems fit.”84 
 
Contemporary examples of such violations have been documented by academics such 
as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way
85
 in relation to countries such as Milosevic’s 
Serbia and Putin’s Russia where it is argued that the legitimizing instrument of 
elections co-exist with violations of the ‘minimum criteria’ of democracy such as  
rights of expression and association. These occur with such frequency that they 
‘create an uneven playing field between government and opposition.’86 Other critics 
go further. Sartori argues that an unrestrained commitment to majority rule will not 
only threaten the rights of a temporal minority but potentially the continued existence 
of democratic government altogether. Such a contention has clear historical 
antecedents in the form of Nazi Germany. 
 
“Establishing the absolute right of the majority to impose its will on 
the minority, or minorities amounts to establishing a working rule 
that works, in the longer run against the very principle that it extols. 
If the first winner of a democratic contest acquires unfettered 
…power, then the first winner can establish itself as a permanent 
winner. If so, a democracy has no democratic future and ceases to 
be a democracy at its inception; for the democratic future of a 
democracy hinges on the convertibility of majorities into minorities 
and, conversely of minorities into majorities.”87 
 
These criticisms betray a concern that while the existence of an electoral mechanism 
as an expression of the popular will is undeniably a central requirement of any polity 
aspiring to the status of a democracy, a narrow emphasis on electoral outcomes 
potentially undermines as well as upholds other essential democratic values. Firstly, 
while elections uphold the principle of representation  by affording the electorate the 
opportunity to choose who will make decisions for them, it is also evident that 
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electoral outcomes rarely express a majority of popular preferences in relation to 
either the composition of government or the policies that such a government may 
implement. Secondly, while the existence of elections offer the prospect of change 
and their procedural operation is based on the concept of an equal citizenry, an 
unconstrained commitment to respect electoral outcomes potentially poses immense 
practical and theoretical challenges to the principles of equal respect and 
changeability. The next two sections of this chapter will attempt to elucidate these 
principles and analyse their implications both in respect of each other and with regard 
to both representation and popular sovereignty. 
 
Intro:3:3 Equal Respect 
 
To claim that political equality is a necessary condition of democracy is to make a 
statement which would be considered by many to be self evident. What such a 
statement does not illuminate, however, is the question of what political equality 
actually does or should consist of in practice.  As was contended earlier this chapter, 
what it clearly does not denote is a commitment to equality of welfare or an equal 
satisfaction of interests. Such a goal while representing a legitimate aspiration and 
arguably a legitimate outcome of the processes of deliberative and electoral processes 
is not intrinsic to democracy as a system of governance. To define democracy in such 
terms would be to remove the substantive disagreement that necessitates collective 
decision making in the first place. 
 
“Democracy is a method for making collective decisions in which 
everyone has an equal right to play a role…the principle of equal 
well being is not concerned by the method by which decisions are 
made…Such equality of well being may be a good thing, but it is 
not the same as democracy…Again, to use a well worn illustration,  
equal well being is compatible with the institution of benevolent 
dictatorship.”88 
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Given also that there are inevitable disagreements within a democratic society over 
both the form and outcomes of  collective choice procedures, political equality in the 
guise of equal participatory rights has been characterized  a ‘fair compromise’89 
between those who are in disagreement. However, the notion of a fair compromise 
ignores the fact that a commitment to democratic decision making inevitably 
privileges the specific preferences of those who already favour it. 
 
“…it is not true that giving each an equal say will constitute any 
compromise at all; the democrats will have their way while the 
aspiring oligarchs will get nothing. The fair compromise in this case 
should be some mix of democracy and oligarchy.”90 
 
Again as previously discussed, the procedural equality inherent within democracy is 
based upon the notion that each individual citizen has an equal opportunity to have 
their interests and preferences considered. On a practical level, this requires not only 
an equal opportunity to influence collective choices through the mechanism of the 
vote but also rights of association and expression which facilitate arenas of collective 
deliberation necessary to allow the casting of votes to be based on informed 
preferences. 
 
Intro:3:3:1 Equality and Majority Rule 
As has already been indicated, the system of majority rule prevalent in contemporary 
democracies can be defended on egalitarian grounds in that it establishes an equal 
right to vote and attributes equal weight to that vote regardless of motive or status.  
Systems of majority rule therefore exemplify a commitment to equality of input or 
procedure or what has already been termed an ‘equal consideration of interests.’91  
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Despite its concern with a procedural equality of input, the logic underlying majority 
rule will result in choices premised on inequality. By its very name, majority rule 
privileges the interests and preferences of those who consist of a majority over those 
who reside within the minority. On a fundamental level, therefore, the outcomes 
produced by majority rule are likely to have ‘inegalitarian implications.’92 While 
inequality of political outcomes may be undesirable from the standpoint of social 
harmony, they are inevitable given the existence of disagreement. As Harrison has 
noted 
 
“Some people, it is true, do not have control. This, however, is a cost 
which has to be paid if we are to have any government at all.”93 
 
From both a democratic and egalitarian standpoint, a major concern regarding the 
inevitability of inequality in political outcomes is that they may be utilized to remove 
or undermine the procedural equality inherent to majority rule. Such a process could 
remove the very basis of democratic governance itself. 
 
“…democracy means that the people govern themselves each as a 
full partner in a collective political enterprise so that a majority’s 
decisions are democratic only if certain further conditions are met  
that protect the status and interests of each citizen as a full partner in 
that enterprise.”94 
 
Those further conditions are often given moral and legal expression in the concept of 
enforceable rights. 
 
Intro:3:3:2 Equal Rights and Democracy 
 
The concept of individual rights is premised on equality. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights opens with ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
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inalienable rights of all members of the human family.’95 Proponents of a principle 
known as either ‘equal concern’ or ‘equal respect’96 argue that the preferences of all 
individuals have a relatively equal moral worth and that, consequently, it is the 
responsibility of the State to ensure the continuing right of each individual to express 
those preferences. This requires not only the equal opportunity to influence collective 
choice procedures but also protection from collective choices which may threaten or 
undermine those equal opportunities. These protections are to be given institutional 
expression by the observance of a system of individual or minority rights. 
 
“…democracy conceived as a majority rule limited by minority 
rights corresponds to the people in full, that is, to the sum total of 
majority plus minority. It is precisely because the rule of the 
majority is restrained that all the people…are always included in the 
demos.”97 
 
The crux of this argument is that in order to ensure that all citizens are given a voice 
then the enforcement of collective preferences must be limited to allow for the 
continued participation of those who may find themselves in a minority. Those who 
advocate individual rights as a means to that end contend that at the very least, this 
requires a commitment to political rights such as freedom of expression and  
association which are viewed as being both necessary to and contingent upon the 
continuation of democratic government. 
 
“…that it is true that the rights of liberty have been from the 
beginning the necessary condition for the correct application of the 
rules of the democratic game, it is also true that the development of  
democracy has become successfully the principal instrument in the 
defence of the rights of liberty.”98 
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From the perspective of liberal democracy, other theorists go further. In A Theory of 
Justice
99
, John Rawls identifies two principles of Justice which rationally self 
interested individuals
100
 would choose from behind a veil of ignorance.
101
 From the 
perspective of democracy, the first principle is the most relevant. 
 
“Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of 
liberty for all.”102 
While acknowledging the existence of a wide variety of differing conceptions of the 
good
103
, Rawls asserts that his system of equal basic liberties by allowing for both 
rational dialogue and equal respect will facilitate the emergence of an ‘overlapping 
consensus… of reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines in a society 
regulated by it’ to which holders of divergent conceptions of the good can adhere 
to.
104
 
The specific rights that such a ‘reasonable’ consensus may yield are given expression 
in the writings of Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin dismisses the majoritarian form of  
democracy which he views as a merely procedural mechanism in favour of a 
conception described as ‘partnership democracy’105that is seen as being integral to 
human dignity. Dworkin argues that while human dignity requires individuals, by the 
act of voting, to be equal partners in the making of binding collective choices, it also 
requires that certain rights remain out with collective control and be a matter of  
individual autonomy. At the very least, these include not only the basic rights of 
political participation but also the right to life, rights of protection against torture or 
cruel and inhuman treatment and freedom of thought, conscience and religious belief. 
Dworkin also argues that due to their legal training and ability to engage in moral 
reasoning, these rights should be constitutionalized and placed in the interpretive 
hands of the judiciary. 
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“We may better protect equal concern by embedding certain 
individual rights in a constitution that is to be interpreted by judges 
rather than by elected representatives, and then providing that the 
constitution can be amended only by supermajorities.”106 
 
In pursuit of the goal of equal concern or respect, liberal theorists defend justiciable 
individual rights as a mechanism for placing limitations on the collective outcomes 
and potential inequalities that electorally produced majorities can enforce. In 
opposition to this view, it is possible to contend that the utilisation of such means for 
the protection of equality goes beyond not only the placing of reasonable limitations 
on the outcomes of popular sovereignty but also transgresses the very concepts of 
equal respect and changeability upon which their adoption is premised. 
 
Intro:3:3:3 The trouble with rights 
 
Firstly, while the desire to protect equal participatory rights for all from their potential 
revocation by a temporal majority is a noble goal, it remains unclear why, in this 
regard, a democratic polity should privilege the judgements of an unelected judiciary 
ahead of the populace and their elected representatives. The adoption of such a 
position not only represents a qualification of the principle of popular sovereignty but 
a comprehensive violation of it. As even a prominent supporter of the mechanism of 
judicial review, Alexander Bickel, has argued, its deployment presents supporters of 
democracy with what he describes as a counter-majoritarian difficulty.
107
 The striking 
down by an unelected court of legislation emerging from a popularly elected chamber 
not only ‘thwarts the will of the representatives of the actual people of the here and 
now’,108 it also indicates that power is being exercised ‘…not on behalf of the 
prevailing majority but against it.’109 
 
Secondly, the constitutionalization or legal entrenchment of rights at least partially 
negates the existence of disagreement which makes the existence of majority rule 
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necessary in the first place. As Jeremy Waldron has argued
110
, there exists enough 
broad and legitimate disagreement over what constitutes justice to invalidate any 
attempt to establish a coherent moral justification for constraining the outcomes of 
majoritarian procedures by judicial review. In a democratic society, there exists 
massive controversy as to which rights should be protected
111
and how specific rights 
should be interpreted.
112
 Constitutionalization or the legal entrenchment of rights is 
suggestive of a consensus that more than likely does not exist.  
 
“…we cannot say…that the whole point of rights is to ‘trump’ or 
override majority decisions. For rights may be the very issue that the 
members of the society are disagreeing about, the very issue they 
are using majority voting to settle.”113 
 
Next, this chapter has previously argued that it is mistaken to base a moral 
justification of democracy primarily on its tendency to produce substantive outcomes 
whose desirability is subject to contestation. Consequently, given the existence of 
fundamental disagreement concerning both the importance and content of specific 
rights, the establishment of a system of judicially created rights which are enforceable 
against popularly enacted legislation is potentially iniquitous. The entrenchment of 
specific rights amounts to the effective exclusion of those who disagree with the 
values underpinning such rights from the ability to influence relevant areas of public 
policy. Such exclusion in the pursuit of an artificial consensus can be classified as 
constituting an effective denial of equal respect. To go further, the placing of 
interpretive power in the hands of an unelected judiciary indicates an attitude towards 
the electorate and their representatives which is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
concept of equal respect upon which the idea of individual rights is premised. 
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“…there is a certain tension-perhaps even a poignant contradiction-
in arguing that we require decisions about the nature of rights to 
taken out of the hands of legislators or of the people as a whole, by  
virtue of the fact that we cannot trust them to act responsibly-that is, 
with the gravity and concern for humanity that provided the 
justification for considering people to possess rights in the first 
place.”114 
 
 
Finally, to entrench specific rights is to place them beyond popular revision. Such a 
process invalidates one of the central purposes of democratic decision making since 
ancient Athens
115
  which has been to modify law in order to improve society and 
promote the common good. While entrenchment of individual rights may arguably 
serve a ‘constitutive purpose’ …such as the protection of ‘the conditions of 
democratic decision making’116, it can also simultaneously act as a  
means of ‘preserving privileges and power asymmetries.’117, therefore threatening not 
only political equality but also the democratic principle of changeability. 
 
Intro:3:4 Changeability 
 
“When democracy takes hold of people’s lives, it gives them a 
glimpse of the contingency of things. They are injected with the 
feeling that the world can be other than it is-that situations can be 
countered, outcomes altered, people’s lives changed through 
individual and collective action.”118 
 
A fundamental inspiration underlying democratic participation is that of 
changeability. The idea that peoples’ lives and prospects can be improved on both an 
individual and collective level has acted and continues to act as a powerful motivation 
for activity within the democratic process. This section will concentrate on two 
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aspects of change which it is argued are fundamental to the democratic process. 
Firstly, the opportunity that elections provide for a government to be removed by its 
people and replaced by a more popular alternative will be briefly discussed. Secondly, 
and more fundamentally, the opportunities for legal change which electoral 
mechanisms provide will be analysed from a democratic perspective. 
 
 Intro:3:4:1 Change in Government 
 
The most obvious change that elections allow for is a change in government. Western 
democracies periodically allow their citizens the opportunity to remove those in office 
from power. As previously discussed,
119
 it is doubtful whether representative elections 
accurately reflect the will of the people on specific issues. What they do allow the 
citizenry, however, is an opportunity to pass judgement on those in office by either 
renewing their mandate or replacing them with alternative leaders or groups. The 
possibility of removal behoves those elected to office to pay at least cursory attention 
to the views of the electorate. 
 
“…democracy strives to control winners…by offering real 
incentives to losers. Democracies introduce a strong element of 
randomness in the patterns of winning and losing. They ideally 
require that individuals and whole groups are sometimes winners, 
sometime losers. Democracies therefore thrive on the selection of 
those who decide matters of government and civil society through 
free, fair and frequent elections…”120 
 
The prospect of change that democratic elections offer, however, is not limited simply 
to a change in relevant personnel. They also allow for the possibility of a change in 
direction in both the specific policies implemented within and overall aims followed 
by a democratic polity. To give a couple of recent examples, while there is no doubt 
that the UK general election in 1979
121
 and the US Presidential election of 2008
122
 are 
historically noteworthy because of who they put in office, their real historical 
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significance may be in the change of direction they signified in the priorities of the 
relevant polities.
123
 It can therefore be argued that the most fundamental change that  
democracies offer its citizenry is not the regular rotation of leaders but fundamental 
economic and social changes at least partially achieved by relevant legislation. 
 
Intro:3:4:2 Legislative Change 
 
The idea of legislative or statutory change within a democracy normally denotes the 
modification of pre-existing rules through a majority decision reached within an 
elected legislature. Such a notion has been around for a while. 
 
“…the idea that an assembly can modify law in a deliberate (and a 
deliberative) fashion has been a critical feature of discussions of 
popular government for centuries.”124 
 
From both a philosophical and democratic perspective, the continuing availability of 
legal change can be asserted on the grounds of fallibility and legitimacy. With respect 
to fallibility, the availability of legal change was defended by earliest legal 
philosophers on the grounds that while the natural law emanating from a divine 
creator is eternal and unchangeable, law created by humans is, by contrast, temporal 
and changeable because ‘human reason is mutable and imperfect.’125  
 
From a modern perspective, the ‘grounding of a defence of flexible law’126 on the 
basis of human fallibility has been defended by Melissa Schwarzberg. She argues in 
opposition to Dworkin and Sartori that such a contention is more respectful to 
minorities than the institutionalization of a judicially enforceable set of legal 
protections. 
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“…that the law may be wrong not only signals to the minority that it 
is potentially revisable, but that through argumentation, they may be 
able to persuade the majority of the rightness of their views. Indeed, 
the commitment to fallibility may indeed reflect a norm of equal 
respect more closely than the entrenchment of rights designed to 
enshrine such respect.”127 
 
It is also opined that the opportunity for an outvoted minority to revisit decisions and 
potentially change them gives the process a degree of democratic legitimacy. This 
view is premised on a conception of democracy which reveres both debate and 
contention and views majority rule as a mechanism by which collective decisions are 
made on the presumption that deliberations surrounding these decisions can be 
resumed at a later time.  As Schwartzberg again puts it 
 
“The legitimacy of democratic decisions… requires that [they] 
emerge from a deliberative process open to all, which, by virtue of 
the nature of the ‘indeterminacy of justice’ and the need for a 
decision, must be concluded. Its enduring validity, however, 
depends upon the capacity of the minority to reopen debate at some 
point in the future and to try again to persuade the majority of the 
correctness of their perspective.”128 
 
Intro:3:4:3 Change as a threat to Democracy 
 
Logically, however, there can be no guarantee that the changes implemented by newly 
elected legislatures will be fair or just. As a result, concerns expressed with regard to 
the principle of changeability echo those surrounding popular sovereignty. An 
unconstrained commitment to changeability potentially threatens democratic 
procedures in exactly the same ways as a similar commitment to popular sovereignty. 
The concern expressed by critics of a purely procedural approach is that electorally 
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successful political movements will be able to (in the absence of legal limitations) use 
the freedoms inherent within democracy to revise not only the policies followed by  
previous democratically elected governments but also remove the minimum 
conditions for continued democratic decision making. 
 
“… a specified list of individual rights should be made immune to 
revision. This list should include, first and foremost, rights that are 
indispensible to democratic legitimacy.”129 
 
The logic underlying a call for entrenchment of such rights is that because procedural 
justifications of democracy display a dangerous ambivalence towards democratically 
produced outcomes which may threaten the continuation of procedural equality, there   
is a necessity to impose substantive limits on democratically produced outcomes in 
order to protect the fairness intrinsic to democratic procedure. Protecting procedural 
equality is perceived as being vital to the continuing availability of the processes of 
representation and popular sovereignty which while imperfect are intrinsic to the 
continuing availability of substantive disagreement and thus change. In essence, limits 
have to be placed on changeability to protect its continuing availability. 
 
Intro:3:5 The Four Principles and Disagreement 
 
It is evident that the four principles discussed above are intertwined in a relationship 
that is mutually reinforcing and yet simultaneously challenging and potentially 
threatening. With regard to their reinforcing characteristics, perhaps their most 
significant common thread is their contribution to the continued existence of 
substantive disagreement which is central to the epistemic quality of democratic 
decision making. To elaborate on earlier themes: Representative democracy 
constitutes a procedural recognition of the impossibility of unanimity given the 
complexity of interest and preference prevalent in modern polities. Those interests 
and preferences are afforded consideration within the system by the existence of equal 
political rights such as freedom of expression and association which allow the 
citizenry to continually influence the processes of collective deliberation and through 
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the right to vote where citizens directly contribute to collective choice procedures. 
While it is true that elections as the primary instrument of popular sovereignty provide 
a means for the temporary resolution of substantive disagreement, the relatively 
regular incidence of elections signify to those unfortunate enough to find themselves 
within the temporal minority that a change in both government and legislative 
priorities continues to be attainable and it is the prospect of substantive change which 
serves as a motivation for continued democratic participation.  
 
Despite their interdependence, it is also evident that an unqualified commitment to 
any one of these principles potentially threatens the continuing applicability of others 
and consequently the capacity for debate and disagreement depends in large part on 
the balance that is struck between them at any given time. A regular example of this is 
that many democracies through the mechanism of a written Constitution have 
established a set of judicially enforceable political rights such as freedom of 
expression and association. These can be viewed as an institutional invocation of the 
principle of equal respect which is designed to prevent the representative organs of 
popular sovereignty from implementing substantive changes which threaten the long 
term applicability of all four principles. However, there exists an alternative approach 
which while pursuing similar aims advocates the utilisation of radically different 
means. Instead of the overt invocation of the principle of  equal respect, this approach 
pursues  temporary dilution of it in order to ensure that specific democratic majorities 
are unattainable and consequently substantive outcomes judged to be deleterious to 
democracy are not only never implemented but are not even pursued. This specific 
dilution of procedural equality is centred on a radical restriction of the right of 
freedom of association in the form of prohibiting or dissolving political parties which 
are deemed to pose a specific threat to the democratic polity. The deployment of such 
a strategy is potentially highly contentious as it removes from the relevant polities, 
specific manifestations of vehicles in the form of political parties which are essential 
to the epistemic virtues of democratic decision making.  The remainder of this chapter 
will discuss in general terms the legitimacy of such an approach. Firstly, it will 
acknowledge the importance of political parties to democracy generally and to the 
four principles previously identified. It will then proceed to address the question of 
when (if ever), it is justifiable for a democratic polity to prohibit or dissolve specific 
manifestations of such an essential democratic mechanism. It will argue that just as a 
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moral justification of democracy requires a balance between procedural and 
substantive elements, an appropriate response to the question of party prohibition 
necessitates a similar balance to be struck between procedural and substantive 
approaches which facilitate the retention of as much substantive disagreement as a 
democracy can be reasonably expected to stand. 
 
Intro:4 Political Parties and Democracy 
 
“While political parties have been long neglected in the 
constitutions of western liberal democracies, in the post-war period 
their relevance for democracy became more widely acknowledged 
also in constitutional terms, to the point that pluralism, political 
participation and competition in many contemporary democratic 
constitutions have come to be defined almost exclusively in terms of 
party. Indeed, and despite their relatively recent appearance on the 
political stage, parties have put an extraordinarily strong mark on 
contemporary democratic politics, to the point that twentieth century 
democracy can be best described as ‘party democracy’.”130 
 
1:4:1The Growth of Parties 
 
From a practical perspective, the legal right of freedom of association is essential to 
modern democracy. The primary reason for this is that it allows for the formation of 
‘competitor parties’ which are central to the opportunity for the citizenry of any polity 
to ‘replace the party in government with a rival political association.’131 This has not 
always been the case. Whilst the formation of rival political associations is often 
rendered illegal in non-democratic regimes, it has not always necessarily followed 
that the absence of political parties ‘indicates a non-democratic system of 
government.’132  As previously referenced, the form of government practiced in 
Ancient Greece 
133
 known as direct democracy expected individual citizens to directly 
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participate ‘in the legislative and judicial functions of the state’134 in a manner that 
required the subordination of private interest ‘to the pursuit of public functions and 
the general good of the community.’135 The contemporary absence of such a system 
alongside the increasing dominance of representative forms of government can be 
primarily attributed to the (in historical terms) relatively recent growth of large scale 
political communities in the form of nation states. These new type of polities 
entertained an increasingly diverse array of economic and social interests and 
preferences. This not only made the direct and active participation of every citizen in 
all decisions impractical but also contributed to the emergence of associations which 
reflected that complexity of interest.
136
 However, the emergence of these new vehicles 
of association was originally met with a degree of hostility by 18
th
 century advocates 
of democracy. Philosophers, such as Rousseau,
137
 viewed parties as an expression of 
narrow partisan interest which would work against the formation of a democratic 
general will. It was not until the early twentieth century and a comprehensive 
extension of the franchise that political parties were afforded a ‘positive normative 
connotation’138 with regard to democracy.   
 
“It was the advent of mass democracy which made direct links 
between the state and the individual increasingly unrealistic and 
which thus served to legitimize the existence of parties as 
intermediary institutions between individual citizens and the 
state.”139 
 
This aura of legitimacy increased throughout the twentieth century. Ingrid Van Beizen 
has noted an increasing trend for previously totalitarian societies such as Germany 
and Italy (in the immediate post war period) and the post Communist polities of late 
20
th
 century Eastern Europe to define modern democratic politics in terms of the 
ascendancy of parties. 
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“While parties were not necessarily seen as inevitable, let alone 
desirable, political institutions when they first emerged, they have 
now become firmly rooted in the established democracies and have 
rapidly acquired relevance in more recently established democracies 
in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world, to the point that they 
are widely seen as a sine qua non for the organization of the modern 
democratic polity and for the expression of political pluralism.”140 
 
The contention that political parties are a central mechanism intrinsic to a healthy 
democracy is not only reflected within national polities but is also recognised within 
international human rights law. A clear example of this can be found in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Firstly, the Court has 
explicitly stated that the scope of protection afforded by the Convention right to 
Freedom of Association
141
extends to political parties. 
 
“…political parties are a form of association, and that in view of the 
importance of democracy in the Convention system, there can be no 
doubt that political parties come within the scope of Article 11.”142 
 
With respect to the ‘importance of democracy’, the Strasbourg Court has stated that 
democracy represents ‘the only political model contemplated by the Convention and, 
accordingly, the only one compatible with it.’143 Political parties are considered not 
only worthy of protection but are perceived to play ‘a primordial role’144 within a 
democratic regime. The following section will provide substance to the contentions of 
both Van Beizen and the Strasbourg Court by detailing the different ways in which 
political parties give weight to and help provide balance between the four principles 
previously identified. 
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Intro:4:2 Political Parties and the Four Principles 
 
Four principles vital to substantive disagreement and thus the epistemic virtues of 
democratic government have been identified as representation, popular sovereignty, 
equality and changeability. The argument advanced earlier has been that while these 
principles are crucial to any understanding of the operation of modern democracies, 
an unrestrained commitment to any can potentially pose threats and challenges to the 
others. Therefore, the health of modern democracies depends to a large extent on a 
proper balance being struck amongst and between these principles.  It is contended 
that as political parties are essential mechanisms of modern democracy, they 
consequently play a crucial role in striking that balance. The roles and functions they 
perform are both numerous and complementary. 
 
Firstly, with regard to representation, political parties play an indispensable role in 
the original and continuing articulation of diverse interests and preferences that exist 
within the complex polities of the contemporary world. They act as a mechanism by 
which individuals are able to unite and collectively give expression to shared interests 
and ideas. As early as the final years of the 18
th
 Century, James Madison argued that 
uneven levels of property ownership would lead to an inevitable difference of 
economic interest which would then be reflected in the formation of competing 
political factions.
145
 From a British perspective, the emergence in the 19
th
 century of a 
two party system which reflected the interests of both the aristocracy and the 
bourgeoisie and the subsequent challenge to it in the early years of the twentieth 
century by a party representing the interests of the industrial working class
146
offers 
convincing subsequent evidence for Madison’s claim. The existence of political 
parties cannot, however, be attributed simply to the existence of economic inequality. 
The 20
th
 and early years of the 21
st
 Century have also seen the emergence of political 
parties throughout the democratic world whose ideologies and philosophies constitute 
an articulation of social and political values which are primarily non-economic. 
Examples include parties whose main focus is the protection of the environment such 
as the Greens, those who wish greater self government for their nation or region such 
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as the Scottish National Party and Bloc Quebecois in Canada, and those of a religious 
nature which include the Christian Democrats in Germany and AKP in Turkey. The 
existence of such parties as well as those whose origins are economically based are an 
institutional outcome of economic and social diversity and the inevitable 
disagreement that proceeds from it. The function of parties in this regard is not only to 
reflect the existence of disagreement but to mobilize the passions and beliefs that 
underlie such disagreement towards democratic participation. 
 
In respect of popular sovereignty, parties play a central role in facilitating the election 
of governments who represent (however imprecisely)
147
 a temporary expression of the 
people’s will. One specific function is the aggregation of interests and preferences. 
Aggregation ‘refers to a…process by which parties bundle together the diverse 
demands of a variety of social groups.’148 Such a process is potentially troublesome as 
it may require a ‘prioritization of demands’149 alongside attempts to maintain a unified 
coalition amongst different groups whose own priorities ‘may be in tension with each 
other.’150 Despite the potential problems inherent in the aggregative process, it is vital 
if a specific party aspires to another role that parties play within democracies, that of 
being a conduit through which governments accede to power.  
 
With regard to the formation of governments, political parties offer the individual 
voter both a selection of candidates and a set of policy proposals which he or she can 
contrast with other parties. In doing so, parties help to ‘structure the voting choice’151 
and help convert the aggregated preferences of voters into the election of a 
government. Once a government has been formed, a continuing task of political 
parties is to ensure that the government remains accountable to the public. This can be 
achieved in a couple of ways.
152
 Firstly, the governing party’s actions can be 
evaluated against the promises it made at election time. Secondly, a failure to match 
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promises with action may result in a transformation of electoral preferences facilitated 
by the existence of competing parties with alternative proposals. 
 
“…the government carries out the kind of policy programme with 
which the governing parties identified themselves at the previous 
election; their incentive for doing so lies in the need to face re- 
election and the prospect of having to retain the support of their 
electorates.”153 
 
With regard to the maintenance of democratic equality and changeability, the 
existence of political parties is again a necessary ingredient. As was conceded earlier, 
the system of majority rule inherent in popular sovereignty potentially threatens the 
rights of those who may find themselves in a temporal minority. In order to protect 
continuing access to and participation within the political system, limitations in the 
form of legal rights can be placed on the enforcement of collective preferences. The 
right of freedom of association as given institutional expression in the form of 
political parties fulfils at least two further functions. Firstly, it contributes to the 
protection of equality by allowing for the continuing articulation and expression of 
preference by those who are unfortunate enough to reside in a temporal minority. 
Secondly, political parties constitute ‘a necessary condition’154of changeability. By 
providing the electorate with an alternative set of candidates for legislative and 
executive office as well as acting as a mechanism for the articulation and aggregation 
of complex interests and preferences, political parties offer individual citizens within 
a polity both the prospect of a change in government as well as a change in legislative 
outcomes.  
 
For these numerous reasons, political parties are essential to both the effective 
functioning and long term sustainability of democratic governance. Consequently, it is 
contended that attempts to enforce either a legal prohibition on the formation of a new 
party or a legal dissolution should only be made under exceptional circumstances. As 
the next section illustrates, however, there is no consensus on what constitutes an 
exceptional set of circumstances. 
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Intro:5 The question of Party Prohibition 
 
With respect to the question of when parties can be either legally prohibited or 
dissolved, the Council of Europe (the parent body of the European Court of Human 
Rights) has set guidelines that err unmistakably on the side of caution 
 
“The prohibition or dissolution of political parties as a particularly 
far reaching measure should be used with utmost restraint. Before 
asking the competent judicial body to prohibit or dissolve a party, 
governments or other state organs should assess, having regard to 
the situation of the country concerned, whether the party really 
represents a danger to the free and democratic political order or to 
the rights of individuals and whether other less radical measures 
could prevent the said danger.”155 
 
Such caution arguably constitutes a reflection of the recognition of the central role 
that political parties play within modern polities. This centrality, however, is 
potentially a double edged sword. As Eva Brems has acknowledged
156
, there is an 
argument that because popular political parties often have the ability to realize their 
aims in government, more convincing arguments may exist to prohibit them than 
other organizations, especially if their aforementioned aims are deemed to be 
illegitimate. Interestingly, a similar argument has been utilized by the Strasbourg 
Court to uphold a specific dissolution. 
 
“It is in the nature of the role they play that political parties, the only 
bodies which can come to power, also have the capacity to influence 
the whole of the regime in their countries By the proposals for an 
overall societal model which they put before the electorate and by 
their capacity to implement these proposals once they come to 
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power, political parties differ from other organizations which 
intervene in the political arena.”157 
 
This penultimate section of this chapter will illustrate the lack of consensus 
surrounding these questions by contrasting and evaluating the two main relevant 
schools of thought relating to party prohibition. It will be evident that the relevant 
debate mirrors that which was concerned with a moral justification of democracy. 
Firstly, the debate is between adherents of either a procedural or substantive approach. 
Next, it will become apparent that both approaches betray similar weaknesses as were 
prevalent within their justifications of democracy. The procedural approach seems 
recklessly unconcerned with outcomes while the substantive view is too ready to 
dilute procedural equality on the premise of protecting an artificial consensus.  
 
Intro:5:1 Procedural Approach 
As indicated previously, the procedural approach to democracy is dismissive of the 
notion that the interests and preferences of an entire citizenry can be equally satisfied 
on the grounds that there exists a lack of the necessary knowledge, resources or 
consensus to achieve such a goal. Therefore, the most that can be achieved is an equal 
consideration of individual and collective interests and preferences.  Consequently, 
democratic procedures must allow for the expression and possible implementation of 
ideas and preferences that challenge and even threaten orthodoxies such as the 
existence of democratic governance itself. 
 
“I reject the notion that one should build into democracy any 
constraints on the content of the outcomes produced, such as 
substantive equality, respect for human rights, concern for general 
welfare, personal liberty or the rule of law. The only exceptions (and 
these are significant) are those required by democracy itself as a 
procedure.”158 
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Ian Cram argues that the modern democracy that ‘comes closest to manifesting the 
attributes of a procedural view of democracy’ is the United States of America.159 As 
will discussed in the final substantive chapter, First Amendment Jurisprudence 
emanating from the Supreme Court has tended to focus primarily on the right to 
freedom of expression. With regard to political expression, it has long been 
established that restrictions are only justified if the expression in question is deemed 
to represent a clear and present danger to the United States.
160
The leading modern 
authority on what constitutes a clear and present danger is the Brandenburg case.
161
It 
interpreted clear and present danger  in such a way as to suggest that political 
advocacy must be afforded the protection of the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution unless it can be proved to be ‘directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to produce such action.’162 With respect to the right of 
freedom of association which is not explicitly guaranteed within the First 
Amendment, the Supreme Court established in a subsequent case
163
 that the principles 
propounded in Brandenburg applied not only to individuals but to ‘state regulation 
burdening access to the ballot’ and to ‘rights of association in the political party of 
one’s choice.’164 Applying the Brandenburg template, it is evident that both 
individuals and political parties are conferred a wide degree of latitude in respect of 
their rights of political advocacy. The idea that political parties could or should be 
dissolved on the basis of ideology is constitutionally unthinkable. As Dan Gordon has 
pointed out, American Courts have 
 
‘…uniformly denied the constitutionality of restrictions on political 
expression merely on the basis of a party’s platform, no matter how 
undemocratic.’165 
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The relatively wide toleration of subversive advocacy afforded in the United States is 
(it shall be argued later) partially attributable to the relative stability of American 
democracy and its two party system. Consequently, such an approach might not be 
appropriate to countries or jurisdictions whose history bequeaths a dissimilar, more 
fragile political context.
166
 Given the fragile commitment to democracy evidenced in 
the modern history of many countries, critics of a procedural approach contend that 
such a method is recklessly protective of rights of expression and association in that it 
 
“...opens up the possibility that a democratic system of government 
might be overthrown under the established democratic route of 
success at the ballot box. It is important to recognise that capture by 
non-democratic groupings might occur even where the non-
democratic party fails to secure a majority of seats in the legislature. 
The classic example of such an undermining from within is 
provided by the rise of the National Socialist Party in 
Germany…”167 
  
The coming to power of the Nazis in Germany by democratic means despite 
advocating an explicitly anti-democratic ideology and acquiring just over a third of 
the votes at the previous election illustrated the dangers of affording equal procedural 
rights to those who would use them in order to gain the authority to then deny them to 
others. It was in response to this catastrophe that a theory emerged from within a 
substantive paradigm which whilst acknowledging the role of parties within the 
democratic process allows for prohibitions on specific manifestations of these 
institutions in the name of upholding democracy. 
 
 
Intro:5:2 Militant Democracy 
Militant Democracy is a theory which was originally articulated by Karl Loewenstein 
in the late 1930s as a response to the seeming inability of western democracies to 
protect themselves from the onward march of the totalitarian ideologies of both 
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Communism and Fascism.
168
 Loewenstein argued with specific reference to Weimar 
Germany that a traditionally procedural approach to democracy had irresponsibly 
afforded toleration of extremist parties who had subsequently used the freedoms 
inherent within democracy to destroy it from within. 
“Democracy was unable to forbid the enemies of its very existence 
the use of democratic instrumentalities…democratic 
fundamentalism and legalistic blindness were unwilling to realize 
that the mechanism of democracy is the Trojan horse by which the 
enemy enters the city. To Fascism in the guise of a legally 
recognized political party were accorded all the opportunities of 
democratic institutions.”169 
Loewenstein’s solution to such potential weakness was to propose that democracies 
arm themselves with constitutional and legislative protections that allow for 
restrictions on the political rights of those opposed to his own substantive conception 
of democracy. 
 
“In this sense, democracy should be redefined. It should be…the 
application of disciplined authority, by liberal minded men, for the 
ultimate ends of liberal government: human dignity and 
freedom.”170 
 
 
While Loewenstein’s critique concerning the weakness of Weimar Germany  and his 
desire to protecting democratic systems of governance from those who wish to 
destroy them from within both have historical validity, his chosen method of the 
widespread adoption of constitutional and legal restrictions on political parties in 
pursuit of this goal raises legitimate concerns. Firstly, the existence of legal 
restrictions on political parties suggests an acceptance of the idea that the State may 
legitimately construct ‘a boundary’ around the notion of political participation and 
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subsequently exclude those who are judged to be on ‘the wrong side’ of it.171 Such an 
acceptance helps illuminate an essential contradiction at the heart of militant 
democracy. It is prepared to sacrifice specific democratic values for the purpose of 
upholding others. 
 
“Paradoxically, for a system that is committed to the value of 
tolerance, the state needs to act intolerantly towards those who do 
not subscribe to this value and other core precepts such as the equal 
worth and dignity of each individual, the rights of minorities, the 
rule of law and freedom of expression.”172  
 
Next, just as adherence to a substantive justification of democracy ‘raises the problem 
of disagreement on the objectives and ideals the legal and political system should 
[pursue] and observe’,173 there is a possibility that legal restrictions up to and 
including dissolution may be visited upon political parties on the basis of values that 
have not acquired universal acceptance and are subject to legitimate contestation and 
dissent. For example, Loewenstein’s  redefinition of democracy as a means to the 
‘ends of a liberal government’174 presupposes a consensus within a democratic polity 
that characterizes liberal aims as unquestionably reasonable and conversely, goals or 
policies which contradict these aims as illegitimate. A concern here is that parties 
would potentially be vulnerable to prohibition not because they constitute a tangible 
threat to the continuing existence of democratic governance but that they simply 
represent a challenge to what Paul Harvey has called ‘the dominant national 
ideology.’175 The utilisation of prohibitive measures in such circumstances, it is 
contended constitutes not an upholding of democracy but a substantive limitation of 
the fundamental disagreement that provides the epistemic virtues inherent in 
democratic decision making. 
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From a more ‘militant’ perspective, while it is acknowledged that legal measures of 
prohibition and dissolution do represent a temporary deviation of democratic 
principle, this acknowledgement is outweighed by the proposition that a temporary 
deviation may be necessary to protect those very same principles in the long term.  
 
“A constitution is not a prescription for suicide, and civil rights are 
not an altar for national destruction….”176 
 
This thesis will argue that in order for a party prohibition to be morally and legally 
justified, the prospect of constitutional suicide must be both theoretical and practically 
plausible. Not only must the specific party in question be ideologically indisposed to 
the principles of democratic governance but it must also pose a realistic threat to the 
continuation of democratic governance and fundamental disagreement with reference 
to the likelihood of it acquiring power and then implementing an anti-democratic 
agenda.  As John Rawls has argued 
 
“The conclusion, then, is that while an intolerant sect does not itself 
have title to complain of intolerance, its freedom should be 
restricted only when the tolerant sincerely and with reason believe 
that their own security and that of the institutions of liberty are in 
danger.”177 
 
If the continuation of a democratic system of governance is seriously jeopardized by 
the continued operation of a political party, then restrictions up to and including 
prohibition must be considered and may be necessary. The problem with a generally 
‘militant’ approach is that it can present and has (as will be evidenced later) presented 
the prospect of a ‘constitutional suicide pact’ as justification for the suppression of 
parties which do not pose a direct and quantifiable threat to democracy but merely 
possess an ideological antipathy towards values which are not fundamental to 
democracy but which may be associated with it within specific contexts. Legal 
prohibitions of specific political parties represent a substantial limitation of the scope 
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of fundamental disagreement within a democratic society. It is the contention of this 
chapter that such a limitation should only ever be applied to protect the long term 
availability of similar disagreement. Limitation of disagreement in pursuit of a 
consensual acceptance of a specific conception of democracy represents a dilution of 
the very aspect of democracy that provides its epistemic virtue and thus its moral 
basis. A failure to acknowledge the extent of legitimate disagreement within a polity 
may consequently lead to a general disaffection with and retreat from the political 
process which may endanger its very fabric. 
 
“A well functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of 
democratic political positions. If this is missing there is the danger 
that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a 
confrontation among other forms of collective identification, as it is 
the case with identity politics. Too much emphasis on consensus and 
the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with 
political participation. Worse still, the result can be the 
crystallization of collective passions around issues, which cannot be 
managed by the democratic process and an explosion of 
antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility.”178 
 
 
Intro:6;Conclusion: Prohibition and the Four Principles 
 
This introductory chapter opened with the contention that neither a purely procedural 
nor entirely substantive approach is sufficient to furnish democracy with an adequate 
moral justification. Referencing David Estlund’s theory of democratic authority, it 
argues that a convincing justification requires a balance to be struck between 
procedural and substantive arguments; in this case a recognition that the procedural 
equality inherent within democratic decision making facilitates the existence of 
substantive disagreement central to a collective deliberation epistemically superior to 
simply ‘fair’ or random procedures. It then proceeded to identify four principles 
crucial to an understanding of the operation of modern democracy; representation, 
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popular sovereignty, equal respect and changeability. These four principles all contain 
procedural and substantive elements and when aligned in a proper balance, they both 
reflect the existence and facilitate the continuing existence of disagreement necessary 
to democracy’s epistemic virtues. Conversely, if out of balance, it is conceded they 
pose a potential threat to each other specifically and to democracy in general. 
  
With regard to the specific issue of party prohibition, it is evident that the adoption 
purely of procedural or substantive criteria towards the permissibility of prohibitions 
on political parties suffers from similar weaknesses as are exhibited by the two 
contrasting approaches when applied towards constructing a moral basis for 
democracy. A purely procedural approach seems blind to the possibility that 
unrestricted equality of procedure has been and may in future be utilized to give effect 
to undesirable outcomes such as the abolition of an entire system of democratic 
government. Conversely, an insistence that democracy is merely a means towards 
particular substantive ends potentially allows for the suppression of parties that do not 
share those substantive goals. Consequently, a more nuanced approach is necessary. 
If, as has been argued, democracy can be at least partially understood with reference 
to the four  principles of representation, popular sovereignty, equality and 
changeability then an evaluation of the legitimacy of prohibitions on associations such 
as political parties (which play an essential role in the attainment of these principles) 
should include an assessment of the effect that specific measures have on the balance 
between them. To some extent, it can be argued that any attempt to restrict the 
operation of specific political parties represent a violation of all four principles in that 
political parties are crucial to at least their partial attainment. However, it is also true 
that prohibitions are often undertaken with the purpose of protecting one, some or all 
of these principles. What must also be taken into account is the fact that although the 
idea of political rights is universal, the specific factors of time and place imbue 
specific manifestations of these rights with their own special concerns. This reality 
alongside the complexity of the relationships between the four principles require, 
therefore, a case by case evaluation which takes into account not only an assessment 
of the ideological threat that political parties may present to a satisfactory balance 
between democratic principles and but also a measure of the actual threat they pose 
within a specific political context to the continuation of democratic governance and 
substantive disagreement.  
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“Ultimately…the aim of suppressing threats to the existence of 
embattled democracies must be to secure the prospect of democratic 
renewal whereby the capacity of citizens to reject their rulers is 
preserved.”179 
 
The opening two substantive chapters of the thesis will examine two jurisdictions 
where the deployment of a militant approach is clearly evident. Firstly, within Turkey 
(which has a long history of party prohibition), the case of Refah Partisi will be 
considered. The legal banning of Refah whatever its merits represented a highly 
invasive legal intervention within the democratic polity as it removed a party which 
had recently been the senior partner in a coalition government. Next, the case of a 
much smaller party, Batasuna, in Spain will be analysed. While the influence of each 
party was a diverging factor, another main point of difference is that Batasuna was 
banned with reference to methods it was alleged to implicitly endorse while Refah’s 
dissolution was based mainly around its alleged commitment to what were perceived 
as illegitimate ideological goals. What unites the two cases is that both prohibitions 
were later upheld by the European Court of Human Rights. The next two chapters will 
analyse jurisdictions which have armed themselves with a variety of ‘militant’ 
legislative provisions but who for differing reasons have failed to effectively enforce 
or utilise them. Firstly, those countries such as Germany in the immediate post war 
period and the new democracies emerging from behind the Berlin Wall after 1989 will 
be examined. The utilisation or non-utilisation of measures throughout these 
jurisdictions is it will be argued more explicable in terms of political climate rather 
than judicial reasoning. This is in contrast to the following jurisdiction of Israel where 
explicit legislative provisions allowing for the utilisation of militant measures  can be 
contrasted with the manifestly procedural approach taken by its Supreme Court in its 
interpretation of them. The final two case studies encompass jurisdictions which have 
primarily followed a procedural approach to the question of curtailing political rights. 
Firstly, the approach taken by the relevant authorities in the United Kingdom will be 
discussed and then followed by an examination of relevant jurisprudence emanating 
from the United States’s First Amendment. It will be evident that in terms of 
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constitutional protection while political rights in the two countries operate within very 
different contexts; there are similarities in that the focus of relevant restrictions have 
tended to concentrate on individuals rather than collective groups such as political 
parties. 
  
Aside from the specific issues that each jurisdictional context presents, the general 
approach of the thesis to is to argue that an assessment of the legitimacy of specific 
restrictions must balance the challenge that they present to the existence of 
substantive disagreement against the intensity of the threat that inaction would leave 
that epistemic necessity vulnerable to. Using the four guiding principles identified in 
this chapter, it is contended that a proper balance within any context must both reflect 
and facilitate the continuing existence of fundamental disagreement necessary to 
democracy’s vitality. 
 
“…the prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions 
from the sphere of the public, in order to render a rational consensus 
possible, but to mobilize those passions towards democratic 
designs.”180 
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      CHAPTER 1 
 
The entrenchment of Secularism: Refah Partisi v Turkey 
 
1:1: Introduction 
 
In 2009, the Council of Europe which is the parent body of the European Court of 
Human Rights published through an advisory body known as the Venice 
Commission
181
 an opinion highly critical of the propensity within the Turkish polity 
to initiate and execute measures leading to the dissolution of political parties. 
 
“Because the substantial and procedural threshold for applying the 
Turkish rules on party prohibition or dissolution is so low, what 
should be an exceptional measure functions in fact as a regular 
one…The Venice Commission is of the opinion that within 
democratic Europe these strict limitations on the legitimate arena for 
democratic politics are particular to the Turkish constitutional system, 
and difficult to reconcile with basic European traditions for 
constitutional democracy.”182 
 
The Venice Commission was rightly in the view of this thesis expressing concern about 
the relative regularity of party prohibitions within Turkey in comparison with other 
European democracies. Its concern was related to both procedural and substantive 
concerns. While the substantive reasons for prohibitions occupy most of the 
consideration of this chapter, it is evident that procedurally the historic ability of the 
Turkish Constitutional Court to ban parties on a barely qualified majority after referral 
by a public prosecutor leaves parties more vulnerable than is the case in other 
democracies. The catalyst for the Venice Commission’s opinion was an attempt in 2008 
by the Turkish authorities to legally dissolve the political party known as the Justice and 
Development party (AKP) which was and remains the party in sole control of the 
                                                 
181
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Turkish government.
183
  In the view of the Venice Commission, a successful prohibition 
in this case may have been ‘…seen as a threat to democracy and as an attempt at 
disenfranchisement of a large part of the electorate.’184 The main focus of this opening 
substantive chapter is the case of Refah Partisi. This case it is argued is illustrative of 
two worrying trends. Firstly, the illegitimate scope afforded to Turkish authorities to 
dissolve political parties. Secondly, in upholding the decision to dissolve, there has been 
a failure in the immediate post 9/11 era by the Strasbourg Court to engage with political 
Islam in a way that allowed for continuing fundamental disagreement. 
 
1:2: Refah Partisi 
 
In January 1998, the Turkish Constitutional Court formally dissolved the political 
party known as Refah (Welfare).
185
 Within a Turkish context; this step was neither 
radical nor unprecedented. In the time period between the adoption of the Turkish 
Constitution of 1982 and the dissolution of Refah, fourteen other parties had been 
subject to prohibition.
186
 What was unprecedented about the Refah decision (at the 
time) was that it concerned a party that had won a plurality of votes at the previous 
parliamentary election and had served as senior partner in a coalition government for 
a year up to almost exactly the time of dissolution. 
 
“By any standard, the dislodging of a government from office is a 
radical intervention in democratic political life by a national court. It 
took the notion of ‘militant democracy’, the measures permissible to 
defend democracy from being subverted through electoral politics, 
to a new level.”187 
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Another unusual aspect of the Refah case (given the later attitude of the Venice 
Commission) was that the dissolution was upheld by the European Court of Human 
Rights on two occasions.
188
 This was in contrast to the three previous occasions when 
dissolved Turkish parties had taken their cases to Strasbourg. On all three 
occasions,
189
 the Court had found that there had been a violation of the Article 11 
right to freedom of association.
190
 
 
This Chapter will argue that the Strasbourg decisions to uphold the Refah dissolution 
are inherently flawed. Firstly, it will argue that the evidentiary basis for the 
dissolution was at best incomplete. Secondly and more fundamentally, it will contend 
that the implications of the decision represent a violation of the previously identified 
four guiding principles most notably with regard to the principle of equal respect in 
relation to political Islam. 
 
1:2:1 Background 
 
Refah Partisi or Welfare Party was an Islamic Political party founded in 1983. 
Between its inception and the mid 1990’s, it regularly participated in subsequent 
national and local elections and grew in popularity for a variety of reasons.
191
The 
zenith of its electoral fortunes was achieved in 1995 when it gained 158 out of 550 
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seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
192
In 1996, the party became the senior 
party in a coalition government and its chairman, Necmettin Erkaban, became Prime 
Minister of Turkey
193
until both were ousted from power in July 1997 in what was 
effectively a military coup.
194
 
The second article of the Turkish Constitution states that Turkey is a ‘democratic, 
secular and social state.’195 The Constitution later identifies boundaries for the 
acceptability of statutes and programmes of political parties. 
 
“…The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political 
parties shall not be in conflict with the independence of the state, its 
indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human rights, the 
principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, the 
principles of the democratic and secular republic; they shall not aim 
to protect or establish class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of 
any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime.”196 
 
If a political party is adjudged to be a ‘centre’ of activities which transgress these 
boundaries, it subsequently becomes vulnerable to prohibition.
197
 After an application 
by the Chief Public Prosecutor in May 1997, the Turkish Constitutional Court 
formally dissolved Refah in January of the following year.
198
 The decision stated that 
as ‘Secularism was an indispensable condition of democracy in Turkey’,199 Refah’s 
actions constituted a threat to Turkish democracy on three grounds. These were the 
advocacy of legal pluralism, the intention to introduce Islamic or Sharia law into the 
general law and the advocacy of the use of jihad or holy war to bring about their 
goals.
200
 In response, the Party lodged an appeal to the European Court of Human 
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Rights on the grounds that the dissolution amounted to a violation of their Article 11 
right to freedom of association. 
 
1:3 The Strasbourg Judgements 
 
1:3:1: Overview 
As referenced in the introductory chapter, the European Court has consistently 
claimed that political parties not only come within the protection of Article 11
201
 but 
that their essential role within modern democracies entail that prohibitions should 
only be made under exceptional circumstances.
202
 From this perspective, the critical 
attitude adopted by the Venice Commission makes perfect sense. It notes inter alia 
that the regular deployment of dissolution procedures within Turkey implies that such 
actions are ‘not in effect regarded as an extraordinary measure, but as a structural and 
operative part of the constitution.’203 It then proceeds to contend that the wide use of the 
instrument can also be partially explained by the fact that a ‘striking feature of the 
Turkish rules on party closure is that they combine a very long list of material criteria for 
prohibition or dissolution with a very low procedural threshold.’204 The combined effect 
of these factors is one that ‘reduces the area for democratic politics’205  in a way that 
prevents ‘…the emergence of political programmes that question the principles laid 
down at the origin of the Turkish republic.’206 The Venice Commission clearly views the 
high incidence of dissolutions within the Turkish polity as an affront to the principle of 
political pluralism. This distaste is reflected in the fact almost all Turkish dissolution 
cases that have been argued before the ECtHR have been found to constitute a violation 
of Article 11 rights. The glaring omission to this trend has been Refah Partisi. How 
exactly did the Court square its commitment to political pluralism with an upholding of 
this specific dissolution? 
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 During the Refah Case, the Court affirmed that ‘drastic measures such as the 
dissolution of an entire political party ‘…may only be taken in the most serious 
cases.’207 However, it also argued that 
 
“By the proposals for an overall societal model which they put 
before the electorate and by their capacity to implement these 
proposals once they come to power, political parties differ from 
other organizations which intervene in the political arena.”208 
 
Such reasoning, as Eva Brems has argued, represents a qualitative shift in emphasis. 
Political parties as a necessary component of democratic governance deserve a high 
level of protection but because they have the potential to directly realize their aims in 
government, there may be more convincing arguments to prohibit them than other 
types of association.
209
 The application of similar logic allowed the Chamber to assert 
by a narrow 4-3 margin that the dissolution of Refah did not constitute a violation of 
the applicant’s Article 11 rights,210 a judgement that was upheld unanimously by the 
Grand Chamber in a subsequent ruling.
211
 
 
These decisions were based on a number of factors. One was a proposal by the party 
to introduce a plurality of legal systems. This was interpreted by the Chamber as an 
infringement of both the neutral role of the state as a guarantor of rights and freedoms 
and of the principle of non-discrimination.
212
Another was the refusal by the Party to 
condemn or discipline individual members who had publicly hinted at the 
acceptability of violent methods as part of an overall strategy.
213
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“(…) acts and speeches revealed Refah’s long-term policy of setting 
up a regime based on sharia within the framework of a plurality of 
legal systems and that Refah did not exclude recourse to force in 
order to implement this policy and keep the system it envisaged in 
place.”214 
 
 
With specific regard to democracy, the Court based its decisions on two distinct but 
complementary lines of reasoning. In the original decision, the Chamber claimed that 
as an Islamic Party, Refah held an allegiance to Sharia law which was incompatible 
with respect for the principles that underlay the Convention. Politically, Sharia as a 
religious ‘dogma’ was perceived as a threat to the Convention principle of political 
pluralism. 
215
 With regard to other potential civil liberty issues, it was the Chamber’s 
contention that Sharia ‘clearly diverges’216 from the Convention in matters concerning 
criminal procedure and the role of women and that consequently ‘it is difficult to 
declare one’s respect for human rights while…supporting a regime based on 
Sharia.’217 This argument was reinforced by the Grand Chamber in its subsequent 
affirmation of the Chamber’s decision.218 
 
Having argued that Refah’s principles were inherently incompatible with the 
Convention, the Court proceeded to argue that Refah constituted a practical as well as 
an ideological threat to democracy. In a combination of history and demography, the 
Chamber contended that the previous existence of a theocratic regime,
219
 the 
preponderance of Muslims
220
 within the country and the popularity of Refah at the 
time of dissolution
221
 made the establishment of a regime based on Sharia ‘…neither 
theoretical nor illusory but achievable.”222 
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The Grand Chamber then went on to develop an argument heavily influenced by a  the 
theory known as Militant Democracy.
223
  As previously discussed,this theory emerged 
during the inter-war years as a response to the rise of Fascism and Communism and 
argues that in order to protect a system of democratic governance; States should take 
steps to restrict the political rights of anti-democratic forces. The influence of this 
theory with regard to the decision to uphold evidenced by the Courts assertion that 
democracy has been historically vulnerable to ‘totalitarian movements organised in 
the form of political parties’.224 It then proceeded to argue that States should have the 
right to launch a pre-emptive strike against those it deems to pose a threat to 
democratic government.
225
With specific reference to Refah, it asserted (with the use 
of election results and opinion polls) 
226
that the party posed a real and identifiable 
threat to democracy and consequently, its dissolution was within Turkey’s margin of 
appreciation.
227
 
 
The remainder of this chapter will subject the Court’s reasoning to detailed and 
critical scrutiny. It will assert that not only does the Court fail to identify a sufficient 
evidentiary basis for upholding the dissolution but that the implications of its 
reasoning have profound repercussions for fundamental tenets of democracy. 
 
1:3:2: Insufficient Evidence 
 
1:3:2:1: Advocacy of Violence 
 
Firstly, with respect to the advocacy of violence, the Chamber examined a number of 
references by prominent members of Refah (including Mr Erkaban) to a strategy of 
jihad or holy war as a means of achieving its societal goals.
228
 While the Court 
accepted the dual argument that Refah as a party had pursued its aims through 
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legitimate means and had never officially endorsed jihad or violence
229
 as a political 
weapon, its failure to publicly distance itself from individuals who had made such 
statements were potentially indicative of a form of tacit approval. 
 
“Consequently, Refah’s leaders did not dispel the ambiguity of these 
statements about the possibility of having recourse to violent 
methods in order to gain power and retain it.”230 
 
While it is true that the Venice Commission clearly states that advocacy of or the 
actual use of violence as a means of overthrowing democracy is a legitimate ground 
for dissolution,
231
 the Court in Refah clearly stretches this framework to breaking 
point by including within it a failure to publicly condemn or discipline individual 
members who allude to such tactics.
232
 
 
“Hence the Court takes a broad approach in its appreciation whether 
or not a party promotes violence: explicit calls for violence are not 
required, ambiguity may suffice. Such ambiguity exists in a strong 
form when members advocate violence and the party does not 
promptly react against this.”233 
 
By taking such a broad approach, the Court gives greater weight to the fact that the 
party did not immediately discipline the relevant party members than the fact the 
Refah as a party had never officially used or advocated violent tactics. Such an 
approach suggests that not only is a party’s right to freedom of expression subject to 
limitation but so is the right to say nothing at all.  
 
With regard to how far an individual’s comments can be imputed to a party, the 
attitude of the Venice Commission is again clear 
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“Any restrictive measure taken against a political party on the basis 
of the behaviour of its members should be supported by evidence 
that he or she acted with the support of the party in question or that 
such behaviour was the result of the party’s programmes or political 
aims. In the case that these links are missing or cannot be 
established, the responsibility shall fall on the party member.”234 
 
Again, it is highly questionable how strictly the Court in Refah adheres to these 
principles. Firstly, the Grand Chamber argues that the remarks of Nemcettin Erbakan 
‘could incontestably be attributed to Refah’ due to his ‘emblematic’ role as party 
chairman.
235
 Next, it reaffirms that ‘such acts and speeches are imputable to a party 
unless it distances itself from them.’236 Finally, it dismisses the expulsion by the party 
of three such individuals on the grounds that they occurred only after the beginning of 
dissolution procedures.
237
 It is evident that while the Venice Commission places the 
burden of proof on the prosecutor with regard to the imputability of individual views, 
the Court in Refah places the burden on the party.
238
  It can be argued that with 
respect to whether a political party can be blamed for the views of its members, the 
Court has abandoned two widely held conceptions of justice: these being the right to 
silence and the assumption of innocence before guilt. 
 
1:3:2:2: Threat to Secularism 
 
With respect to whether Refah posed a real threat to the principle of Secularism, the 
Court, it is contended, again assumed too much on the basis of too little. First of all, 
the Chamber broke with previous precedent and failed to take into account the lack of 
a stated challenge to Secularism either within Refah’s Constitution or stated policy 
programmes. 
 
“No reliance was placed either by the Principal State Counsel in 
bringing the proceedings or by the Constitutional Court in 
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dissolving the party on the statute or programme of the party itself 
or on any election manifesto or other public statement issued by the 
party. In particular neither the State Counsel nor the Court was able 
to point to any provision of the statute or detailed programme of the 
party which advocated the creation of a theocratic State or which 
served to undermine the secular character of the State as embodied 
in the Constitution: on the contrary, the programme of the party 
expressly recognised the fundamental nature of the principle of 
secularism.”239 
 
Next, and in a similar vein, ‘… it was decisive that no evidence had been evinced that 
the Party had, in its year of government, done anything to challenge secularism.’240 
The Court argued that policy pronouncements in favour of allowing the public 
wearing of Islamic headscarves and the reorganization of working hours in the public 
sector to accommodate fasting and prayers were “… consistent with  Refah's 
unavowed aim of setting up a political regime based on Sharia.”241  To partially base 
the dissolution of an entire political party on such statements is in the opinion of 
Kevin Boyle ‘extraordinary.’242  The reasoning adopted by the Strasbourg Courts 
seems impervious to the possibility that such measures may enhance rather than 
restrict rights. 
 
“There is certainly no wording in the judgments of either the 
Chamber or the Grand Chamber that acknowledges that either issue 
might raise questions of respect for religious conviction or its 
manifestation.”243 
 
While it seems, therefore, that the evidentiary basis on which the decisions of the 
Strasbourg Court were based is contentious; it is the implications of the Court’s 
reasoning as applied to democracy which are most troublesome. The final section of 
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this chapter will examine the relevant reasoning in detail and contend that it adheres 
to a specific conception of rights at the expense of the protection of those principles 
identified as crucial to the maintenance of substantive disagreement. 
 
1:3:2:3 A Threat to Democracy? 
 
As previously alluded to, Strasbourg based its decisions to uphold on the view that 
Refah posed a twin threat to democracy based on both its ideology and growing 
influence. 
 
 
1:3:2:3:1: Ideology 
Firstly, as has been previously alluded to, the Court ignored the party’s Constitution 
and policy programmes and used ‘scattered statements and symbolic public acts by 
party members of various standing’244 to conclude that Refah intended to impose a 
general system of Sharia Law. Defining Sharia as a monolithic religious dogma, they 
declared that ‘principles of political pluralism in the political sphere or the constant 
evolution of public freedoms have no place in it.’245 The Chamber went on to assert 
that 
 
“It is difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human 
rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on sharia, 
which clearly diverges from Convention values.”246 
 
As Christian Moe has eloquently pointed out, there are a number of flaws inherent to 
such reasoning. Firstly, the contention that Sharia is ‘stable and invariable’247 is 
highly contentious.  Interpreting Sharia as a ‘fixed and homogenous concept’248  
ignores interpretations of Sharia that are ‘plural and diverse, allowing for a 
considerable legitimate divergence of opinion (ikhtilhaf) at any point in time’.249 Such   
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reasoning indicates a view of political Islam which is woefully ignorant of ‘diverse 
interpretations’ of Sharia which are increasingly being applied ‘by Muslims.’250 
 From a historical perspective, Islamic Scholars such as Abu Zayd have argued that 
the history of the Caliphate betrays a struggle for political power predicated on the 
control of religious authority rather than an unquestioning allegiance to it.
251
 
Therefore, democracy and pluralism are potentially compatible with the internal 
workings of the umma or community of muslims. 
 
 
It is necessary to break the monopoly of power, and the monopoly 
of the production of the conscience and the memory on the level of 
peoples from Arab nations and on the level of all the Umma, and 
there is no way to this end unless there is struggle for the 
recognition of pluralism on the level of thought and the level of 
society and on the level of politics. This is a total democracy, 
democracy of reason, democracy of the living represented in the 
equal rights of human beings, in the participation of the fruits of the 
national production, and the political democracy in the right of 
alternance of the authority and the right of participation through the 
social, cultural and political institutions.
252
 
 
Next, the Courts’ reasoning failed to take into account interpretations of Sharia which 
view it as a set of moral principles applicable to the conscience and behaviour of 
individuals rather than a set of legally directives enforceable on an entire polity. Such 
interpretations would view a monolithic Islamic State in negative terms. 
 
“Acts carried out under duress are neither punishable nor 
meritorious. To many Muslims, a totalitarian ideological state 
seeking to enforce Islamic virtue would seem likely only to breed 
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hypocrisy. This insight suggests that the sharia does not require 
private morality to be policed the way it is in Saudi Arabia or Iran. 
This was in fact the position taken by Refah e.g. on headscarves.”253 
 
Thirdly, the Court also showed itself to be unaware of an increasing trend amongst 
Islamic Scholars such as Yusuf Al Qaradawi
254
and Abdullahi An-Na’im255 to endorse 
democracy as a protective mechanism of and necessary precondition for ‘the authentic 
exercise of one’s religion.’256 Finally, the Court’s lack of awareness extended to 
examples of Islamic political leadership which have either successfully contributed to 
the ending of dictatorship (as in Indonesia) or publicly challenged non-democratic 
secular regimes as in the case of Tunisia.
257
 While in the Court’s defence, it may be 
unrealistic to expect them to show expertise in the nuances of Islamic political 
theology, it is that very lack of expertise which should have motivated them to refrain 
from making sweeping generalisations which were then used as a basis for upholding 
prohibition. 
 
“The problem is precisely that the Court nevertheless does venture 
opinions in these fields and bases its judgements upon them.”258 
 
In attributing a monolithic and invariable character to political Islam, the Court 
effectively argues that Sharia represents a threat to principles of political pluralism 
and that restrictive actions may be necessary to protect the pluralism necessary for a 
continuing commitment to equal respect. However, by ignoring alternative 
interpretations of Sharia, it can alternatively be argued that while inspired by a 
commitment to the protection of equal rights, the Court undermines the very principle 
of equal respect which is central to that notion. Firstly, from the perspective of 
political Islam itself, the attribution to Islam of immutability potentially makes them 
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unwitting bedfellows with those who adhere to the very fundamentalism they profess 
to fear. 
 
the Court took it upon themselves, and only themselves, the right to 
declare what is and is not Islamic, leaving no room for others who 
may have a more liberal interpretation of the Shari'a
259
 
 
Also, if the Court was as committed to principles of political pluralism as it 
suggested,
260
 then should it not have viewed the right of religious parties to argue in 
favour of policies reflecting their own world view as worthy of protection? To 
conflate the promotion of potentially illiberal policies with a desire to destroy 
democracy as the Court did in Refah ignores the fact that such a fusion was not 
supported by the official policies of the party,
261
by their actions when in power as the 
senior partner in a coalition government
262
 or by the methods and strategies used by 
the party in the public arena.
263
 Upholding the dissolution of Refah in the absence of 
any such evidence represents another unwarranted interference with the principle of 
equal respect. 
 
“Illiberal Parties need not be anti-democratic. For example, a 
religious fundamentalist party that has the support of the electorate 
of a polity can remain essentially democratic both internally and 
externally, and yet systematically spread illiberalism. Even from the 
standpoint of militant democracy, however, illiberalism is not 
synonymous with anti-democratic, and hence prohibition of illiberal 
parties would not be as justified… as anti-democratic ones would 
be.”264 
 
When one contrasts the decisions reached in the previous Turkish dissolution cases 
where Strasbourg did find a violation of Article 11 rights,
265
one can clearly identify a 
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further move away from the principle of equal respect. The relevant parties all 
advocated, to some extent, a degree of self determination for the Kurdish people 
within Turkey. While these advocacies were viewed by the Turkish authorities as 
constituting ‘threats to the indivisibility of the national and territorial integrity of the 
State’,266 they were not considered by Strasbourg ‘to be inconsistent with fundamental 
principles of democracy.’267 However, in Refah, the advocacy of specific policies 
which challenged a rigid Secularism was viewed as being representative of such an 
inconsistency. This suggests that political advocacies of policies in line with Islamic 
doctrine are afforded less protection than those emanating from other ideologies. 
Kevin Boyle has argued that such a disparity is explainable in terms of the 
contemporary international political context rather than a deep philosophical 
commitment to the protection of democracy. In specifically contrasting Refah with 
United Communist Party, he contends that the finding of a violation of Article 11 
rights in the latter case can be explained by the fact 
 
“…that, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the European 
Court is more relaxed about the promotion of the ideology of 
Communism than the Turkish authorities.”268 
 
Conversely, since the attack on the twin towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 
2001, it is contended that political Islam has become the new bogeyman to the 
democracies of the West with subsequent implications for the political rights of those 
who express support for policies or participate within associations which reside within 
that ideological paradigm. 
 
“ It is difficult to suppress the thought that the endorsement by a 
European-wide court of such a radical intervention in the democratic 
process, as a result of which the choice of a significant percentage of 
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the Turkish electorate was removed from power, was influenced by 
the events of ‘9/11’ and the world we have lived in since then.”269 
 
It is submitted, therefore, that when analyzed in its own terms and in contrast with 
other cases, the assertion that Refah posed an ideological threat to democracy and the 
reasoning thus applied by the Strasbourg Courts signifies an ideological suspicion of 
Islam which in turn betrays (at least within the Turkish context), an excessively 
narrow secular and liberal interpretation of the principle of equal respect. When the 
reasoning behind the assertion that Refah simultaneously posed a practical, imminent 
threat to democracy is also examined, not only is the principle of equal respect seen to 
be violated but so also, are the principles of popular sovereignty, representation and 
changeability.    
 
1:3:2;3:2An Imminent Threat? 
 
In its original decision, the Chamber argued that as Turkey had previously 
experienced theocratic rule and had in terms of the religious beliefs of its population, 
a Muslim majority; it was especially vulnerable to the introduction of a clerical 
system of government. 
 
“the establishment of a theocratic regime, with rules valid in the 
sphere of public law as well as that of private law, is not completely 
inconceivable in Turkey, account being taken, firstly, of its 
relatively recent history and, secondly, of the fact that the great 
majority of its population are Muslims”270 
 
The latter part of this statement betrays significant contempt for political Islam. It 
effectively argues that a country with a majority of Muslims is more likely to be 
amenable to the establishment of a theocracy than countries who do not. It again 
raises the question of whether Islamic political doctrine is afforded equal respect in 
relation to other faiths.  
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“One can only wonder whether the Chamber would extend this 
argument to other religious groups as well, or whether it sees a 
disposition for such political projects as something inherent to the 
nature of Muslims and Muslims only”271 
 
The Grand Chamber subsequently argues that modern history provides clear examples 
of political parties using procedures inherent to democracy in order to substantively 
undermine it. With clear reference to the rise of Nazism and Fascism, it contends 
 
“…that it is not at all improbable that totalitarian movements, 
organised in the form of political parties, might do away with 
democracy, after prospering under the democratic regime, there 
being examples of this in modern European history.”272 
 
While the Court is unquestionably accurate in its assertion that democracy is and has 
shown itself to be capable of destroying itself from within, it is questionable whether 
such an argument should be used as a justification for the dissolution of an Islamic 
party when the historic references used did not emerge from a similar culture. 
 
“We know, from bitter experience, that democracy is capable of 
dissolving itself. This experience, however, derives not from any 
Muslim “theocracy” but from the Weimar Republic in 1933, at the 
heart of “Christian”, West European civilisation.”273 
 
Given that the Court viewed Refah as an ideological threat to democracy, it viewed 
Refah’s success at previous elections and growing support in opinion polls274 as 
evidence of an imminent threat to Turkish democracy. It therefore argued that the 
Turkish authorities were entitled under their margin of appreciation to restrict Refah’s 
right of association under Article 11 of the Convention.
275
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“The Court accordingly considers that at the time of its dissolution, 
Refah had the real potential to seize political power without being 
restricted by the compromises inherent in a coalition. If Refah had 
proposed a programme contrary to democratic principles, its 
monopoly of political power would have enabled it to establish the 
model of society envisaged in that programme.”276 
 
This reasoning represents a clear violation of the principle of popular sovereignty. 
Firstly, by referring to Refah’s growing strength as a basis for prohibition, the Grand 
Chamber was effectively arguing that political parties should be more vulnerable to 
prohibition or dissolution as their popularity increases. Secondly, even if one were to 
accept this militantly democratic contention, the Grand Chamber’s own reasoning 
would negate the prohibition. By using the phrase ‘If Refah had proposed a 
programme contrary to democratic principles’277 it implicitly accepted that Refah had 
proposed no such thing.
278
 In that respect if one were to extend the logic  
applied by the Court to uphold the dissolution, there would be major repercussions for 
the continuing validity of majority rule throughout Europe. 
 
“An extension of the ECHR’s analysis would lead to the inference 
that any political party, with a monopoly of control, should be 
dissolved because its monopoly posed a threat to Turkey’s 
democratic principles.”279 
 
It is also contended that the effects of the Refah decision are deleterious in respect of 
the principle of representation. In modern representative democracies, political parties 
contribute to the effective representation of the citizenry in two main ways. Firstly, by 
presenting candidates for public office, they facilitate the aggregation of expressed 
preferences by the voters into the election of a government. By dissolving a party that 
had attracted a plurality of support amongst the Turkish electorate, the Strasbourg 
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Court was effectively expressing at best, indifference or at worst outright hostility to 
their expressed views. 
 
“…prohibition is a very restrictive measure, because it disregards 
the political choice of a large number of voters; it infringes not only 
the rights of party leaders, but of an increasing number of 
people.”280 
 
Secondly, the representative role played by political parties is not solely concerned 
with the aggregation of expressed preferences. Political parties also play an essential 
role with respect to the original and continuing articulation of those preferences. The 
removal of a vehicle that facilitated a continuing articulation of preferences consistent 
with Islamic beliefs must be viewed with regret. 
 
“…democracy is not essentially concerned with the aggregation of 
individual preferences through the mechanism of voting. Instead, it 
is designed to achieve the potential transformation of preferences of 
an active public realm which enhances opportunities for discussion 
and deliberation. Democracy is not just the will of a majority, but of 
a will that has been formed after wide ranging and free 
discussion.”281 
 
If any conception of a popular will is dependent upon it being realized at least 
partially through wide ranging and free discussion then the Court’s unquestioning 
attitude towards the principle of Secularism has major implications  for another 
guiding principle of democratic disagreement;  that being the principle of 
changeability. 
 
1:4 The Triumph of Secularism 
 
In a previous dissolution case, United Communist Party, the Strasbourg Court argued 
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“One of the principal characteristics of a democracy is the 
possibility it offers of resolving a country’s problems through 
dialogue, without recourse to violence even when they are irksome. 
Democracy thrives on freedom of expression. From that point of 
view there can be no justification for hindering a political group 
solely because it seeks to debate in public the situation of part of the 
State’s population and to find according to democratic rules 
solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. The fact that a 
political programme is incompatible with the current principles and 
structures of a State does not make it incompatible with the rules of 
democracy. It is of the essence of democracy to allow diverse 
political programmes to be proposed and debated, even if that calls 
into question the way the State is currently organised provided that 
does not harm democracy itself.”282 
 
In Refah, this reasoning is turned on its head. The Grand Chamber argues that (in the 
Turkish context), democracy requires a limitation of  expression ‘…that calls into 
question the way the State is currently organised’283 by asserting that any attitude that 
‘fails to respect’ the principle of Secularism would not necessarily ‘…enjoy the 
protection of Article 9 of the Convention.’284 From the perspective of the principle of 
democratic changeability, such reasoning is inherently troublesome. 
 
Firstly, the assertion that Secularism and Democracy are inextricably linked and co-
dependent is not entirely historically accurate. As Christian Moe has pointed out, the 
original Secular republic under Attaturk constituted a one party state and the 
introduction of multi-party electoral contests after 1946 coincided with a relative 
relaxation of secularism.
285
 As a result, it has been contended that rather than pose a 
threat to democracy, Refah merely questioned a temporally dominant conception of it. 
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“It is submitted that Refah did not challenge democracy as such, but 
rather sought to question an ideology imbued in the institutions of 
the State and enforced by the Turkish military. It was for such 
questioning that implicitly challenged the undemocratic control of 
the military over Turkish political development that it was 
removed.”286 
 
In Refah, the Court effectively ‘welded together’287 the principles of secularism and 
democracy. A non-secular regime was viewed as being incompatible with democracy. 
The Court’s inaccurate conception of Islam as a monolith allowed it to uphold the 
assignment by the Turkish authorities of rigorous restrictions on the potential for 
change in the name of protecting a continued right to change. In endorsing the 
constitutionally elevated role of secularism, the Courts have acted as an obstacle to 
the implementation of popular preferences in respect to both the question of who 
should occupy positions of power but also on the general nature of the policies that 
those allowed into power will be permitted to follow. Such a situation is a clear 
violation of democratic changeability. 
 
“If secularism… is an ideology, should it not, under European Court 
standards, compete within democratic society with other 
dispositions? Human rights cannot trump what people regard as 
authentic meaning to such an extent that it imposes an ideology such 
as secularism. Yet this is precisely the position in Turkey, where 
secularism has been imposed through the Constitution for 
generations by a regime that has nevertheless had an unenviable 
record of gross human rights violations.” 288 
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1:5:Conclusion: Refah and the Four guiding Principles 
 
In asserting that the Strasbourg Courts had taken a ‘correct and balanced approach’289 
to the Refah Partisi case, Gregory Tardi expressed the following opinion. 
 
“The conclusion that all democratic states must draw from the Refah 
judgement is that it is dangerous and potentially self-defeating to 
grant democratic rights to political parties that avow that they would 
take away those very rights if they would come to power and would 
then refuse to relinquish power, all in the name of knowing best 
what is right for the entire people.”290 
 
Samuel Issacharoff has also defended the decisions reached in Strasbourg with respect 
to their effect rather than their intrinsic reasoning. In referencing the coming to power 
in 2002 of the AKP ( Justice and Development Party) which is viewed as a ‘far more 
moderate Islamic party’,291 the contention is made that the Refah decision  
 
“…appears to have sparked a realignment in which committed 
democratic voices from the self proclaimed Islamic communities 
found a means of integration into mainstream Turkish political 
life.”292 
 
It is the conclusion of this chapter that both these assertions exhibit flawed reasoning. 
With respect to the former, these flaws are two-fold. Firstly, it is the opinion of this 
thesis that the Courts failed to establish a sufficient evidentiary basis for the argument 
that Refah ever posed an ideological threat to democracy. Secondly, in giving 
disproportionate protection to the Turkish constitutional principle of Secularism at the 
expense of observance of the Article 11 rights of a party that merely challenged 
specific manifestations of that principle, it was the Court rather than the party that 
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were taking away rights ‘in the name of knowing what is best what is right for the 
entire people.’293 
 
With respect to Issacharoff’s argument, the subsequent attempt by Turkish authorities 
to dissolve the AKP
294
 (which only narrowly failed) suggests that while there may 
indeed have been a ‘realignment’ of Islamic political forces within Turkey, the 
continued blind protection of Secularism acts as a potential barrier to observation of 
the four democratic principles identified in the opening chapter. With regard to the 
‘realignment’ of Islamic political forces, Christian Moe has forcefully argued that 
while this may have indeed happened, it is certainly not attributable to the 
‘generalisations…hidden biases and double standards’295 of the Strasbourg Courts. 
 
“It represents is another missed strategic opportunity for the 
socialisation of an Islamic political movement into democratic 
politics, the conversion through the exigencies of political 
participation of Islamists into “Muslim Democrats.” If this transition 
has in fact nevertheless been completed in Turkey through the 
establishment and electoral success of the AK party, it is despite 
rather than thanks to the efforts of the Turkish Government and the 
Strasbourg Court.”296 
 
 With respect to the four guiding principles, it is the opinion of this thesis that the 
decisions reached by the Strasbourg Court in Refah are both ill considered and 
arrogant. Firstly, with regard to popular sovereignty and representation, the decision 
validates the removal of a vehicle for both the articulation and aggregation of 
preferences of a substantial minority within the polity. The specific prohibition also 
does not even have the arguably redeeming feature (as is the case in the next chapter 
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and the dissolution of Batasuna) of being supported by the majority of the population. 
Next, in terms of changeability, the Court effectively put limits upon the type of 
change that could be campaigned for within Turkey. Change is to be limited to 
advocacies and policies which do not threaten or even challenge a liberal secular view 
of democracy. Finally, with regard to the principle of equal respect, the Court by 
refusing to consider alternative conceptions of Islam consistent with democracy 
displays both ignorance and arrogance. Effectively, it is arguing that western liberal 
democracy has nothing to learn from political Islam; that any educative process 
should and can only be a one way street. The problem with such an approach is that it 
encourages polarization rather than democratic contestation and debate. The recent 
difficulties enveloping Egypt represent an example albeit an extreme one of a polity 
where citizens treat fellow citizens simply as enemies they can demonise rather than 
opponents that can or should be listened to. 
 
The following substantive chapter will consider a case from Spain that represents 
another ‘militant’ and invasive legal intervention within the democratic arena. Aside 
from the scale of the intervention, the prohibition of Batasuna exhibits similarities to 
Refah in that the relevant dissolutions were both upheld by the Strasbourg Court. 
However, the two cases differ in two distinct ways. Firstly, while Refah was a large 
popular national party, Batasuna was a small regionally based party with no realistic 
prospect of attaining legislative or executive power. Also, while Refah was prohibited 
largely on the basis that its ideological goals were inconsistent with democratic 
decision making, the dissolution of Batasuna was premised on the assertion that it 
tacitly endorsed methods deemed contradictory to democratic debate. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Democracy and the advocacy of political violence 
Batasuna v Spain 
 
2:1: Introduction  
 
In 2003, the political party known as Batasuna was legally dissolved by the Spanish 
Supreme Court.
297
 The party was widely acknowledged to be the political wing of the 
Basque terrorist group ETA. Its dissolution was subsequently upheld by the European 
Court of Human Rights in 2009.
298
 Batasuna posed a perceived threat to the Spanish 
State in two different ways. Firstly, in ideological terms, it aspired along with other 
parties to create an independent Basque state free of interference from both Spain and 
France. Secondly, and in contrast to other nationalist parties, it was adjudged to have 
both implicitly and explicitly endorsed the use of violence as a strategic means to 
political ends. As has been argued so far in this thesis, the dissolution of a political 
party represents a major legal incursion into the arena of democratic contestation. The 
right of freedom of association is widely acknowledged to be central to the effective 
functioning of contemporary democracies. Not only do political parties act as a 
conduit by which governments’ can both accede to power and be held accountable, 
but they also act as a mechanism by which both the composition of and policies 
followed by elected governments can be transformed. The continuing prospect of 
change is fundamental to any notion of democracy. 
 
“…the democratic future of a democracy hinges on the 
convertibility of majorities into minorities, and conversely, of 
minorities into majorities.”299 
 
Given the importance of their role, it is commonly accepted that attempts to enforce 
legal prohibitions on the existence of specific parties should only be made under 
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exceptional circumstances. In 1999, an advisory body to the Council of Europe 
popularly known as the Venice Commission
300
 adopted a set of guidelines intended to 
influence both member states and the Strasbourg Court with regard to the potential 
prohibition of political parties.
301
 Most of the guidelines echo previous jurisprudence 
from Strasbourg in that they assert the importance of political parties to the 
democratic process
302
 and consequently impose requirements of both restraint
303
 and 
proportionality.
304
 
 
With regard to which types of political party may be vulnerable to interference, the 
third guideline states 
 
“Prohibition or enforced dissolution of political parties may only be 
justified in the case of parties which advocate the use of violence or 
use violence as a political means to overthrow the democratic 
constitutional order, thereby undermining the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the constitution. The fact alone that a party advocates 
a peaceful change of the Constitution should not be sufficient for its 
prohibition or dissolution.”305 
 
As referenced above, a relatively recent example where a specific party was adjudged 
to have met the criteria of this guideline occurred in the case of Batasuna
306
 when the 
European Court of Human Rights upheld their dissolution by the relevant Spanish 
authorities. This Chapter will contend that the decision to uphold the prohibition is 
flawed for a couple of reasons. Firstly, it will argue that the evidence presented 
against the party is not only insufficient to meet the legal requirements of a strictly 
procedural approach to the question of party prohibition but that it also fails to 
establish a level of threat necessary for prohibition under a substantive ‘militant’ 
approach to such questions. More fundamentally, it will contend that while the 
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decision to dissolve is arguably consistent with the principle of popular sovereignty, it 
is outweighed by the challenge that it presents both in theoretical and pragmatic 
terms
307
 to the other three principles necessary to the continuation of substantive 
disagreement 
 
2:2: The dissolution of Batasuna 
 
2:2:1: Background 
The terrorist organization ETA was formed in the early years of the 1960’s as a 
response to the totalitarian and centralizing nature of General Franco’s fascist 
regime.
308
 Its commitment to violence survived beyond the demise of Franco’s regime 
and continued into the modern era of Spanish democracy.
309
 While its main political 
goal of achieving independence from Spain is a legitimate aspiration to hold and 
campaign for in a democratic society, the means it has chosen in pursuit of that goal 
are a great deal more contentious, with it has been estimated, at least 800 deaths 
directly attributable to its actions.
310
 Eventually, in late 2011, ETA announced a 
permanent and definitive ceasefire.   
 
The political party, Batasuna was formed in 2001
311
 from the wreckage of Euskal 
Herraritok which folded earlier that year after disastrous election results.
312
 The 
original incarnation of the party occurred in 1978 under the name Herri Batasuna.
313
 
It is widely accepted that all three organizations have served as the political wing of 
ETA in much the same way as Sinn Fein fulfilled that purpose for the Irish 
Republican Army.
314
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In 2002, at the behest of the Spanish Parliament, the Spanish public prosecutor began 
proceedings against Batasuna. These proceedings were at least partially motivated by 
the political pressure that emerged after the party refused to join others in condemning 
an ETA atrocity which saw a car bomb take the lives of two innocent civilians. On 
March 27
th
 2003, the Spanish Supreme Court declared Batasuna to be an illegal 
organization.
315
 
 
2:2:2 Legal Bases for Proscription 
 
Article 22(2) of the Spanish Constitution states that ‘that ‘Associations which pursue 
ends or use means legally defined as criminal offences are illegal.’ Articles 578 and 
579 of the Spanish Criminal Code make it illegal to ‘proffer expression in praise or in 
justification of terrorism…’316 However as Victor Comella has noted, Courts in Spain 
have been hesitant to enforce criminal penalties on associations such as political 
parties which may have thousands of members.
317
 The response of the Spanish 
legislature to this dilemma was to pass a law on political parties in 2002
318
 which 
effectively creates an ‘intermediate stage’319 between criminal illegality and legality 
that can be described as ‘constitutional illegality.’320 
 
The new law allows the Spanish judicial authorities to declare a party illegal if it 
indulges in behaviour which can be construed inter alia as ‘legitimizing violence as a 
means of reaching political objectives’321and ‘supporting the actions of terrorist 
organizations in order to subvert the existing constitutional order or egregiously 
affect…public order.’322 The parameters of these actions are more clearly defined in 
Article 9 (3) which applies them to those parties which ‘give express or tacit political 
support to terrorism, and thus legitimize terrorist actions…’323  
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In applying this law to Batasuna, the Spanish Supreme Court based its declaration of 
illegality on two grounds. Firstly, the refusal by Batasuna to condemn terrorist actions 
was equated as illegal action in the form of tacit political support.
324
 Secondly, public 
statements made by prominent members of the party were judged to be providing 
‘explicit support to ETA and creating an atmosphere of terror and intimidation…’325 
The further question of whether a statute whose passage was clearly motivated by the 
desire to prohibit a specific political party was constitutional was answered in the 
positive by the Court. 
 
“The Constitutional Court…held that the statute is valid as far as 
this problem is concerned. That the intention to ban Batasuna was 
the occasio to enact the statute does not mean the Statute’s ratio is 
only to ban Batasuna…The Statute is applicable in the future to any 
other party that falls under it definitions and this is sufficient to 
answer the objection that the statute targets a particular party.”326 
  
In response, representatives of the party lodged an appeal to the European Court of 
Human Rights alleging violation of their Article 10 and 11 rights to freedom of 
expression and association respectively. 
 
2:3: The Strasbourg Judgement 
 
On June 30, 2009, the European Court of Human Rights published its decision.
327
 In 
its general approach to these questions, the Court basically poses three tests for the 
legitimacy of a restriction.
328
 Firstly, is the interference ‘prescribed by law’? In the 
specific case of Batasuna, the Court asserted that the prohibition was legally merited 
on the basis of the Law on Political Parties (2002).
329
 It did so by rejecting the 
applicants’ arguments that the law had been applied retro-actively while at the same 
time stating that the principle of non-retroactivity
330
could not be applied in non-
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criminal cases.
331
 The second test is whether the restriction meets a legitimate aim 
under Article 11 of the Convention.
332
 The Court argued that the restriction pursued 
several legitimate aims including public safety and protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.
333
 The third and most important test in assessing the 
proportionality and subsequent legitimacy of a restriction is whether the relevant 
interference is ‘necessary in a democratic society.’ The phrase ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ was originally defined by the Court during the Article 10 case, 
Handyside.
334
 In this decision the Court argues that the phrase should not be defined 
as merely ‘useful’ or at the other extreme ‘indispensable’. Instead it should be taken 
as to imply ‘a pressing social need.’ 
 
2:3:1 Pressing Social Need? 
 
As already discussed,
335
 with regard to whether an interference with Article11 rights 
meet a pressing social need, the guidelines of the Venice Commission permit 
prohibition with respect to the advocacy of violence. Relevant jurisprudence from the 
previous case study also states 
 
“…the Court considers that a political party may promote a change 
in the law or the legal and constitutional structures of the State on 
two conditions: first, the means used to that end must be legal and 
democratic; secondly, the change proposed must itself be 
compatible with fundamental democratic principles. It necessarily 
follows that a political party whose leaders incite violence or put 
forward a policy which fails to respect democracy or which is aimed 
at the destruction of democracy and the flouting of the rights and 
freedoms recognised in a democracy cannot lay claim to the 
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Convention's protection against penalties imposed on those 
grounds.”336 
 
In this specific case, the Court found that while the change proposed by Batasuna was 
compatible with the guiding principles of democracy,  actions and speech imputable  
to Batasuna with regard to the acceptability of violence amounted to the advancement 
of a political project which would ‘contradict the concept of ‘democratic society’’337 
and therefore posed a ‘strong threat to Spanish democracy.’338Consequently, the 
interference did meet a pressing social need
339
 and was proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued.
340
 It is the opinion, however, of this chapter that the reasoning adopted 
by the Strasbourg Court is seriously flawed. Later, this reasoning will be analysed 
with reference to both the underlying principles of democracy and the aim of 
protecting a citizenry from political violence. Firstly, however, the argument will be 
advanced that the evidence presented by the Strasbourg Court would fulfil the 
requirements of neither a procedural nor substantive approach to party prohibition. 
 
2:3:1:1: Clear and Present Danger? 
As the final substantive case study will illustrate, a strictly procedural approach to the 
question of party prohibitions affords such organizations wide latitude with respect to 
the expression or advocacy of ideas which challenge or even threaten democratic 
governance. The jurisdiction that comes closest to an approximate manifestation of 
such an approach is the United States of America whose Supreme Court has 
consistently stated that potentially subversive expression should only be subject to 
restriction when it is deemed to constitute a Clear and present danger to either the 
Constitution or security of the American citizenry.
341
 Clear and Present Danger has 
subsequently been subject to an interpretation that distinguishes between advocacies 
of violence as a component of ‘abstract doctrine’342 which are deemed acceptable and 
that which produce or are directed at producing ‘imminent lawless action’ which are 
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not.
343
It has also been established that the principles underlying this interpretation 
apply equally to political parties as well as individuals.
344
 
 
The reasoning adopted by the Strasbourg Court in Batasuna takes a much wider 
interpretation regarding permissible restrictions and thus affords greatly reduced 
latitude with respect to the acceptability of specific advocacies than that exemplified 
by the United States Supreme Court. With regard to the actions and behaviours of 
Batasuna, it is noted that the ‘acts and speeches of… the applicants do not preclude 
the use of force to achieve their purpose.’345 The Court then proceeds to agree with 
the Spanish Court that the refusal to condemn violence either generally or specifically 
is evidence of ‘tacit support to terrorism’346 and the use of this element as a ground for 
dissolution is ‘not contrary to the Convention.’347 Far from inciting ‘imminent lawless 
action’, it can be argued that Batasuna is being punished at least partially, not for the 
content of its expression but for what it has not said. This suggests that the dissolution 
of a political party can be justified not only by the existence of a clear and present 
danger but simply by a refusal to publicly acquiesce in a political consensus 
sufficiently condemnatory of political violence. While in the post 9/11 era, protection 
of the polity and citizenry from politically inspired violence is a laudable indeed 
necessary objective, the act of refusing to condemn an act of violence should be 
challenged within the political arena of contestation and not utilised as a piece of 
evidence to facilitate restriction of democratic debate. As Ian Cram has argued, such a 
position would not only conflict with a purely procedural approach but would be 
irreconcilable with Convention principles also. 
 
“Does a refusal to condemn a terrorist action to equate to support for 
the same? As an independent ground for disbanding a party, the 
punishment of party officials for not speaking out raises, at the very 
least issues of compatibility with Article 11…”348 
 
The Court is careful, however, to claim that the dissolution is based on more than a 
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 failure to condemn or preclude the use of violence. Referencing evidence of speech 
utilised at party meetings and in newspaper interviews by prominent members that 
refer to ‘struggle’349 and the ‘need to use all instruments to deal with the State’,350 the 
Court concludes that such behaviour comes extremely close to ‘explicit support for 
violence’351 and ‘praise of …terrorism’352 and as such represent legitimate grounds for 
dissolution. By taking this approach, the Court echoes earlier jurisprudence,
353
 which 
held that a lack of strong and immediate disciplinary action by a party against 
individual members who simply allude to the possibility of using violent methods 
represents evidence of a propensity towards violence.
354
  
 
“Hence the Court takes a broad approach in its appreciation whether 
or not a party promotes violence: explicit calls for violence are not 
required, ambiguity may suffice.”355 
 
Once again, Strasbourg’s approach diverges greatly from the diminishing procedural 
approach exemplified in the United States. In attributing legal significance to 
statements which are at best ambiguous regarding the utility or desirability of violence 
as a strategic means to political ends, the Strasbourg Court displays an unwillingness 
to make a distinction between abstract and specific advocacies which (as will become 
evident later) are applied within the relevant jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court.  
 
However, the identification of major differences between the reasoning of the 
Strasbourg Court and that of its American equivalent represents a sufficient basis for 
neither a laudatory nor condemnatory conclusion. When one considers the relative 
stability of American democracy and its two party system against Spain’s recent 
experiences of political violence and the historic vulnerability of its democracy to 
civil war, it is unsurprising that the U.S. Courts exhibit a degree of latitude in 
tolerating subversive advocacy which would be potentially more harmful in a 
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dissimilar, more fragile political context.
356
 A potentially more fruitful avenue is to 
evaluate the decision to uphold against some of the reasoning applied by the 
Strasbourg Court in the case of Refah which was the focus of the previous chapter.  
 
2:3:1:2: A twin threat? 
As was evident in the last chapter, the Court had previously applied the notion of a 
‘twin threat’ to democracy to justify the dissolution of a political party. In justifying 
the dissolution of a major Pro-Islamic party in Turkey, the Court argued that the party 
in question was both committed to an ideology incompatible with Convention 
principles
357
while its growing influence and popularity meant that it had the real 
potential to implement such an agenda if elected to government.
358
 This combination 
of ideology and growing popularity represented, in the Courts’ opinion, a threat 
tangible enough to legitimize prohibition.
359
 As argued previously, the coherence and 
potential implications of this reasoning left a lot to be desired. However, even if one 
were to suspend disbelief and accept the premises of such an approach; in the specific 
example of Batasuna, there existed neither the ideological incompatibility nor level of 
popular support necessary to justify prohibition on militantly democratic grounds. 
 
Firstly, it is questionable whether the objectives associated with Batasuna represent an 
ideological threat to democratic governance. While their overriding goal of 
Independence for a Basque State undoubtedly constitutes a challenge to the specific 
cultural and territorial basis of the Spanish version of democracy, it does not directly 
threaten the idea that democracy remains the fundamental principle underlying 
government. With respect to separatist movements in general, Issacharoff argues that 
the goal of secession from an existing state is compatible with the idea of the 
democratic principle of self determination. 
 
“…they typically do not seek to take control of the entire state 
through electoral, paramilitary, or any other means. Rather, they 
seek to challenge the political will of the majority to continue its 
hold over a distinct region of the country, and they often promote 
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themselves as upholding the claims of a majority of citizens in the 
contested area to democratic self-determination. Their object is 
typically independence, not conquest of the entire state. Because of 
their identification with a broader claim for the rights of a regionally 
defined, generally subordinated section of the nation, separatist 
parties readily invoke the language of self-determination to claim 
independent democratic grounds for their right to advocate 
dissolution of the broader polity.”360 
 
Next, with regard to the existence of a strong practical threat; even if one were to 
accept the contentious proposition that Batasuna did explicitly justify the use of 
violence by ETA, it is arguable whether their continuing participation represented a 
sustained challenge to the continuation of democratic government. Michel Rosenfeld 
has argued that whereas the existence of a civil war or the threat of foreign invasion 
may constitute a crisis for a polity sufficient to justify the temporary suspension of 
political rights, the existence of terrorist acts (while undeniably a threat to the security 
of individuals) merely constitute a stress within a polity rather than a full blown 
crisis.
361
 With specific reference to Spain, Cram has noted  
 
“…the violent actions of ETA could not be said to have caused an 
institutional crisis for Spanish democracy in the sense of forcing the 
postponement of elections or preventing opposing parties standing 
for election.”362 
With respect to their level of popularity and thus ability to implement their goals, 
Samuel Issacharoff has argued that as well as being defined as a separatist party, 
Batasuna can also be described as an insurrectionary organization.
363
 As an 
insurrectionary party, Batasuna ‘…participate in the political process for the purpose 
of propagandizing their views, but without any real prospect of seriously competing 
for political office.’364 With little chance of acquiring power at either the regional or 
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central level, Batasuna cannot therefore be argued to pose either a practical or 
imminent threat to the existence of democracy. Indeed, Issacharoff has argued that the 
legal standard necessary to justify prohibition for such parties should the clear and 
present danger test which as has been argued above; the example of Batasuna fails to 
meet. 
 
“Where the danger to democratic stability posed by a party arises 
from the threat of extralegal conduct, the clear and present danger 
test properly directs a court's attention to the imminence and 
likelihood of the harm.”365 
 
It is contended, therefore, that the decision to uphold the dissolution of Batasuna fails 
to meet the legal requirements of either a procedural or substantive approach to party 
prohibition. A subsequent assessment of whether the prohibition can be justified on 
democratic grounds requires both recognition of the wider political context within 
which it was set as well as an evaluation of its implications when considered in 
respect of the four guiding principles. 
 
2:4: Batasuna and the four principles 
 
When one looks at the decision on a superficial level, the decision to uphold can be 
justified with reference to all four underlying principles. With respect to popular 
sovereignty, it can be viewed as either a legitimate expression of popular feeling or 
less of a violation than that exemplified in the aforementioned Turkish case. With 
regard to the latter point, the fact that at the height of its popularity, Batasuna only 
took 10- 20% of the vote for the Basque regional parliament
366
 meant that its 
dissolution constituted a less invasive intervention within a polity than that deployed 
in Turkey. More fundamentally, the passage of the relevant law on political parties on 
which the dissolution was based was a clear response to popular concern regarding 
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public safety as evidenced by the fact that it passed through the Spanish Parliament 
with a 95% majority.
367
  
 
The Strasbourg Court also rejected the applicant’s arguments368 that the dissolution 
constituted a violation of democracy and political pluralism. It did so by referring to 
the existence of other separatist parties within the Basque region who share 
Batasuna’s aim of independence.369 It has been argued that the existence of these 
parties is evidence of respect for the three remaining principles of equal respect, 
representation and changeability. Not only is advocacy of independence regarded as a 
protected form of expression but those who advocate it are afforded both the 
opportunity to organize parties and contest elections with the aim of achieving their 
goal. Those who support the prohibition of Batasuna contrast them with other 
separatist parties not in terms of their ideological vision but on the alleged methods 
used in pursuing that vision. 
 
“In Spain, such distinctions are of paramount importance in 
illustrating that the proscription of Batasuna has at its foundation 
not the prohibition of an ideology but rather of the means employed 
in promoting that ideology.”370 
 
In respect of those means, the Court noted that Batasuna exhibited ‘behaviour very 
close to an explicit support for violence’ as well as a ‘refusal to preclude force’371as a 
possible strategic means to political ends. Such action or inaction argue helped ‘foster 
a climate of social confrontation’372 which in itself can be perceived as displaying at 
best indifference to the principle of equal respect. While it is apparent that the 
prohibition can be justified with strong reference to the principle of popular 
sovereignty and a superficial nod in the direction of the other three: it is the opinion of 
this chapter that a wider examination of relevant factors will lead our argument in the 
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opposite direction These factors include a specific examination of the opportunities 
that separatist movements actually possess to achieve their goal within the framework 
of the Spanish Constitution and a more general appraisal of whether prohibition is 
likely to serve as a deterrent to or rallying point for the use of political violence. 
 
Although it is evidently true that other separatist parties are allowed to operate 
without interference and that regional governments are given a great deal of 
autonomy
373
, it can be argued that pro independence movements are denied an 
effective means for achieving their goals. According to Article 2 of the Spanish 
Constitution, there exists an ‘indissoluble unity’ of the Spanish Nation. Independence 
for any of the autonomous communities therefore represents an illegitimate goal 
regardless of the strength of feeling within them. 
 
“Democracy is defined in Spain by the Spanish Constitution…If you 
don’t accept the Spanish Constitution, you are not democratic. But 
in the Basque country, there is a clear lack of democracy. The 
majority would vote for independence…and are being deprived that 
democratic right.”374 
 
The Spanish Constitution is not unique. International Law while recognizing a legal 
right to Self determination
375
 has interpreted it in terms of merely allowing colonized 
peoples to right to ‘freely determine their political status.’376 While some 
commentators have also suggested that a remedial right to secession exists where 
there are glaring inequalities between groups concerning rights accessing the political 
process,
377
 there exists no internationally recognized right of secession for distinctive 
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national groups within existing States. The lack of such a right affords existing states 
like Spain the ability to legally entrench its jurisdiction over all of its territory 
regardless of the wishes of the citizens of each of its component parts. While such 
matters were clearly beyond the remit of the Strasbourg Court in this case, its 
assertion that the existence of pro-independence parties served as proof of political 
pluralism ignores the fact that distinct national groups within Spain are unable to 
access a constitutional exit route. This means that although pro independence parties 
represent a majority of Basque voters and are allowed to argue and campaign for the 
achievement of independence within the democratic process, they are denied an 
effective democratic mechanism for the achievement of their ultimate goal. This 
represents a clear violation of the principles of both popular sovereignty and 
changeability. If one accepts Sartori’s claim that democracy depends upon the 
continuing convertibility of minorities into majorities, then could it not be argued,(to 
paraphrase Sawyer), that the Spanish Constitution has at its foundation not the 
prohibition of an ideology but rather of the democratic opportunity to realize that 
ideology.  
 
2:5 Pragmatic Considerations 
 
In more pragmatic terms, it is also contended that prohibition is likely to be inimical 
to the specific aim of protecting the citizenry from political violence. While the 
existence of terrorism unquestionably represents a serious threat to the physical 
security of a citizenry, it is doubtful whether the dissolution of political parties who 
either condone or refuse to condemn such acts does anything to actually lessen the 
threat. Firstly, it can be argued that such steps are unnecessary where there already 
exist provisions to punish individuals who instigate, praise or incite violent actions.
378
 
Prohibition in these circumstances amounts to a form of ‘collective punishment’ and 
can be viewed a denial of the principles of both representation and equal respect. Not 
only does such an action curtail ‘… the freedom of members to campaign and 
represent the party, but also the opportunity for like minded voters to express their 
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support at the ballot box.’379 Such an act is also likely to aggravate the sense of 
injustice and political impotence which may have served as motivation to consider 
violence in the first place. With specific reference to Spain, the decision by the 
Strasbourg Courts to uphold the dissolution of Batasuna was immediately followed 
by a renewed campaign of bombing by ETA.
380
 While it is true that ETA has now 
declared a definitive ceasefire, it is doubtful whether this had little or anything to do 
with the dissolution and more to do with ETA having ‘come to terms with its defeat 
by Spanish and French policing.’381 
  
It can also be argued more generally that a decision not to proscribe may have 
beneficial consequences. Within nationalist groups with a propensity towards 
violence, Cynthia Irvin has recognised a tripartite division.
382
 These sub-groups are 
defined as ideologues that hold a steadfast commitment to an armed struggle, radicals 
who combine armed actions with political engagement and politicos who prefer a 
political and bargaining process to that of an armed struggle. To proscribe a political 
party in such circumstances would run a huge risk of ‘defining politics as closing out 
the political expression of the grievances of the minority’ thus undermining the 
principle of equal respect
383
 and subsequently strengthening the ideologues to the 
detriment of the radicals and politicos. Within this context, it is surely legitimate to 
argue that the movement from political violence to power sharing by the politicos 
within the nationalist community in Northern Ireland was facilitated by the refusal of 
successive United Kingdom governments to proscribe Sinn Fein. As will be argued in 
the penultimate case study, although the nationalist community in Northern Ireland, 
(like that in the Basque Region) had alternative vehicles which shared their overriding 
goal,
384
 the UK government’s approach recognized the existence of a diversity of 
opinion within the broad nationalist movement and subsequently allowed both the 
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legitimate expression of diverse forms of nationalist aspiration and the continued 
possibility of a negotiated settlement to the political cause of the violence. Prohibition 
in such a context would have made a political solution to the impasse much more 
problematic. 
 
‘…the ability to negotiate with terrorists becomes more difficult if 
the authorized face of the group is banished from sight.’385 
 
2:6: Conclusion: A disproportionate Step 
The case of Batasuna is a complex one. The Spanish authorities acted in a manner 
that clearly reflected a society wide revulsion at political violence. In this regard, it 
can be argued that the prohibition was a reflection of the principle of popular 
sovereignty rather than a violation of it. That it signalled an alternative strategy to that 
of the United Kingdom in its dealings with Sinn Fein is explicable in terms of Spain’s 
less stable, more brittle history in relation to the maintenance of democratic norms 
and institutions. What is less understandable is the approach of the European Court of 
Human Rights in upholding the prohibition. In effect, it ignored its own previous 
jurisprudence by validating the prohibition of a party which posed neither a 
substantial ideological nor a convincingly practical threat to the continuation of 
democracy. The right of freedom of association is correctly identified by Conor 
Gearty as one of the most strongly protected elements of political culture.
386
 Indeed, 
with regard to the link between democratic government and political parties, he claims 
that ‘the former is hardly possible without the latter…’ It is contended that the 
specific prohibition of Batasuna is illegitimate on the grounds that its continued 
operation did not represent a sufficient or imminent threat to either collective security 
or the continuation of democratic government. In the absence of such threats, parties 
which challenge democratic orthodoxies or even question the assumptions under 
which the democratic game is played must be allowed to express those doubts. 
Banning such parties not only represents ‘evidence…of the decline of democratic 
                                                 
385
 Leslie Turano ‘Spain: banning political parties as a response to Basque Terrorism’ in International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 1(4), 2003, 73 
386 Conor Gearty, Civil Liberties, Oxford University Press, 2007-155 
96 
 
freedom’387 but potentially acts as a further impetus to the use of violence as a 
political goal. 
 
‘It is preferable that non-democratic pressures find their expression 
within the legitimate frameworks of democracy and not outside 
it.’388 
 
To attribute such forms of expression as being outside of the ‘legitimate frameworks’ 
of democracy not only denies them equal respect in theoretical terms but potentially 
places the relevant citizenry in more danger through either a continuation of or a 
retreat back into violent methods. It is contended that such an outcome would 
constitute a greater violation of equal respect than allowing the continued expression 
of ideas which allude to rather than directly incite violence. 
 
The next two substantive case studies both reflect elements from the cases of Refah 
and Batasuna but also diverge substantially from them. The next chapter considers the 
experience of transition democracies emerging from totalitarian systems of both the 
left and right while the fourth case study examines the political jurisdiction of Israel. 
Where these examples equate with Turkey and Spain is that at a constitutional and 
legislative level, they allow for restrictions up to and including prohibition for parties 
deemed as a threat to either democracy or other established substantive goals. Where 
they differ however is that while Turkey and Spain have recently taken active steps to 
apply and enforce these provisions, the provisions in the next two chapters have been 
sparingly enforced (if at all) and stand more as symbolic manifestations of a desire to 
protect either democratic decision making or substantive goals judged to be of similar 
importance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Militant Democracy and the Politics of Transition 
 
3:1 Introduction 
 
 As discussed in the introduction, the theory of Militant Democracy
389
 originated as a 
contemporary response to the seeming ease by which the Nazis destroyed the Weimar 
Republic from within. Whilst acknowledging that the myriad of economic, social and 
political factors that led to ‘…the failure of the democratic experiment are by far too 
complex to be measured in terms of a single denominator’390, Karl Loewenstein 
proceeded to argue that a relative lack of militant measures available within the 
Weimar Republic as well as an under utilization of those that did exist were the most 
important factors in explaining the demise of democracy. 
 
“The German Republic foundered on its own concepts of 
constitutional legality, which opened the way to power for Hitler. 
Democracy had surrendered to National Socialism long before 
Hitler was “legally” appointed Chancellor of the Reich…The one 
party system was the logical answer to the democratic tolerance of 
the crushed republic.”391 
 
The clear implication of this analysis is that in order to protect democratic 
governance; democracies should both enact and enforce both constitutional and 
legislative restrictions on those who are unmistakably opposed to the continuation of 
democracy. Logically, it would also suggest that the existence of relevant defensive 
measures is particularly appropriate within those democratic polities which exhibit 
patent if varying degrees of vulnerability. With respect to such measures, Paul Harvey 
has pinpointed three claims that Militant Democracy advances for itself.
392
 Firstly, by 
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taking active steps to restrict the rights of ‘anti-democratic actors’393, it represents a 
particular type of liberal democracy rather than a departure from it. Secondly, such 
steps may be necessary to save democracy in the future and may if available have 
stopped the triumph of Nazism in Weimar Germany. Finally, even though restrictions 
may not be desirable from a purely democratic standpoint, the alternative is 
potentially a great deal more troublesome. 
 
 “…while we may question the high ethical cost of militant 
democracy, if we assume that its second claim as to its own efficacy 
is true, even such a high cost is preferable in ethical terms to a 
constitutional suicide pact.”394 
 
This Chapter will assess the validity of these claims in respect of Constitutions which 
have emerged from the ashes of totalitarianism and with specific regard to their 
approach towards the prohibition of political parties; firstly, in post-Nazi Germany 
and then in relation to a number of the societies which transitioned from communism 
to democracy after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. An examination will be made 
of enacted measures relevant to the process of party dissolution and an assessment 
will be offered concerning the implications of relevant jurisprudence that developed 
as a direct response to attempts to enforce them. What will become evident is that 
while there exist major constitutional and legislative provisions within both contexts 
allowing for the dissolution of political parties; these provisions currently fulfil a 
primarily symbolic role in that the frequency of their enforcement has declined in a 
manner proportional to the level of threat the relevant ideologies are perceived to pose 
within a contemporary setting. It will be contended therefore that these post 
totalitarian polities have managed to strike a reasonable balance between an 
embracement of the principle of pluralistic political competition and the need to 
protect nascent democracy from the real or perceived threat of anti-democratic actors.  
 
“…the presence of antidemocratic ideologies creates a dilemma for 
the democratic state. Suppression of these ideologies offends the 
democratic main principle, yet their presence threatens the survival  
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of a system in which the principle of tolerance is 
institutionalized.”395 
 
It is contended that the most appropriate place (within a post-totalitarian context) to 
begin such an appraisal is where the theory of Militant Democracy first emerged. This 
requires therefore an examination of the constitutional order
396
 that emerged in the 
Federal Republic of Germany in the immediate post Nazi period. 
 
3:2: Germany and the protection of democracy 
 
That a commitment to democracy permeates the entire German constitutional order 
can be evidenced in a variety of ways. The principle that is afforded the greatest 
protection is the ‘free democratic basic order’. This phrase occurs several times 
throughout the Basic Law.
397
It was defined by the Constitutional Court in 1952. 
 
“The free democratic basic order can be defined as an order which 
excludes any form of tyranny or arbitrariness and represents a 
governmental system under a rule of law, based upon self 
determination of the people as expressed by the will of the existing 
majority and upon freedom and equality. The fundamental 
principles of this order include at least: respect for the human rights  
given concrete form in the Basic Law, in particular for the right to 
life and free development; separation of powers; responsibility of 
government; lawfulness of administration; independence of the 
judiciary; the multi-party principle; and equality of opportunity for 
all political parties.”398 
 
This principle of a ‘free democratic basic order’ is protected by specific articles within 
the Basic Law. The intention of these articles is to defend the democratic order by 
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facilitating the restriction or forfeiture of fundamental rights of those who are deemed 
to pose a threat to it. For example, Article 18 states 
 
Whoever abuses the freedom of expression, in particular the 
freedom of the press (paragraph (1) of Article 5), the freedom of 
teaching (paragraph (3) of Article 5), the freedom of assembly 
(Article 8), the freedom of association (Article 9), the privacy of 
correspondence, posts and telecommunications (Article 10), the 
rights of property (Article 14), or the right of asylum (Article 16a) in 
order to combat the free democratic basic order shall forfeit these 
basic rights. This forfeiture and its extent shall be declared by the 
Federal Constitutional Court. 
 
More pertinently for this chapter, Article 21 on political parties asserts 
(1) Political parties shall participate in the formation of the political 
will of the people. They may be freely established. Their internal 
organization must conform to democratic principles. They must 
publicly account for their assets and for the sources and use of their 
funds. 
(2) Parties that, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their 
adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic 
order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court 
shall rule on the question of unconstitutionality. 
This constitutional protection of the ‘free democratic basic order’ is augmented by 
Article 79 (3) (otherwise known as the eternity clause) which states that the principles 
reflected in specific provisions can never be amended. These provisions include 
Article 20 which defines Germany as a ‘democratic and federal social state’. At a 
general level, therefore, the democratic character of the State seems to be well 
protected. However, the very existence of such measures poses interesting dilemmas 
for those committed to fundamental principles of democracy. 
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3:2:1: Democratic Dilemmas 
 
The definition of a ‘free democratic basic order’ by the Federal Constitutional Court 
in 1952
399
 offers substantive support to the guiding principles which underlie 
substantive disagreement. References to ‘self determination of the people’ and ‘will of 
the existing majority’ are consistent with the principle of popular sovereignty while 
adherence to both ‘the multi party principle’ and ‘equality of opportunities for all 
political parties’ seem to fulfil the conceptual requirements of equal respect, 
representation and changeability. A closer examination, however, yields a more 
complex picture. Firstly, by asserting that such an order is premised on fundamental 
principles which include  ‘respect for … human rights, in particular…the right …to 
life’ as well as constitutional  niceties such as a ‘separation of powers’, it can be 
argued that the Court is pursuing a substantive conception of democracy based on 
contested values which have not acquired universal validity. This represents at least a 
potential dilution of the principles of changeability and equality. 
 
With regard to changeability, the broad substantive definition of democracy given by 
the Court potentially allows it to define any proposals which are deemed to contradict 
this definition as undemocratic and therefore unlawful. The ability of unelected 
Courts to modify or strike down democratically produced legislation represents a 
substantial limitation on the principle of democratic changeability. Within the specific 
context of Germany, it can be argued that such potential limitations on democratic 
change are congruent with and exacerbated by the legal entrenchment of democracy 
provided by the eternity clause.
400
 While, from a democratic perspective, it may seem 
self evident that a legal entrenchment of democracy against itself provides ‘a 
compelling defence of immutable law’,401 the ability of a Court to determine what 
constitutes a democratic order may inhibit a specific democracy’s ability to develop 
organically. 
 
“…we must bear in mind that entrenchment of a provision as vague 
as a regime type may empower the constitutional court to determine 
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the contours of what, precisely, a [democracy] entails, with the 
distributive consequences and the irreversibility such a decision 
might entail.”402 
 
With regard to the principle of equal respect, the implications of the Court’s broad 
definition of what constitutes ‘the free basic democratic order’ are potentially 
troublesome. This arises from the fact that Articles 18 and 21 allow for the forfeiture 
or restriction of the rights of those who are deemed to pose a threat to such an order. 
With specific regard to political parties, Article 21 is worthy of examination. In 
conjunction with the German Court’s broad interpretation of principles fundamental 
to democracy, this specific provision confers wider latitude for prohibition than those 
countries which suffered similar degradations during the relevant historical era.  
 
In both Italy
403
 and Austria,
404
 laws relating to the prohibition of political parties 
specifically ban those associations which were in power during the 2
nd
 World 
War.
405
By contrast, the framers of the new German Basic Law evidently took the 
view that a wider defence against all forms of totalitarianism was necessary. 
 
“Arguably, the lessons to be learned from a historical experience of 
the overthrow of democracy concerns the vulnerability of 
democracy vis-à-vis its enemies in general, rather than the threat 
posed by one specific anti-democratic ideology. Hence, an effective 
translation of this lesson into legal provisions requires measures of a 
more general nature.”406 
 
Consequently, Article 21(2) allows for the prohibition of parties that ‘by reason of 
their aims or the behaviour of their adherents seek to undermine or abolish the free 
democratic basic order...’  In doing so, it gives the Constitutional Court the authority 
to restrict the political rights of those it deems to pose a threat to its own conception of 
a free basic democratic order. Such wide latitude raises legitimate concern as to how 
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effectively the principle of equal respect will be observed. However, any judgement 
as to whether this or any other principle has been violated requires a move beyond the 
textual provisions of the Constitution to an analysis of the jurisprudential reasoning 
that has emerged out of cases based on them. 
 
3:3 German Prohibition Cases 
The monopoly of jurisdiction and apparently wide latitude afforded to the Federal 
Constitutional Court with respect to the banning of political parties must (like the 
emergence of the theory of Militant Democracy itself) be placed in a proper historical 
context. While giving an unelected Court the power to ban vehicles of popular 
representation undoubtedly raises questions relating to democratic principles, the 
experience of Weimar Germany where an elected party and executive had destroyed 
the democratic rights of its opponents places such a decision in a more understandable 
light. Indeed, it has been argued from within this context that the decision to afford 
the judiciary exclusive jurisdiction in this respect should be viewed as recognition of 
the vital importance of political parties to democracy and a subsequent need to afford 
them greater protection from potential opponents than had existed before.
407
 However, 
in spite of, and perhaps because of, this general desire to protect political parties who 
are committed to democratic means and ends, the Constitution betrays an 
understandable indisposition to parties which might possibly be deemed to threaten 
the new democratic order. This attitude is reflected in Article 21(2) of the Basic Law 
and has been given jurisprudential support by Constitutional Court. 
 
“Article 21(2) … expresses the conviction of the [drafters], based on 
their concrete historical experience, that the state could no longer 
afford to maintain an attitude of neutrality toward political parties. 
[The Basic Law] has in this sense created a “militant democracy,” a 
constitutional [value] decision that is binding on the Federal 
Constitutional Court.”
408
 
 
Despite this constitutionally recognized indisposition towards anti-democratic parties, 
it is instructive to note that only two parties have been banned under the provisions of 
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Article 21; parties who both had links with overtly totalitarian ideologies and who 
were operating at a time of vulnerability for the new Federal Republic.
409
  
 
3:3:1: Socialist Reich Party 
The Socialist Reich Party was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1952
410
 Founded 
in 1949; it had achieved moderate levels of support in elections to State or Lander 
parliaments.
411
 It was clearly a successor party to the Nazis in terms of ideology and 
membership.
412
 While the ban was seen as politically uncontroversial at the time,
413
 
the Court’s reasoning to justify the ban is less so. Rather than simply tying the party’s 
professed ideology to the assertion within Article 21(2) that ‘aims or…behaviour’ 
which ‘seek to impair or abolish the free democratic order’ are grounds for a finding 
of unconstitutionality, the Court utilized the wording in Article 21(1) that a party’s 
internal organization must ‘conform to democratic principles’ as the main justificatory 
ground for dissolution. The Court stated that political parties 
 
“…must be structured from the bottom up, that is, that the members 
must not be excluded from democratic processes and that the basic 
equality of members…must be guaranteed.”414 
 
The Court then used the lack of internal democratic procedures within the SRP to 
argue that this betrayed a clear anti-democratic desire to ‘impose its own 
organizational structure on the state.’415 While it is certainly true that internal party 
democracy is a German constitutional requirement and that parties indisposed to 
democracy inevitably lack such structures, the utilization of such as the main 
justificatory ground for dissolution of a party sets a potentially dangerous precedent. 
As Samuel Issacharoff has argued,
416
 an insistence on internal democracy might make 
parties based on ‘fixed principles’ such as religious parties vulnerable to prohibition. 
He also contends that such a requirement may forestall the development of political 
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movements originally based around the popularity of a leader (for example-Peronism 
in Argentina) into mass parties.
417
 An insistence on internal democracy is suggestive 
of unwarranted state intrusion into the affairs of organizations which serve as 
important intermediaries between the citizen and the state. 
 
“…because parties are not the state, the need for pluralist 
competition in a democratic society does not necessarily require the 
same pluralist competition within all of the contending 
parties…There appears to be no compelling reason why we should 
demand that all parties adhere to the same internal structure as long 
as the ultimate objective is meaningful voter choice and the capacity 
to vote politicians out of office.”418 
 
While the lack of internal democracy within the SRP constituted the main legal 
ground for its dissolution; it is difficult to believe that this represented the main reason 
for its prohibition. Again, the historical context is illuminating. As Samuel Issacharoff 
has argued, the Socialist Reich Party was banned because it served as a symbol of a 
recent anti-democratic and grotesque past. Prohibiting them served as a counter 
symbol of the new polity’s determination not to return there. 
 
“At the end of the day, the simple, compelling fact was that this was 
a party of Nazis, complete with a heroic worship of the "Reich," 
serious elements of anti-Semitism, and a conspicuous refusal to 
disavow any link to the Hitler government. It was these specifics, in 
the context of post-war Germany that placed the SRP outside the 
bounds of democratic tolerance.”419 
 
The reasoning used in the Socialist Reich case can therefore be viewed as a clumsy 
attempt to justify prohibiting a specific temporal threat on grounds of general 
democratic principle. The potential problem arising from such reasoning is that a 
requirement of internal party democracy might potentially allow for the restriction of 
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future parties which do not threaten democracy as such but simply challenge the 
contested conception of democracy evident within the Constitution. Therefore, there 
exists a fundamental disconnect between the political reasons underlying prohibition 
and the legal grounds presented to justify it. It is contended that the second prohibition 
case also exemplifies a similar detatchment. 
 
3:3:2 Communist Party (KPD) 
 
While the prohibition of the SRP was relatively uncontroversial, the dissolution of the 
German Communist Party in 1956 inspired heated debate.
420
 Perhaps in cognisance of 
this reality, the Court took steps within its reasoning to characterise prohibition not as 
an aggressive instrument with which to silence political dissent but as an ultima ratio, 
a weapon of last resort against the activities of a party bent upon the destruction of 
democratic governance. 
 
“Therefore, a party is not unconstitutional if it does not 
acknowledge the supreme principles of a free democratic basic 
order, refuses them, or sets them against other [principles]. An 
actively combative aggressive attitude against the existing order 
must be present; it has methodically to affect the functioning of the 
order and aim for the abolition of this order over time. This means 
that the free democratic state does not proceed against hostile parties 
by itself, but acts in defence, repelling attacks against its 
fundamental order.”421 
 
In its subsequent reasoning, the Court found that such an attitude could be attributed 
to the KPD. The Court argued that as a Communist Party, the KPD adhered to 
Marxist-Leninist ideology whose ideological goal of a dictatorship of the proletariat 
was fundamentally hostile to a free democratic order. 
 
“In the parliamentary system of liberal democracy, each party 
participating in forming the popular political will is to be given a 
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chance to come as close as possible to achieving its own goals 
through its activity in parliament. But no party may pursue material 
goals that, when reached, would forever exclude existence of other 
parties… But ... this is exactly the KPD's goal.”422 
 
Again, it can be argued that the reasoning adopted by the Court is somewhat 
unsatisfactory. Firstly, by banning a party on the basis of its overall Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, it was effectively arguing that there was no longer room within the polity 
for ideas ‘…that had certainly formed part of Germany’s intellectual legacy.’423Also, 
in a similar fashion to the SRP decision, the argument used by the Court hid rather 
than illuminated the historically specific reason for prohibition. This was the 
perceived threat of communist East German forces at the border during the height of 
the Cold War. 
 
“Under these circumstances, the Communist Party became more 
than an electoral outlier and instead assumed the role of an ally of 
forces seeking to unwind the German democratic state, not through 
elections as such, but in conjunction with a real foreign threat.”424 
 
That this specific prohibition was linked to the perceived practical danger as opposed 
to the dangers of Marxist-Leninism per se is evidenced by the Court’s own contention 
that ‘banning the KPD is not incompatible with the reauthorization of a Communist 
Party were elections to be held throughout Germany.’425 This, as Isacharoff has noted, 
constituted ‘a clear invitation to revisit the Court’s holding outside of the context of 
the Cold War’,426, an assertion given further credibility by a corresponding lack of 
action taken against a newly constituted Communist Party in 1968. This particular 
example of inaction occurred within the context of a period of economic growth 
which proceeded alongside and may have contributed to a perceived dilution of the 
threat from the East.
427
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When taken together, the legal reasoning adopted by the Court in these two cases 
seems to portend and potentially set a precedent for subsequent highly restrictive 
interventions. However, despite this and the continuing legal availability of 
prohibition, there has been a subsequent dearth of attempted and a complete lack of 
successful prohibitions. This suggests that as the perceived threats to the continuation 
of the polity that inspired the 1950’s cases have receded so has the inclination to apply 
prohibitive measures. It indicates that the ‘Militant Democracy’ established by the 
Basic Law of 1949 has matured and consolidated to a point where it can be viewed as 
a tolerant albeit defensive democracy rather than an aggressive interventionist 
mechanism which some of the disjointed reasoning applied in the 1950’s cases gave it 
an opportunity to be.  
 
The remainder of the chapter will examine some of the relevant restrictions and 
jurisprudence that have emerged from other transition polities; specifically those who 
moved out of the shadow of Soviet communism in the early 1990’s. It will contend 
that in a similar vein to post war Germany, these polities have armed themselves with 
the legal weapons to defend democracy but in the main have utilised them extremely 
sparingly if at all. 
 
3:4 Post Communist Polities 
 
One of the potential difficulties that any newly emerging democracy faces is to 
establish democratic competition as the norm. There is a danger that the electoral 
arena simply becomes a playground within which old enmities battle for State power 
and that once achieved, the winning party uses such power to restrain or even remove 
the prospect of continuing competition. With reference to the newly independent 
countries that emerged from the de-colonization process in the years after the 2
nd
 
World War, Samuel Issacharoff has noted 
 
“In country after country, the dispiriting lesson of experiments in 
democratic rule was that elections were a brief transition between 
the overthrow of colonialism and the rise of one-party or one-man 
autocracy. If anything, the elections served primarily to legitimate 
109 
 
the control that one faction had on state authority as it went about 
the often violent task of eliminating its political opponents.”428 
 
With regard to the potential vulnerability of a newly functioning democratic order, it 
would be reasonable to argue that those societies in Eastern Europe which emerged 
from Communist rule in the early 1990’s are potentially susceptible to an attack from 
within. With specific concern to a threat from a reconstituted Communism, Eva 
Brems has argued that 
 
“ If ‘threat’ is the main criterion, there are good reasons to argue 
that the threat of communism is more serious in today’s post 
communist states, where communist parties may still have a 
substantial basis of support among the population, or a potential of 
easily winning it back, for example in times of severe economic 
crises.”429 
 
In addition to the potential threat posed by a reconstituted Communism, Andras Sajo 
has identified a further two ‘foundational’430 risks to post-Communist democracies. 
These are a growth in extreme nationalist movements or ethnicity based political 
groupings alongside a ‘partly related’431 resurgence in right wing extremism. In 
recognition of the existence  of these foundational risks, an examination of the new 
post-communist constitutions reveal a variety of provisions infused with similarities 
to those adopted by the ‘militant democracy’ of post-war Germany. These provisions 
exhibit a desire to protect democratic governance from both a general misuse of 
majoritarian power as well as specific manifestations of perceived threats in the form 
of political parties.
432
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3:4:1 Constitutional Provisions 
In general terms, the new Constitutions have attempted to guard against the danger of 
unrestrained majoritarianism by inter alia, organizing the new electoral mechanisms 
as manifestations of the principles of proportional representation and with the 
exception of Estonia
433
created superior courts (Supreme or Constitutional) with the 
power to ‘enforce the democratic commands of the constitution.’434 Just as the 
introduction of proportional representation can be viewed as a defence mechanism 
against an unwarranted accumulation of power by one political party or bloc, the 
creation of newly formed courts can help ‘protect the vitality of democratic 
competition’435by upholding the rights to expression and association of those who 
find themselves in a temporal minority. 
 
“…the role of constitutional courts as a buffer against unchecked 
majoritarian power in the first stages of democratic rule alters the 
dynamics of the initial constitutional balance. Courts may emerge as 
a pole of independent authority ensuring a corrective against the 
inherent frailties of democracy. At the stage of constitutional 
formation, the argument runs, the creation of constitutional courts 
alters the political equilibrium and results in a greater margin of 
protection for political and other minorities. At the very least, the 
presence of such courts makes it more difficult for the first 
generation of political rulers to disregard the terms of the founding 
political balance.”436 
 
With specific respect to political parties, Priban and Sadurski
437
 have noted that those 
who framed the post Communist democratic constitutions had to deal with two 
conflicting political impulses. Firstly, the ‘unfortunate experience with one party 
rule’438 meant that there existed a tendency to celebrate the principles and stress the 
importance of a pluralistic party system. On the other hand, there was a corresponding 
recognition that the move from a Communist system to a democratic and capitalist 
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society and the consequent social and economic turmoil may act as a stimulus for the 
growth of anti-democratic and extremist groups (similar to those referenced by Sajo) 
from which the new democracy might need protection. 
 
“On the other hand, social dislocation combined with the ideological 
vacuum left by the demise of an all-encompassing orthodoxy posed 
fertile ground for anti-democratic, often extremist organisations, 
aiming to cater for the needs of large numbers of disillusioned and 
impoverished voters.”439 
 
This fear of a return to totalitarianism inspired a number of the new polities to follow 
the example of Germany and not only establish a clause entrenching a system of 
democratic government
440
 but also adopt ‘… relatively wide ranging means of 
regulating parties based on their potential to threaten democracy.’441 With specific 
regard to political parties, the inherent tension between the desire to celebrate and yet 
at the same time place limitations on the principle of political pluralism is evident in 
many of the relevant constitutional provisions. The Bulgarian Constitution, for 
example, states that while parties ‘facilitate the formation and expression of the 
citizens’ political will’,442 it also asserts that ‘there shall be no political parties on 
ethnic, racial or religious lines, nor parties which seek the violent seizure of state 
power.’443 Similarly, while the Constitution of the Czech Republic asserts that its 
political system ‘is based on the free and voluntary foundation and free competition of 
political parties’,444 it proceeds to assert that such parties must ‘respect the 
fundamental democratic principles’ and renounce force as a means of promoting their 
interests.’445 The Polish Constitution states that the purpose of political parties ‘shall 
be to influence the formulation of the policy of the state by democratic means’446 but 
then goes on to place substantial limits on the type of party allowed to influence state 
policy. 
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“Political parties and other organizations whose programmes are 
based upon totalitarian methods and the modes of activity of 
Nazism, Fascism and Communism, as well as those whose 
programmes or activities sanction racial or national hatred, the 
application of violence for the purpose of obtaining power or to 
influence the State policy, or provide for the secrecy of their own 
structure or membership shall be prohibited.” 
 
While it can be argued that the constitutional provisions celebrating pluralism reflect 
the principles of popular sovereignty and representation, what is clear from the 
provisions establishing limitations to pluralism is that the requirements of 
constitutional legitimacy for parties are evidently substantive. Consequently, such 
provisions allow for parties to be deemed constitutionally illegitimate on the basis of 
their profession of particular views and goals. The danger to the principles of equal 
respect and changeability is self evident. Political parties may be prohibited not 
because they necessarily pose a fundamental threat to the continuation of democratic 
government but that they simply challenge either a ‘dominant national ideology’447or 
the interests of those currently in the political ascendancy. 
 
“…a ban on [a] party on the basis that its aims are unconstitutional 
may simply be a disguised attempt to entrench the political status 
quo by those benefitting most from current constitutional 
arrangements.”448 
 
However, despite the existence of a number of constitutional opportunities for the 
regulation or prohibition of anti-democratic actors, there has been a noticeable lack of 
enthusiasm for putting such restrictions into practice.
449
 This means that there exists a 
relative dearth of jurisprudence in support of prohibition. Indeed, most of the relevant 
judicial reasoning errs on the side of protecting rather than restricting the rights of 
parties. A corresponding and perhaps contributory factor to the lack of enforced 
restrictions is that even when they are applied by a post communist Constitutional 
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Court, they are almost always adjudged by the European Court of Human Rights to  
have constituted a violation of the Article 11 right of freedom of association. Two 
relatively recent cases with regard to Communist parties illustrate these reinforcing 
trends. 
 
3:4:2: Relevant Cases 
 
In 2001, a ten year old ban on the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) was revoked by 
the Ukrainian Constitutional Court.
450
 The initial ban had been enforced by executive 
decree in the days after Ukraine had declared its independence from the Soviet Union. 
The newly formed CPU was adjudged to be a continuation of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (CPSU) and was perceived therefore in the light of an attempted 
coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow to constitute a threat to Ukrainian 
independence. 
451
 The leadership of a subsequent reconstitution of the Communist 
Party (with 139 MPs)
452
 fought unsuccessfully to legislatively overturn the ban 
throughout the 1990’s but successfully petitioned the Court to accept the case in 
1997.
453
  The Court invalidated the decade old ban as an infringement of the 
constitutionally protected right of freedom of association.
454
 It justified its decision on 
two grounds. Firstly, it found that the CPU’s charter promised to ‘follow the laws and 
the Constitution.’455 Secondly, it found that the party which had been registered as a 
regular party in July 1991
456
 was a newly constituted party which was independent of 
the old CPSU which was deemed illegitimate as it had ‘…retained its leadership from 
the Soviet era.’457 
 
 The background to and reasoning applied within this case suggests acknowledgement 
of the diminishing nature of the perceived threat of Communism. The fact that a 
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newly constituted Communist party with significant electoral support were advocating 
a reversal of the ban is indicative of a toleration of Communism as a legitimate 
political viewpoint within the Ukrainian polity. The distinction made by the court 
between the Communist party of the Ukraine and that of the Soviet Union suggests 
that the level of the perceived threat of Communism is directly related to the current 
status of Ukraine’s historically difficult relationship with Russia or the old Soviet 
Union and not with the intricacies of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. 
 
A similar tolerance of Communist ideology has been exemplified by the European 
Court of Human Rights. In the case of Partidul Communistilor v Romania,
458
 the 
Strasbourg Court found that the refusal of the Romanian authorities to register a 
Communist party in 1996 constituted a violation of Article 11 of the Convention.
459
 
This decision is in line with other related jurisprudence. Following the guidelines of 
its own Venice Commission,
460
 the Court has consistently argued that in the absence 
of evidence relating to the use of violence or other undemocratic measures, adherence 
to a specific ideology does not constitute a sufficient basis for party closure.
461
 In 
regard to the specific Romanian case, the Court argued that while ‘Romania’s 
experience of totalitarianism’462meant that the restriction met the legitimate aims of 
‘being in the interests of national security and for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others’, it represented an unjustified interference in the pursuit of 
legitimate political aims and ideas. 
 
“…that context by itself cannot justify the need for the interference, 
especially as communist parties adhering to Marxist ideology exist 
in a number of countries which are signatory to the Convention.”463 
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The trend of an increasing tolerance towards Communist parties might (as in 
Germany) be partially explained by the lack of a specific and contemporary threat 
equal to that posed by the presence of the Soviet Union. However, this geopolitical 
reality evidently does not provide an explanation as to why ‘militant’ measures have 
not been frequently applied against extreme nationalist or right wing groupings. It is 
to this question that the chapter now turns. 
 
3:5 Explanations for Inaction 
The disparity between the availability of restrictive measures within transition 
democracies and the infrequency of their utilization cannot be explained in terms of 
an absence of extremist organizations. In a number of post-communist polities, there 
are examples of neo-Fascist, anti-Semitic and anti minority parties successfully 
campaigning and electorally prospering. Examples include the league of Polish 
Families who in 2001 acquired 7.9% in parliamentary elections and reached a high 
point of 15% in elections to the European Parliament in 2004
464
and the Movement for 
a Better Hungary (Jobbik) which achieved 16.7% in the first round of Hungary’s 2010 
parliamentary elections.
465
  The prominence of some of these groups suggests that an 
alternative explanation for the relative lack of prohibition is required. 
 
Priban and Sadurski offer three complementary explanations.
466
 Firstly, they argue 
that given most of these countries’ recent totalitarian pasts, there exists a ‘clear and 
legitimate aversion’467 to the utilisation of restrictions against political parties.  
Secondly, they argue that there exists a deeply held view that anti-democratic parties 
should be defeated and confronted within a political rather than legal arena. This view 
(with clear reference to events that occurred in Weimar Germany) is partly 
conditioned by the fear that legal restrictions may provide extremist groups a judicial 
forum out of proportion to their actual influence which could then be used to create a 
perception of martyrdom which would assist in the spread of their ideology.
468
 These 
two explanations reflect the existence of ‘…good faith disagreements within post 
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communist states on the limits of justified tolerance for extremists and those who are 
themselves intolerant.’469  The third and final explanation is, however, potentially 
more troublesome. It is that the dearth of attempted prohibitions may be related to ‘a 
hidden indirect sympathy for the programmes of extremist parties and movements’470 
both within the corridors of power and society at large.  
 
“In [post communist states] as universally, tolerating the intolerant 
is often not based on principled liberalism but driven by purely 
pragmatic considerations…or on a degree of identification with the 
intolerant.”471 
 
Whatever the differing motivations underlying relative inaction and as Priban and 
Sadurski note ‘the borderline between[them]…are fluid’,472 the potentially 
questionable nature of some of them should not necessarily be used as an argument in 
favour of more concerted action. While these parties may profess ideas or present 
policies which are premised on a denial of the principle of equal respect, a subsequent 
refusal to legally tolerate political organization around such ideas would represent an 
arguably greater violation of the same principle. As Eva Brems has argued such a 
policy may also have negative symbolic effects and be counter-productive. 
 
“The first few years of democracy after transition have an 
educational function, and radical measures such as party closure 
may give a repressive impression and suggest that in terms of 
political freedoms, the new regime is not all that different from the 
old one.”473 
 
 It is evident that with regard to parties perceived to hold extreme nationalist or right 
wing views, the actions or lack thereof of relevant authorities within post-communist 
policies have largely assuaged such concerns. The dominant trend within post-
communist polities has (for conflicting reasons) been a non or under utilization of 
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available restrictive measures. Recent events in the Czech Republic, however, suggest 
a tentative step in a more restrictive direction. 
 
3:6: The Worker’s Party Case 
In 2010, the extreme right Worker’s Party474 was dissolved within the Czech 
Republic. In February, the Supreme Administrative Court made the decision
475
 to 
dissolve the party by judicial resolution, a decision upheld by the Constitutional Court 
in May.
476
 Founded in 2002, the party was for the first few years of its existence ‘one 
out of several inconsequential groupings of the extreme right whose short-term 
alliances usually ended in personal and ideological disputes.’477 In 2007, it formed an 
alliance with ‘neo-nazi militants’478 who ‘were looking for a political platform that 
would allow them to penetrate into the party system’.479 In 2008, the party established 
paramilitary units which, though unarmed, clashed with representatives of the Roma 
community and police numerous times throughout the remainder of 2008 and the 
early months of 2009.
480
 These incidents raised the party’s profile and in the European 
Elections of 2009, it received just over 1% of the popular vote,a percentage which 
although relatively miniscule made it ‘eligible to receive funding the state provides 
for political parties.’481 In response to petitions received by concerned anti-racist 
groups and organizations representing the Jewish and Roma communities, the 
government initiated proceedings through the courts to dissolve the party.
482
 
 
3:6:1 Legal Context of Dissolution 
The Constitution of the Czech Republic
483
 states that 
 
“The political system is founded on the free and voluntary formation 
of and free competition among those political parties which respect 
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the fundamental democratic principles and which renounce force as 
a means of promoting their interests.”484 
 
It then proceeds to establish the right of citizens to ‘… form political parties and 
political movements and to associate therein.’485 However, limitations may be placed 
on the exercise of this right if such measures are  deemed‘… necessary in a 
democratic society for the security of the state, the protection of public security and 
public order, the prevention of crime, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.’486 In addition to this loose constitutional framework, there also exists a law on 
association in political parties and movements
487
 which allows for a judicial resolution 
mandating dissolution if the party in question has objectives or indulges in activities 
which inter alia breach the Constitution,
488
 endanger public order or civil rights
489
 or 
involve the establishment of armed units.
490
 It was on the basis of these legal 
provisions that the relevant courts justified their findings that dissolution was 
appropriate. 
 
3:6:2 Judicial Reasoning 
In the original decision to dissolve the extreme right workers’ party,491 the Supreme 
Administrative Court argued that dissolution represented a warranted interference 
with associational rights. Firstly, the continued toleration of the party would threaten 
the rights of others as its programme 
 
“…has as its objective inciting national, racial, ethnic and social 
intolerance and, as a consequence, an attempt to limit the basic 
rights and freedoms of certain  groups of Czech Republic’s 
inhabitants, especially minorities (typically Roma, but also 
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Vietnamese and Jewish, plus immigrants more generally and 
individuals of different origins, skin colour or sexuality).”492 
 
Secondly, the party also fundamentally breached the intent behind Article 5 of the 
Constitution. Rather than respecting the principle of free political competition, the 
party ‘in asserting its interests…does not renounce violence, its activities incite this 
violence and the party also publicly approves and glorifies violence committed by its 
members and sympathisers.’493 The Constitutional Court in upholding the dissolution 
argued that constitutional protection of an equal political right to contest the processes 
of popular sovereignty of freedom of association is itself contingent on the adoption 
of ideas and behaviours premised on equal respect. 
 
“This free competition should be understood primarily as a 
competition of thoughts, ideas and conceptions of how to administer 
the modern state at the beginning of the 21st century and how to 
face the challenges brought by that era. It should not therefore 
consist in setting the various groups of inhabitants against each 
other, in adoration of violence or in flooding the public space with 
poison. We must always face the evil, irrespective of the form it 
assumes.”494 
 
Whether the decision to abolish the worker’s party represents the first step towards a 
more consistent utilisation of restrictive legislation or merely a blip within an 
established tradition of non-utilisation still remains to be seen. Supporters of the 
decision may contend that while an equal right to participate within the processes of 
popular sovereignty has undoubtedly been subject to interference, contemporary 
opinion polls suggested that over 75 % of the population supported dissolution of the 
Workers Party and any party committed to ‘racial intolerance, xenophobia and innate 
violence’495 thus giving popular support to a broader and deeper statement on the 
importance of equal respect. Detractors such as the liberal journalist Peter Zantovsky 
echo the earlier observations of Priban and Sadurski in criticising the ban in terms of 
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its limitation of genuinely free debate and its potential to counter-productively create 
martyrs of what was ostensibly an electorally insignificant rump. 
 
“Bans, restrictions, persecutions, arrests, street skirmishes—this is 
the proper territory of extremists, this is the place where they 
become perfectly visible and our media will gladly provide them 
with space on their front pages. In addition, the leaders of the party 
will draw above their heads the halo of those who suffer for their 
convictions. And this is where it gets really dangerous. There is only 
one way: if we want to strip bare the Workers’ Party and similar 
groups, let them speak. Let them say freely what they have to say. It 
is only in a free discussion that the true content of their rhetoric 
becomes apparent, and a discerning citizen can then make a free 
choice—and I also believe that it will be a reasonable one.”496 
 
3:7 Conclusion: Transition Democracies and the Four Principles 
When analysed together, it is evident that the militant democracy of Germany and the 
post-communist transition societies of Eastern Europe display similar characteristics. 
Given their common totalitarian past, it is perhaps understandable that there exists 
within the relevant constitutions, measures facilitating the prohibition of political 
parties ostensibly for the purpose of defending their own explicitly substantive 
conceptions of democracy. While the availability of such restrictions undoubtedly 
raises conceptual challenges to the four guiding principles, their inclusion within 
democratic constitutions drafted within the temporal shadow of a recent totalitarian 
past is both understandable and mainly symbolic. The fact that, for the most part, the 
relevant Constitutional Courts have been spared the task of grappling with these 
difficult questions due to a relative paucity of attempts at prohibition lends a degree of 
credence to this analysis. 
 
It is contended that the relatively small number of attempted prohibitions warrant a 
finding that the four principles presently co-exist in a balance amenable to the 
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continued existence of substantive disagreement. In the case of Germany, the lack of 
relevant cases since the 1950’s signifies a consolidation of democracy as well as a 
corresponding diminution of a perceived threat. The diminution of a perceived threat 
from the ideologies of totalitarianism has facilitated a greater tolerance within the 
polity for ideas premised on radical change. Consequently, there has been a gradual 
acceptance that holders of such views should be afforded equal rights to seek 
representation for them by contesting the processes of popular sovereignty. In eastern 
Europe, while it has been argued that the tendency not to enforce prohibition 
measures against the extreme right  is a sign of ‘condemnable leniency’497 towards 
viewpoints which potentially erode the principle of equal respect in relation to 
specific social issues: it is contended that an aggressive approach which utilises 
prohibition in the early years of democracy  is likely to be counterproductive to the 
aim of  upholding and defending the very same system against its potential enemies. 
Prohibition by overtly stating that the processes of both collective deliberation and 
popular sovereignty are not equally open to all would potentially undermine the 
public legitimacy of democracy as a whole. More specifically, it might convince 
holders of radical views that their political goals can only be achieved or even 
represented by resorting to methods premised upon a fundamental denial of equal 
respect. 
The following jurisdiction of Israel exhibits a large degree of similarity with the 
jurisdictions discussed in this chapter. As is the case with them, Israel has clear 
legislative provisions allowing for restrictions on political parties. Also, like the 
relevant jurisdictions, these provisions have been extremely sparingly enforced. They 
differ however in a couple of distinct ways. Firstly, the reason for the sparing 
enforcement of legislative provisions within Israel have less to do with a lack of 
political will emanating from a recent totalitarian history but by the existence of a 
high evidentiary threshold established in case law by the country’s Supreme Court to 
protect relevant rights from potentially over-zealous politicians. Secondly, the 
restrictions enshrined in Israeli Law are more concerned with the right to contest 
elections rather than the right to organize and campaign around a set of shared ideals. 
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        CHAPTER 4 
 Israel: The distinction between words and actions 
 
4:1 Introduction 
 
The adoption of either a purely procedural or substantive approach to the question of 
party prohibition is problematic. An entirely procedural approach seems indifferent to 
the dangers that popular anti-democratic movements potentially pose to democracy at 
large. As will be evidenced later, it is surely no coincidence that those modern 
democracies (such as the US and UK) which principally utilise a procedural approach 
tend to be free of large influential anti-democratic political movements. Conversely, 
an equation of democracy with particular substantive ends as has been evident in the 
jurisdictions of Turkey and Spain facilitates a reduction in their areas of democratic 
contestation by tolerating the suppression of parties like Refah and Batasuna who do 
not adhere to a particular temporal consensus. Such a contention both exposes and 
reflects the real dilemmas at the heart of the issue of party prohibition. 
 
“Democracy may be in jeopardy because of ‘underprotection’, 
because the enemies of democracy are treated leniently, and because 
state intervention, conditioned on there being clear and present 
danger, may come too late to be effective. On the other hand, an 
activist self defending democracy may pose dangers of democratic 
‘overprotection’, of encroachment on free speech, and of also 
applying this policy against democratic opponents of a regime.”498 
 
This chapter will briefly revisit this dilemma and will argue that an examination of 
relevant Israeli law and its subsequent application by the country’s Supreme Court 
reveals a fundamental difference in the approach taken by the main legislative and 
judicial bodies
499
 which is illustrative of the opposing paradigms in the debate 
surrounding the legitimacy of restrictions. It will assert that while the relevant Israeli 
legislation that allows for exclusion display clear signs of ‘militancy’, recent 
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interpretation of these laws by the Israeli Supreme Court utilises a clear distinction 
between words and action which places the relevant jurisprudence within a mainly 
procedural paradigm. It will also contend that the Israeli practice of allowing parties  
deemed  illegitimate to continue organizing and campaigning while excluding them 
from the electoral arena also rests on a fundamental distinction between words and 
actions but on one which defines actions on a more speculative, less stringent legal 
standard than that applied by the Court. 
 
4:2: Procedural v Militant Democracy revisited 
 
In a book chapter published in 2009.
500
 Benjamin Neuberger distinguishes between 
the procedural and militant schools of thought in terms of geography. He argues that 
proceduralism can be described as an ‘American’ approach whereas a more militant 
approach is designated as a ‘European’ characteristic. As we will see in the final 
substantive chapter, the U.S. Supreme Court has primarily adhered to a procedural 
approach. It is also evident from the jurisdictions examined thus far that a more 
militant approach has emerged and has mainly been applied within Europe. However, 
the variety and complexity of approaches applied within the continent of Europe mean 
that such a distinction is not entirely accurate. A more accurate and explanatory 
distinction also utilised by Neuberger is between a ‘diminishing’ and ‘expanding’ 
approach.
501
 ‘Diminishing’ denotes reducing or strictly limiting the number of legal 
restrictions on expression and association in order to uphold democracy while the 
contrasting ‘expanding’ approach is clearly prepared to  defend democratic 
governance by increasing the application of similar restrictions. 
 
Those who align themselves to a diminishing approach argue that there can be ‘no 
democracy without risks.’502 They argue that democracies must allow for the 
expression of ‘anti- democratic’ views as the harm done to democracy by prohibiting 
such speech outweighs any potential harm inflicted on democracy by allowing such 
expression. Tolerating anti-democratic expression will protect democracy by allowing 
the holders of such views to have their opinions publicly aired and thus defuse the 
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possibility that such citizens will be pushed towards covert and potentially violent 
activity. 
 
“But can a democracy be tolerant in its defence against anti-
democratic tendencies? It can to the extent that it must not suppress 
the peaceful expression of anti-democratic ideas. It is just by such  
tolerance that democracy distinguishes itself from autocracy. We 
have a right to reject autocracy and to be proud of our democratic  
form of government only as long as we maintain this difference. 
Democracy cannot defend itself by giving itself up.”503 
 
Central to this argument is a fundamental distinction between words and actions. 
Freedom of expression is considered inviolable and must be defended at all costs and 
at all times. This is to be contrasted with freedom of action which cannot be defended 
if relevant acts are either criminal and/or violent. Conversely, proponents of a militant 
or expanding approach argue that there is often a logical connection that can be made 
between both the expression of words and commission of actions and consequently an 
unrestricted tolerance of anti- democratic expression presents a stronger threat to 
democracy than targeted and specific legal restrictions. 
 
“ The guardians of self-defending democracy are aware of the 
danger that a self defending democracy may glide along the slippery 
slope toward dictatorship, but they agree that the dangers of an 
absolutist ‘purist’ approach democracy granting its gravediggers all 
the rights and tools is often much greater.”504 
 
It is evident, therefore, that the debate concerning whether or not a clear distinction 
can be made between the effects of words and actions is often utilised to support 
either a diminishing or expanding approach towards party prohibition. In general 
terms, while a link between word and action is often sought to justify the restriction of 
political rights; support for the contention that a clear distinction exists between word 
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and action has often been used to invalidate the legitimacy of legal restrictions on 
expression and association. What is interesting about the Israeli polity is that while  
such a distinction has been utilised by the Supreme Court to invalidate legislative 
restrictions on specific forms of political association; a similar distinction has been 
applied by the legislature to justify the existence and of the very same restrictions. 
 
4:3:Israeli Law on Political Parties 
Contemporary Israeli statutes on political parties effectively set up a system of 
‘double review’505 where a party can be disqualified at two distinct stages. These are 
at the time of initial registration and at election time where party lists can be excluded 
from contesting elections to the Knesset. With regard to the latter, Section 7A of the 
Basic Law relating to elections to the Knesset states 
 
“A list of candidates will not take part in the elections to the Knesset 
nor shall an individual person be a candidate for the Knesset if the 
goals or deeds of the list or the deeds of the person explicitly or 
implicitly are one of the following: 
 
1 reject the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic 
state; 
2 incite to racism; 
3  support the armed struggle of an enemy state or a terrorist  
         organization against the State of Israel.” 
 
While the stated grounds for excluding a party list from the electoral process and their 
implications will be discussed in detail later, what is interesting from a comparative 
perspective is that disqualification at initial registration requires additional necessary 
conditions than those required for electoral exclusion. Specifically, Section 5(3) of the 
Parties Law of 1992 states that a decision not to register must also be based upon a 
finding that  
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“…any of its purposes or deeds, implicitly or explicitly 
contains…reasonable grounds to deduce that the party will serve as 
a cover for illegal actions.” 
 
The requirement to establish a direct link with unlawful conduct to justify 
disqualification at the initial registration stage is suggestive of recognition that  
absolute prohibition of a political party is an inherently more draconian measure than 
simply forbidding it from competing within the processes of popular sovereignty. 
Consequently, the subsequent gap in protection at these two distinct stages can be 
viewed as ‘…inviting courts to apply a more stringent standard before a party is 
outlawed altogether and a less rigorous standard when a party is being merely 
disqualified from having its members elected to the Knesset.’506 Such an approach, 
while consistent with the procedural view that restrictive measures require proof of 
illegitimate actions as well as words, raises new and fundamental questions. It clearly 
allows a situation where although parties are allowed to exist, recruit and organize 
themselves around what are deemed to be ‘reprehensible’ ideas507, they are 
simultaneously denied the opportunity to contest elections and acquire the political 
power necessary to put such ideas into practice. This, according to Samuel Issacharoff  
 
“…leads directly to the question whether democracies may regulate 
the political arena on a basis distinct from that underlying the 
regulation of speech, association and assembly generally.”508 
 
This question has clearly been answered in the affirmative by Raphael Cohen-
Almagor. 
 
“In a nutshell: I see significant difference between the right to free 
expression and the right to be elected to parliament. We cannot and  
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we should not employ the same standards of tolerance for both. 
Simply put: words are different from ability to legislate. Therefore, 
a wider scope of tolerance is reserved for free expression than for 
free election.”509 
 
While a distinction between words and action has traditionally been applied to 
invalidate legal restrictions on political parties, a similar distinction is utilised here in 
order only to justify restrictions on parties within the electoral arena. However, 
actions are defined, not in respect of attributable criminal or illegal conduct, but in 
terms of the potential power to effect undesirable legislation that access to the 
electoral arena and public office may bestow. 
 
“Both the existence of the State and its democratic regime are basic 
conditions, and only when these conditions are present can the right 
to be elected (and to elect) like other rights be taken into 
account…They should therefore be ensured, and defending them 
against those seeking to subvert them is justified even when doing 
so violates the right to be elected.” 510 
 
Part of this fear within an Israeli context may lie in the fact that Israel has an electoral 
list system that is almost purely proportional and subsequently produces a Knesset 
‘that reflect(s) almost exactly the various political divisions of the electorate.’511 
While a purely representative legislative body may be considered a good thing, the 
fractured nature of such representation makes it potentially more difficult for a 
governing majority to be established and thus increases the possibility that the views 
(extremist or otherwise) of smaller parties may be given consideration out of 
proportion to their support within the whole electorate as a possible price for 
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participation within or at least support of a prospective coalition government. Those in 
favour of an ‘expanding approach’ towards restricting participation within the 
processes of popular sovereignty argue that it is better to deny electoral and 
consequently legislative representation to extremist parties than allow them (in the 
context of specific election results), a position of undue prominence and influence. 
 
“It bears mentioning that different electoral systems or thresholds 
may be crucial variables in explaining the legal means taken by 
different democracies to ban certain parties. Hence the United 
States, with its plurality single member districts and strong two-
party system, and Germany, with its 5 percent threshold, enjoy good 
structural protection from extreme elements in parliament. Israel, 
with its highly proportional system and low threshold, enjoys no 
such protection.”512 
 
However, while these specific contextual factors may help partially explain the Israeli 
practice of excluding party lists from the electoral arena; acknowledgement of such 
factors does not necessarily grant the process of electoral exclusion a consequent 
legitimacy. Indeed, it is contended that the effects do not necessarily achieve a 
satisfactory balance between the four principles of democracy. 
 
4:3:1: Electoral Exclusion and the Four Principles 
In general terms, it can clearly be argued that exclusion from the electoral arena is a 
less restrictive measure than outright abolition and as such is more respectful of the 
principle of equality in that the individuals associated with relevant parties are still 
afforded rights of expression and association. It does, however, indisputably represent 
a diluted principle of equality which arguably brings more attention to the potential 
violation of the other three principles. Exclusion from the electoral arena constitutes a  
clear dilution of the principles of representation and changeability in that adherents of 
what are deemed to be extremist views are denied the opportunity to both challenge 
for and attain public office and achieve temporal legislative recognition of such ideas. 
With regard to the specific principle of  popular sovereignty, while the denial of an 
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opportunity to compete at the ballot box represents an obvious deviation, a full and 
informed evaluation of whether a major violation of the principle has taken place may 
depend upon an informed assessment of either or both the popularity of the party in  
question (which may be well nigh impossible due to its exclusion) or the attitude of 
the public at large towards the relevant prohibition. 
 
 A more accurate and informed evaluation of the efficacy and legitimacy of the Israeli 
approach, however, must combine both a general overview of the system with a 
specific examination of both the relevant legislation and jurisprudence which has 
emerged from the Israeli Supreme Court’s interpretation of statute. It will be 
contended that while the relevant legislative provisions represent an expanding 
approach threatening to democratic principles; for the most part, the Israeli Supreme 
Court have utilised a ‘diminishing’ methodology more consistent with underlying 
democratic values. 
 
4:3:2: Establishing Statutory Grounds for Exclusion 
In 1984, the Israeli Supreme Court invalidated a decision by the Central Elections 
Committee to deny participation in forthcoming elections to the Eleventh Knesset to 
party lists from both the left and right of the political spectrum which the Committee 
deemed to be too extreme.
513
The decision
514
 to invalidate was based at least partially 
on the absence of a specific legal directive sanctioning such actions. The absence of a 
relevant statutory provision was held to constitute a violation of the political rights of 
the relevant parties and subsequently their participation in the elections was secured. 
 
In response to this decision, the newly elected Knesset quickly legislated for an 
amendment
515
 to Section 7A of the Basic Law: Knesset. This amendment established 
legal grounds on which the electoral exclusion of entire party lists could be justified.  
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The newly amended law stated that 
 
“A list of the candidates shall not participate in Knesset elections if 
any of the following is implied or expressed in its purposes or 
deeds: 
1. Denial of the existence of the State of Israel as the State of the 
Jewish people; 
2. Denial of the democratic character of the state; 
3. Incitement to Racism.” 
 
Mordechai Kremnitzer has suggested that the amendment essentially represents a 
political compromise between left and right factions within the Knesset who desired a 
legal basis for the disqualification of party lists of which they did not approve: on one 
hand those who promoted or incited racism and on the other those who argued for the 
negation of Israel as a Jewish state.
516
 It can similarly be argued that subsequent 
decisions to exclude are also essentially political in nature in that the authority to 
disqualify is entrusted to a Central Elections Committee which is composed of elected 
Knesset members whose party allegiance is in rough proportion to that of the Knesset 
as an entire body.
517
 While it is true that the Committee is chaired by a Supreme Court 
Justice and that its decisions are subject to review by the Court, an argument can be 
legitimately advanced that ‘…allowing politicians to decide the qualification of other 
politicians for parliamentary membership is an idea that is structurally flawed.”518 The 
potential for tension between the stated goal of ensuring the continued democratic  
character of the state and opportunities for politicians to restrict those who oppose 
them is clearly evident. 
 
“Thus, one of Israel’s primary legal means of enshrining 
its…democratic character allows for politically dominant blocs to 
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alter the boundaries of political inclusion whenever and however 
they see fit.”519 
 
In 2002, Section 7A of the Basic Law: Knesset was amended again to what is its 
present form. This was in large part a response to both a renewed period of political 
and societal upheaval as well as the immediate post 9/11 political climate.
520
 Its 
present formulation states 
 
“A list of candidates will not take part in the elections to the Knesset nor shall an 
individual person be a candidate for the Knesset if the goals or deeds of the list or the 
deeds of the person explicitly or implicitly are one of the following: 
 
1. reject the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state; 
2. incite to racism; 
3. support the armed struggle of an enemy state or a terrorist organization against the 
State of Israel.”521 
 
An argument can be advanced that the grounds on which electoral exclusion can be 
legally justified present major challenges to the principles underlying the very 
democracy they are designed to protect.  
 
4:3:3: Potential Implications of  the present form of Section 7A 
Prior to the amended law listing the specific legal grounds on which a party can be 
disqualified from contesting a national election, it initially asserts that a party can be  
banned if its ‘goals or deeds’  can  be implicitly or explicitly deemed to meet at least 
one of the three stated criteria. Therefore, Section 7A clearly states that a party list  
can be excluded from the electoral arena on the basis of its implied goals as well as its 
explicit actions. Such an assertion clearly places the relevant legislation within a 
militant or expanding paradigm. Disqualification on the grounds of ideological goals 
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is not only a substantive violation of equality in that it discriminates against parties 
which adhere to specific ideas, it also subverts the principles of popular sovereignty, 
representation and changeability by effectively diluting the value of arguably the 
most central democratic right of all. 
 
“…disqualification also violates the freedom to vote: a group in the 
population whose values lead it to identify with the ideology of the 
rejected list will be unable to vote to the best of its consciences and 
preferences.”522 
 
With regard to the specific grounds for disqualification, a number of issues 
are worthy of discussion which also contain implications for the four guiding 
principles crucial to the epistemic virtues of democracy. 
 
Ground1: rejection of existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and 
Democratic state 
   
Whether  one aligns themselves to a procedural/diminishing or militant/expanding 
approach to party prohibition or disqualification, it is self evident that the continuing 
existence of a functioning State with a democratic system constitutes a necessary if 
not sufficient condition for the overall protection of democratic rights. Subsequently,  
parties who therefore profess an ideological commitment to or indeed take concrete 
actions towards the eradication of the existing State and/ or its democratic character 
may leave themselves vulnerable to disqualification. 
 
“It is the elementary right of every state to maintain its very 
existence and freedom, both against external enemies and those who 
follow from within…One cannot ask any government for the sake of 
freedom of association to accept the formation of a Fifth Column 
within the state’s borders.” 523 
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However, the conflation of the democratic character of the state with its Jewish 
identity raises troubling questions from a democratic perspective. While its Jewish 
identity may indeed be perceived as both a ‘constitutive’ and ‘defining’ feature of the 
contemporary state,
524
 an attachment to Judaism is not necessarily synonymous with 
its continuing existence. Subsequently, any attempt by a political party to remove or 
alter such an attachment cannot be equated with a desire to endanger the very 
existence of the State. Allowing for the electoral exclusion of a party on any grounds 
represents at least a dilution of the principles of popular sovereignty and 
representation. To do so on the grounds that a party refuses to recognise or adhere to 
the Jewish character of the State represents not only a dilution of but also a 
substantive violation of those of equality and changeability. 
 
As Armen Rosen has argued
525
, contemporary Israeli Society is clearly divided with 
‘a growing… gulf between [its] secular and religious Jews, as well as between its 
Jewish and Arab citizens.’526 Within such a context, a legal requirement to respect the 
Jewish nature of Israeli democracy represents a clear violation of the principle of 
equality. Firstly, such a requirement clearly leaves parties who represent the minority 
Arab population in a more vulnerable position. Secondly, depending on how the word  
‘Jewish’ is interpreted, there is also the potential for a deficit in protection between 
those who define their Jewishness primarily in relation to religion and those who do 
so with respect to ethnicity. 
 
“The identity of the state is a subject within rather than beyond the 
democratic discourse. The state’s founders have no acquired right to 
determine its character in perpetuity, determining, for instance, ties 
with a specific church, a specific religious quality, or the absence 
thereof. These are highly meaningful and vital questions, which 
cannot be excluded from the democratic discourse without deeply 
violating the essence of democracy.”527 
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With regard to changeability, the legal requirement to accept the Jewish nature of the 
state represents an effective entrenchment of Judaism as a defining characteristic. This 
clearly inhibits the prospect for democratically inspired change. 
 
“ It could be argued…that in any democracy [parties] should be 
allowed to strive to change the character of the state, as long as it is 
done in a democratic way, and as long as the purpose is not to 
abolish democracy.”528 
 
Ground 3: Support of an armed struggle or a terrorist organization against the State of 
Israel 
 
At first glance, this particular provision seems unproblematic. Disqualifying those 
whose main aim is the destruction of the State seems both a necessary and 
proportionate defensive measure. However, more careful scrutiny reveals issues 
which potentially raise fundamental questions relating to the Israeli democracy’s 
ability to ensure a healthy diversity of opinion. 
 
Firstly, Kremnitzer has noted in relation to Israeli foreign and military policy,
529
it 
might be possible under the law to disqualify a party list which challenged specific  
Israeli military operations. A potential example
530
 that he offers is of a party list which 
demands the withdrawal of Israeli Defence Forces from Southern Lebanon on the 
grounds that their presence is both a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and 
international law. He proceeds to argue that such a position could also logically 
legitimize and sanction an armed response by the Lebanese government in defence of 
their country. Such an argument could possibly be defined as ‘support for an armed 
struggle … against the State of Israel’ and therefore be used as a legal basis for 
disqualification. While such a scenario may seem politically unlikely given both the 
diversity and strength of opinion that exists within the Israeli polity in relation to its 
foreign and military policy, the essential point made is that the law as presently 
constituted may allow (in times of relative agreement and consensus) politically 
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dominant forces to disqualify those who present an electoral challenge to the existing 
consensus. The potential threat to the principle of changeability is clearly evident 
within such a scenario. 
 
Next, the use of the terms ‘implicit’ and ‘goals’ in conjunction with ‘support… for a 
terrorist organization’ raises similar issues as to those which will discussed in the 
following chapter with respect to the UK’s criminalisation of the ‘glorification’ of 
terrorism. If ‘support’ is defined in terms of an abstract attachment to the use of 
violence in the past, present or future, such a definition may potentially used a means 
for circumscribing access to the processes of popular sovereignty  by specific sections 
of the electorate thus diluting the Knesset’s purpose of accurately  reflecting all 
shades of opinion within the polity. Finally, with regard to equality; the  interpretation 
of  terrorism as an act which is solely directed at the ‘State of Israel’ allows for the 
possibility that support (whether active or tacit) for right wing violence against the 
minority population may be afforded greater protection than that directed against 
either the state directly or against the majority Jewish population. 
 
 
“ Focusing on the armed struggle against the state implies that a 
Jewish political body that engages in terrorism against Palestinian 
citizens (without inciting racism) is politically legitimate- per se a 
problematic consequence, both in regard to the phenomenon of 
terrorism, which is unjustifiable, and in regard to the equality 
principle.”531 
 
In summary, it is evident that the relevant statute concerning grounds for electoral 
disqualification can be placed squarely within a militant or expanding approach to 
legal restrictions. Not only does it dilute the principles of popular sovereignty and 
representation by allowing for exclusion at all, detailed scrutiny of the ideological 
goals that may under the law warrant disqualification  reveals a less than full 
commitment to the principles of equality  and changeability. However, such a 
contention does not necessarily place Israel squarely within a militant paradigm. 
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While it is incontestable that Section 7A allows for a substantive approach towards 
legal restrictions, the next section will illustrate that the Israeli Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the relevant provision is indicative of a more complex picture. Early 
cases seem consistent with the militant or expanding approach exemplified within 
current legislation. However, recent jurisprudence demonstrates a clear intention to 
proceed in a primarily procedural or diminishing direction. 
 
4:4: Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
 
4:4:1: Disqualification on the basis of a Party’s goals 
 
The earliest cases that the Supreme Court had to deal with in regard to party 
prohibition or disqualification clearly exhibit a tendency towards a militant approach.  
 
In 1964, a refusal to register an Arab Socialist Party known as El-Ard
532
 was upheld 
on the grounds that its professed goal of ‘national self determination for the Arab 
people in the whole of Palestine’533 was interpreted as ‘a denial of the legitimacy of 
the existence of the State of Israel.’534 One year later, the outlawed group formed a 
new party known as the Socialist List with the purpose of contesting the Knesset 
elections of 1965. The Supreme Court upheld a decision of the Central Elections 
Committee to disqualify the party list for similar reasons as those expounded a year 
previously.
535
 However, what is unusual about the decision is that in upholding the 
decision to disqualify, it can be argued that the Court arguably sanctioned a deviation 
from the principle of the rule of law.
536
 Whilst recognizing that  no  positive statutory 
provision existed allowing for disqualification relating to a party’s goals, the Court 
applied what was deemed to be to be ‘Supra-Constitutional principle’537 
 
“Just as a man does not have to agree to be killed, so a state too does 
not have to agree to be destroyed and erased from the map. Its 
                                                 
532
 Sabri Jeryis, Op cit 
533
 Neuberger, Op cit, 189 
534
 Ibid 
535
 EA 1/65, Yeredor v Chairman of Central Elections Committee for the Sixth Knesset 19 PD (3) 365 , 
1965 
536
 Navot, Op cit, 748 
537
 Neuberger, Op cit, 190 
137 
 
judges are not allowed to sit back idly and to despair from the 
absence of a positive rule of law when a plaintiff asks them for 
assistance in order to bring an end to the state. Likewise, no other 
state authority should serve as an instrument in the hands of those 
whose perhaps sole aim is the annihilation of the state.”538 
 
The first substantial deviation from this approach came in 1984 when the Central 
Elections Committee disqualified the Kach party. This party,under the leadership of 
an extreme right wing Rabbi called Meir Kahane, had previously argued in favour of 
policies that included the forcible deportation of Arabs, prohibition of marriage or 
sexual relations between Arab and Jew and the establishment of a theocratic Jewish  
State.
539
  The decision to disqualify was rejected by the Supreme Court on the grounds 
that no law existed at that time which justified disqualification for the profession of 
racist or anti-democratic views.
540
 It was further argued that the precedent established 
in the Socialist List case was not relevant as supra-constitutional principles only 
applied with regard to parties who denied the state’s right to exist. 
 
“There must always be a logical connection between the degree of 
danger and the means taken; and not any advocacy, even if it raises 
a justified indignation, may cause the denial of the entire scope of 
liberty. A democracy that activates restrictions without existential 
necessity…loses its spirit and force.”541 
 
What the contrasting approaches exhibited by these two cases illustrate is that in the 
absence of positive law that specifically provided legal bases for electoral exclusion, 
there is a protective deficit for parties of the extreme left compared to those of the 
extreme right. Neuberger has convincingly argued why such a gap may have existed. 
 
“While the Arab Nationalist threat is perceived as a threat to the 
very existence of the state or to its existence as a Jewish state, and 
only indirectly as a threat to democracy, the threats of the Jewish 
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extreme right are perceived as a direct threat against the democratic 
regime and not in any way a threat against the state and its Jewish 
character.”542 
 
 As previously discussed, it was partly in response to the failure to disqualify Kach 
that the 1985 amendment to the Basic Law was adopted. Subsequently, a further 
decision by the Central Elections Committee to disqualify the Kach list from the 1988 
elections was upheld by the Supreme Court on the grounds that the goals and deeds of  
prominent party members provided clear evidence of both incitement to racism and a 
desire to replace a democratic system of government with a theocracy.
543
 On a  
superficial level, the decision by the Court to uphold disqualification would seem to 
indicate the continuation of a militant or expanding approach. However, the Court 
adopted preconditions for disqualification which were more in keeping with a 
procedural or diminishing template. This specific case is of vital importance because 
the relevant elements created by Justice Shamgar during it have been ‘adopted since 
then by the Court in all its rulings concerning disqualification of list and parties.’544 In 
summary,
545
 the Court argued that in order to serve as a basis for disqualification, the 
illegitimate goals identified within the Basic Law must be dominant and constitutive 
factors of party doctrine. While the relative dominance of specific goals may be 
inferred from official party declarations and policy platforms, a mere abstract 
theoretical attachment to these goals does not suffice as a basis for disqualification 
unless accompanied by ‘persuasive, clear and unequivocal’ evidence546 that 
‘continued and consistent’547 actions have been taken in pursuit of the achievement of 
such goals. 
 
“The court demands proof that the list of candidates ‘is working to 
promote its goals for the purposes of transforming them from an 
idea into reality’548… As such, according to the case-law of the 
Israeli Court, no list can be disqualified purely on the basis of its 
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goals…The Supreme Court gave a negative answer to the question 
of whether a party can be disqualified exclusively on the basis of its 
illegitimate ideology and stressed the additional need for proof of its 
acts and activity.”549 
 
4:4:2 Support for Terrorism 
 
Between 1996 and 2002, the leader of the ‘Balad’ (Democratic National Assembly) 
Party, Dr Azmi Bishra emerged as a polarizing figure within the Israeli polity.
550
 Not  
only did he make several controversial statements regarding Israel’s right to exist as a 
Jewish homeland, he also travelled to many Arab Countries considered enemy states. 
It was during a visit to one of these countries, Syria in 2001, that he expressed support 
for the terrorist group, Hezbollah and its policy of ‘resistance’ to Israel in Southern 
Lebanon. This visit and pronouncement took place amidst a violent uprising (intifada) 
by the Palestinian people within the occupied territories. This uprising included the 
use of suicide bombings against Israeli citizens.
551
 Given such a febrile atmosphere 
and in the immediate post 9/11 climate, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Basic Law 
regarding disqualification was again amended to include ‘support’ for the ‘armed 
struggle of an enemy state or terrorist organization against the State of Israel.’552 On 
the basis of this amendment, the Balad List was disqualified for the 2003 Knesset 
elections. However, the Supreme Court overturned the decision by a margin of 7-4.
553
 
 
“The Court ruled that the statements attributed to MK Bishara did 
indeed express support for a terrorist organization, but it had not 
been proven with the required degree of certainty that Bishara 
supported the ‘armed’ struggle of a terrorist organization, and as 
such he could not be denied the right of candidacy in the Knesset 
elections.”554 
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With respect to what constitutes ‘support’ for an armed struggle, the Court stated that 
 
“This support may be material, in which case it is tantamount to 
actively participating in the struggle. This support may be political . 
. . this kind of political support may take different forms, all of them 
conferring legitimacy to the armed struggle against the state.”555 
 
While there is an absence of a clear definition of what constitutes political support, the 
Court’s subsequent reference to a need to identify ‘activity on the ground’556 as a 
ground for upholding disqualification suggests that in a similar vein to the question of 
a party’s pursuit of ideological goals, disqualification requires proof of action as 
opposed to an abstract theoretical commitment. This approach was given further 
reinforcement by the reasoning employed in two exclusion cases heard in 2009. 
 
4:5: The 2009 Cases 
In a case decided in January 2009, the Supreme Court overturned a decision by the 
Central Elections Committee to disqualify both the Balad and Ra’am Ta’al party lists 
for the Knesset elections of that year. The reasons for the decision to overturn the 
disqualification were not published until March 2011.
557
 The original decisions to 
disqualify the two lists were made in the Central Elections Committee by votes of 28  
out of 38 and 21 out of 38 respectively.
558
 The grounds for disqualification were that 
both parties were allegedly committed to the ‘rejection of Israel’s existence as a 
Jewish State’ and ‘support for the armed struggle of a terrorist organization.’559 
However, the Court overwhelmingly rejected the decision to exclude these parties 
from the forthcoming elections on the basis of an 8-1 vote in the case of Balad and a 
unanimous vote with respect to Ra’am Ta’al.560 
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The Court’s reasoning delivered by Chief Justice Beinisch paid deference to the 
militant provisions of Basic Law 7A but nevertheless continued with the Court’s 
previous procedural approach by asserting that ‘a cautious and very limited approach 
should be used, and strict requirements – legal and actual should be defined before 
making a decision to disqualify a party.’ 561 These legal requirements include an  
assessment whether the alleged goals of the relevant party lists were ‘dominant 
characteristics…central to the list’s aspirations or activities’562 and not simply 
‘marginal things whose impact on the ideological and operational whole is neither 
significant nor serious.’563 With respect to the assessment of the alleged goals as 
dominant characteristics, the Court reinforced previous rulings that in order for 
disqualification to be justified, there had to be ‘convincing, clear and unequivocal 
evidence’564 that the relevant party lists not only aspired to these goals but were acting 
in a consistent and concerted fashion to realise them. 
 
“Theoretical goals alone are not sufficient and a distant objective of 
an abstract nature set by a list competing [for the Knesset] is also 
not enough. It is necessary to show that a list is acting to realize 
goals charted in its platform and to put its ideas into practice. For 
the purpose of examining the de facto activity of a list, sporadic  
activity is not sufficient. Rather, there must be repeated and 
systematic activity that is expressed in a way that is severe and 
significant in its strength.” 565 
 
With respect to the specific parties in question, the Court found very little ‘evidentiary 
infrastructure’566 to uphold the exclusions. In the case of Balad, the quality of 
evidence was less than had been presented in the previous Balad case
567and ‘even by 
inference it was not proven… that the party should be disqualified based on these 
grounds.’568With regard to Ra’am Ta’al, the Court found that the relevant evidence 
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constituted ‘even much less’569 than that presented in support of the exclusion of 
Balad and subsequently that disqualification could also not be upheld. 
 
The Court also made serious criticisms of the Central Election Committee with 
respect to its original decisions to disqualify. It stated that there had been ‘no in-
depth’ discussion of the evidence at hand and that the Court’s criteria with respect to 
upholding disqualifications ‘formulated’ in previous rulings ‘were not 
examined.’570Any discussion which did take place was ‘conducted in the format of 
slogans without establishing a sufficient evidentiary infrastructure as mandated by the 
seriousness of this issue.’571 In making these criticisms, the Court apportioned at least 
partial responsibility to the ‘political’ nature of the committee thus expressing disquiet 
about the potential prospect of politicians utilising power to restrict opponents (which 
were expressed earlier in the chapter). 
 
“In addition, and as we already noted in the previous ruling by this 
court, the committee is a political body by its makeup, and its 
considerations are clearly political. This fact affects – even if only 
potentially – the extent of objectivity and seriousness of the  
discussion held in its framework. In the circumstances of the matter 
before us, it appears that this potential was realized, because here 
too it is evident that the guidelines and criteria stipulated in the court 
rulings were not given proper consideration when adopting the far 
reaching step of disqualifying lists from competing in elections.”572 
 
While the formal decisions by the Courts focus on the evidential basis for the 
application of the relevant law, it would be unrealistic to imagine that political and 
social considerations have played no role in the Court’s transition to a more 
procedural diminishing approach. With respect to the twin goals of both protecting 
democratic governance and reducing the incidence of terrorism, it is certainly 
conceivable that the Court views the potential damage that party disqualification may 
inflict in terms of a‘potential alienation’ of  the Arab minority is ‘perhaps not 
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proportionate to the actual risk posed to Israel’s society by the party’s activities.”573 
With respect to these considerations, the recent jurisprudence  of the Israeli Supreme 
Court makes a fundamental distinction between the effects of words and actions upon 
which is predicated  an inclusionary as opposed to exclusionary strategy towards the 
containment of political dissent. This inclusionary approach, it is contended, pays due 
consideration to the principles of equality and representation by facilitating continued 
contestation within the processes of popular sovereignty. The protection of the 
effective right to vote and be elected has trumped periodic attempts by politically 
motivated members of the Central Elections Committee to legitimise restrictions on 
the basis of temporal expressions of popular sovereignty which are themselves often 
predicated on a fear of the type of change that popular government, if unchecked, may 
construct. 
“Analysis of the case-law in Israel reveals that the Supreme Court of 
Israel was willing to define the extremist parties as minority anti-
system parties acting within the system, rather than as 
‘outlaws’…the Supreme Court in Israel will not allow the majority 
to curtail the political freedom of a political minority which poses 
no real threat… to the Jewish and democratic state.”574 
 
4:6: Conclusion: Israel and the Four Principles 
 
When the laws that have emerged from the Knesset regarding party disqualification 
are contrasted with and evaluated against the Supreme Court’s corresponding 
interpretation of them, it is evident that the Knesset and Court’s respective approaches 
are intrinsically divergent. As Suzie Navot has contended,
575
 if an imaginary scale of 
grounds for disqualification were applied ranging from the simple  expression of  
‘illegitimate’ views to  actual proof of violent or illegal actions  then the approaches 
exemplified by the Knesset and Court could be placed at or near the opposite ends. 
 
“In terms of this ‘scale’, the Basic Law (section 7A) places Israel at 
the same extreme that permits the ‘easy’ disqualification of terror-
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supporting parties. However, Israel’s Supreme Court ‘moved’ Israel 
from one extreme of the scale to almost the opposite extreme. In 
doing so it sent a clear message: banning a party from the political 
process in Israel would only be approved in extreme, exceptional 
cases in which there is clear and unequivocal proof of a severe 
violation of the grounds enumerated in the law. Although an 
explicit law had been adopted by the Knesset to facilitate the 
disqualification of specific parties; the Court refused to do so.”576 
 
With regard to the four guiding principles, it is clear that the very existence of 
electoral exclusion as a mechanism for limiting or containing political dissent 
represents at some level a violation of all four. Whilst parties which advocate specific 
changes which have been identified as illegal are allowed to continue to exist and 
recruit members, they are denied an equal opportunity to contest the processes of 
popular sovereignty and thus achieve legislative representation for the type of change 
they aspire to. The Supreme Court by contrast has by establishing a high evidentiary 
threshold for the justification of electoral exclusion shown itself to be willing to  
ignore temporal manifestations of popular sovereignty for the purpose of maintaining 
equal access to the mechanisms underlying the very same principle. 
 
If a common theme does exist between the approach of the main political and judicial 
bodies with regard to party disqualification, it is in the utilisation of a distinction 
between words and actions. However, even within this contention there exists a 
fundamental and substantive difference.  Legal exclusion from the electoral arena has 
been justified by a distinction between words and actions which defines action in 
prospective terms, by identifying ‘illegitimate’ goals or policies that a party may wish 
or be able to bring into effect if electorally successful. By contrast, by defining actions 
in terms of attributable illegal or violent conduct, the Supreme Court  has established  
judicial barriers to disqualification which have significantly strengthened the right of 
minority parties to present an electoral challenge to those in power.  
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“While the Supreme Court has accepted the “Defensive 
Democracy” theory reflected in Article 7A of the Basic Law in 
principle, it has consistently set a high evidentiary threshold in cases 
of disqualification of political parties. This may come as a reaction 
to the abuse of the disqualification process by the Knesset Elections 
Committee, which sometimes uses it to settle political accounts. It 
may also reflect the Court’s assessment that despite the legislature’s 
inclination to create more grounds for disqualification, Israeli 
democracy has reached a level of maturity in which such measures 
are largely redundant, and perhaps counterproductive.”577   
 
Israel, therefore, represents a complex case study. While like the transition 
democracies it has legislated for restrictions based on the protection of substantive or 
constitutive features of the relevant State, its sparing use of such provisions has been 
predicated on a procedural judicial approach rather than a number of fluid political 
factors. Despite the differing reasons for this, both the transition democracies and 
Israel exhibit a disconnect between their legislative ability to restrict political parties 
and their actual enforcement of the relevant provisions.  
 
The final two case studies of the United Kingdom and the United States operate 
within different parameters and as a consequence their overall approach to such 
matters differs greatly from the type of democracies previously discussed. They 
represent two long established, stable democratic polities and consequently their need 
and propensity to legislate for militant restrictions is less than other more fragile 
democracies. However, like the transition democracies and Israel though less 
obviously, they have at times both displayed tendencies at odds with their traditional 
approach. While both have unquestionably operated within a procedural paradigm, 
there have been and continue to be examples where both polities have sanctioned 
legal interventions with political rights in pursuit of substantive goals. 
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CHAPTER 5 
United Kingdom: Flexibility in the face of contingency 
 
 
‘Few British lawyers are acquainted with the term ‘militant democracy’578 
 
5:1 Introduction 
The quotation above indicates the absence of a tradition within United Kingdom law 
 which argues for the restriction of political rights with the aim of protecting the long 
term viability of a system of democratic governance. The lack of such a tradition is 
reflected in a relative absence of legislative provisions allowing for the restriction of 
political rights on constitutional grounds. This does not mean, however, that there 
exist no examples in UK law of the authorities restricting political rights in the name 
of pursuing legitimate societal goals. Indeed, while the United Kingdom (like the 
USA) has traditionally followed a primarily procedural approach to such matters; the 
conventionally unwritten nature of the UK constitution has (in theoretical terms) 
allowed massive scope for interference with political rights on substantive grounds. 
One of the tasks of this chapter will be to explain why the relevant authorities have 
not used the scope available to them to legally intervene in the political arena; thus 
keeping relevant restrictions both to a relative minimum and to areas not necessarily 
concomitant with the principles underlying militant democracy. 
 
This chapter will briefly acknowledge examples of such restrictions and the 
potentially wide template afforded to the authorities in implementing them. This can 
be explained by a legal context which places no formal limits on parliament’s ability 
to legislate and until very recently contained no formal written protections of relevant 
rights. It will argue, however, in the case of parties, that the lack of formal protection 
(based on a view that they are private associations) may have inter alia aided the 
actual procedural protection of such rights in that there has until recently existed no 
legal recognition of substantive goals upon the pursuit of which, interference with 
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specific rights may be justified. Correspondingly, it will also argue that the attempt to 
give further effect to specific rights in the form of the passage of the Human Rights 
Act may have in some cases had the practical effect of acting in contradiction to one 
of its main goals of ‘giving further effect to rights and freedoms’579 by providing for 
the first time explicit legal grounds on which interference with specific rights can be 
justified. 
 
It will then assess the legitimacy and implications of legislation and associated 
jurisprudence with reference to at least two of these stated grounds; namely the 
protection of  both public safety and the rights of others. It will proceed to 
acknowledge that while there now exists the potential for over-invasive interventions 
on substantive grounds, the tradition of a primarily procedural approach toward such 
rights  suggests that any attempt to locate the United Kingdom’s approach within 
either a purely procedural or substantive paradigm is both inaccurate and simplistic. 
Finally, this chapter will assess these developments against the template of the four 
guiding principles and assess whether the balance achieved between them facilitates 
the continuing availability of disagreement necessary for a vibrant, flourishing 
democracy. 
 
5:2: Constitutional Context 
 
In 1843,
580
 Karl Marx made a distinction between the idea of human rights which 
were related to the protection of individual autonomy from collective action and civil 
liberties which were ‘partly political rights, which are only exercised in community 
with others’581 whose purpose was to facilitate ‘…participation in the community, in 
the political community or state.’582 Implicit within Marx’s observations was a belief 
that not only was there a distinction in purpose between these types of rights but that 
such purposes existed in inherent opposition to each other. 
 
“There is also a suggestion that the two are contradictory rather than 
complementary, serving what may sometimes be conflicting goals: 
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one is designed to fuel the engine of democracy, and the other to act 
as its brake.”583 
 
This tension between the power of the collective polity and the rights of the individual 
is one that lies at the heart of most modern constitutions. What has made the United 
Kingdom unusual is the lack of a single codified document detailing the respective 
powers of government and the rights afforded to its individual citizens. In essence, the 
Constitution of the United Kingdom can be described as 
 
“…a body of rules, conventions and practices which describe, 
regulate, or qualify the organisation, powers and operation of 
government and relations between persons and public 
authorities.”584 
 
The United Kingdom has also adhered to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
Two of the major tenets of this doctrine are that, firstly, there are no effective 
restrictions on the legislative power of parliament and secondly, no parliament can 
pass legislation that effectively binds its successors. Such a situation has inevitably 
left the rights of individuals vulnerable to legislative action. The fact also that within 
the parliamentary system, executive power is premised on the ability to secure 
majority support for legislation has meant that traditionally, the United Kingdom has 
been perceived as 
 
“…not a country where everything done by government is 
prohibited unless expressly permitted; rather [it] is a country where 
everything done by government is permitted unless formally 
prohibited.”585 
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This untrammelled legislative and executive power was reconciled with individual 
liberties in the writing of A.V. Dicey.
586
 Dicey argued that individual liberties were 
protected due to the conception of the rule of law under the system of Common Law. 
He contended that such protections developed as a result of firstly, an 
acknowledgement of the principle of equality before the law allied to an observation 
that the system of Common Law evolved as a result of independent judicial decisions 
concerning the liberties of the individual. Dicey viewed the Common Law as a 
bulwark of liberal individualism against the potential misuse of legislative power 
residing in Parliament. It was to be the brake on democracy envisaged by Marx.  
 
In the early years of the twentieth Century, two cases showed that the Common Law 
could indeed be utilised to deny the extension of civil and political rights. In Nairn v 
St Andrews University
587
, it was declared that it was ‘…a principle of the unwritten 
constitutional law of this country that men only were entitled to take part in the 
election of representatives to parliament.’588 In Osborne589, the House of Lords struck 
down the imposition of a levy on Union members which purpose was ‘to promote 
parliamentary representation generally and the Labour Party in particular…’590 
arguing that working class representation in parliament was only acceptable ‘provided 
that they adapted to the values of the existing constitution in which the role of 
parliament was to advise and deliberate in the ‘national interest’, rather than to act in a 
concerted and predetermined way to promote the sectional interests of a particular 
class.’591 
 
Unsurprisingly therefore, it has been Parliament itself which has created the basic 
rights of political participation. Examples include the first major extension of the 
franchise in 1832,
592
 the adoption of the secret ballot in 1872
593
 and the establishment 
of women’s equal right to vote in 1928.594 In enacting such legislation, Parliament and 
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more specifically the House of Commons enhanced the underlying principles of 
democratic governance by both equalizing the conditions under which the processes 
of popular sovereignty operate and strengthening the popular legitimacy of those 
subsequently elected to represent the citizenry. Such measures also offered an 
increased prospect of economic and social change as those elected to implement 
legislation now had to take account of a wider array of economic and social interests. 
In widening the basis for political participation, parliament can be characterised as 
having provided the fuel for the engine of democracy. However, the dominant norm 
of parliamentary sovereignty contained the seeds of an underlying paradox.
595
 While 
parliament had fashioned and extended the tools of political participation, it retained 
the ability to both dilute and restrain their effective use. The effectively untrammelled 
right of parliament to change legislation meant that the procedural equality established 
through the processes of popular sovereignty remained vulnerable to restriction and 
contraction in pursuit of particular substantive ends.  The dominance of parliament 
was potentially a brake on as well as a fuel for democracy. 
 
“ We are thus immediately faced with the dilemma of democracy 
which is that only a  sovereign parliament can satisfy the 
requirement that the political and legal sovereign be representative 
and accountable, but in a representative and accountable democracy 
only a sovereign parliament can impose controls on the exercise of 
that sovereign power.”596 
 
The United Kingdom parliament has passed numerous measures either restricting or 
suspending certain rights of all or some of its citizens. As we shall see, these legal 
interventions have tended to be piecemeal in nature. When the activities of certain 
political actors have been deemed to be threatening, the inclination has been ‘to 
respond to the activities of a particular group in ways that speak concretely to the 
threat it appears to pose.’597Consequently, such interventions are often justified not in 
reference to philosophical theory but in light of the specific circumstances that exist. 
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This approach has been convincingly described as ‘flexibility in the face of 
contingency’598 
 
5:2:1Examples of Restrictions 
In the early years of the twentieth century, the United Kingdom Parliament passed 
legislation which heavily restricted the civil (if not explicitly political) rights of many 
citizens. For example, in relation to the struggle of Irish Nationalists to overthrow 
British rule, laws were passed which inter alia allowed for conferral of exceptional 
powers to the executive including the ability to impose martial law
599
as well as the 
application of internment,
600
,a power utilised by the Stormont Government of 
Northern Ireland almost fifty years later. While these measures can be viewed in 
context as being ‘militant’ in pursuit of substantive goals such as protecting both the 
territorial integrity of the State and the physical security of the citizenry, it is difficult 
to place them within the paradigm of ‘militant democracy’.601 
 
“These responses to Irish Nationalism…provide rather problematic 
examples of militant democracy. For they have to do with the 
preservation of a legal order that was the fruit of an imperialist 
project that began in pre-democratic times.”602 
 
Further evidence that the UK approach to Irish Nationalism cannot be simply placed 
within a ‘militant’ classification is the general freedom and tolerance afforded to 
political parties closely linked to violent as well as non-violent activities. As the 
acknowledged political wing of the IRA, Sinn Fein has both praised and justified the 
commission of violent acts in pursuit of its goal of a united Ireland. Despite this and 
with some infamous exceptions,
603
 British governments have generally allowed Sinn 
Fein the freedom to both argue its case and to contest elections within Northern 
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Ireland. A partial explanation for such leniency was the recognition by the United 
Kingdom authorities that as a popular political party, Sinn Fein helps both articulate 
and aggregates the preferences of a large section of the nationalist population. 
Consequently,  if a political solution to the conflict was to be achieved then such 
views had to be afforded both tolerance and the opportunity to seek electoral 
representation. 
 
“A sustainable peace was only achieved in Northern Ireland when 
the British government accepted that the cause of the violence was 
political and that a solution must also be political.”604 
 
By continuing to afford these rights, the UK government also allowed (whether 
intentionally or otherwise) for the beginning of a genuine shift in strategy within the 
republican movement towards more peaceful methods. For example, even at the 
height of the conflict exemplified by the 1981 hunger strikes, the continuing ability of 
Sinn Fein to contest elections helped plant the seeds of a greater commitment to 
democratic methods which would come to fruition in the form of a successful peace 
process years later. 
 
“The IRA’s political wing, Sinn Fein, ran Bobby Sands in a by-
election for a seat at Westminster and he won handsomely. When he 
died a month later it was as an elected member of the British 
parliament. This political success also had the long term and quite 
unanticipated consequence of demonstrating to the membership of 
the IRA the advantages of political over military action and 
provided a spur to the pragmatists within the movement who sought 
to develop a political strategy.”605 
 
In allowing Sinn Fein to continue to function as a legitimate political entity, 
successive governments have displayed a laudable flexibility. This flexibility at least 
allowed for the perception that the views of the entire nationalist community were 
being afforded equal respect and consequently facilitated the development of political 
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space which allowed Sinn Fein to gradually move procedurally to an endorsement of 
democratic methods as a  means of political engagement and thus towards a 
substantive negotiated settlement. 
 
By contrast, it is more plausible to argue that the legislative restrictions aimed at 
members of the British Union of Fascists in the late 1930’s (including the 
criminalisation of paramilitary displays
606
 as well as the introduction of detention 
without trial
607
) were more concerned with protecting the democratic character of the 
State given that the organisations concerned were avowedly totalitarian in ideological 
terms and as a result politically sympathetic to a foreign regime against whom, war 
was becoming increasingly inevitable. 
 
Whatever the specific motivations behind these restrictive measures, one consistent 
feature of them is that they were primarily aimed at individual members of the 
offending political groups or parties and not the organizations themselves. These 
groups were allowed the continuing freedom to argue their case and contend for 
elected office on an equal basis to others. The next section of this chapter will provide 
at least a partial explanation of the relative free reign given to political groups and 
parties by arguing that the legal status historically afforded to political parties grossly 
underrepresented their actual influence on the legislative process. As a consequence, it 
is also contended that the actual influence of individual members of parliament has 
been negligible in comparison to the relevant legal and constitutional orthodoxy. 
 
5:2:2 Parties, MPs and the Constitution 
The fact that the United Kingdom’s constitution is not codified has meant that 
political parties are given little if any formal constitutional recognition. This lack of 
recognition has been such that Jean Blondel was able to write in 1963 that political 
parties were ‘private associations to which the law does not give more rights or duties 
than to other private organizations.’608 Any legislative recognition of the role of 
parties has occurred in a piecemeal and incoherent manner. Examples include the 
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recognition of the post of Leader of the Opposition
609
, allowing the placing of party 
affiliation on ballot papers
610
 and most recently the establishment of a registration 
system for elections requiring parties to inter alia provide information on their main 
office holders, a copy of their constitution as well as evidence of financial probity 
alongside the imposition of limits on fundraising and spending.
611
 While the provision 
of a copy of a party’s constitution is a necessary element of registration, there are no 
formal requirements as to what these must contain and there therefore exists no ‘legal 
incentive, or indeed compulsion’ for political parties to organise their internal affairs 
‘according to democratic principles.’612As such, the view of political parties as private 
entities beyond the scope of legal regulation continues to represent a ‘dominant 
paradigm.’613 
 
“…the motivation for the statutory recognition of political parties in 
the United Kingdom has…largely been driven as a driven as a by-
product of the debate on political finance and how best to regulate it, 
and to enable party lists in the European elections, rather than as a 
measure to rectify their arguably anomalous status as voluntary 
associations.’614 
 
A substantial contributory factor to the lack of formal recognition for parties is the 
continuing attachment within the constitution to the Burkean
615
 notion that Members 
of Parliament are independent representatives working for the national interest. This 
notion has received judicial backing in numerous cases which have established the 
principle that an MP is a trustee rather than a delegate and cannot be mandated to vote 
in a particular way
616
, be it through adherence to party policy
617
 or the wishes of his or 
her constituents.
618
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“It would appear…that a voter cannot hold their elected 
representatives accountable for voting along party lines in breach of 
their duty to their constituency. Similarly, neither a political party 
nor its members nor supporters can hold its parliamentarians legally 
accountable for failing to abide by party policies or election 
promises.”619 
 
However, this traditional and judicially endorsed view of the MP as a trustee is one is 
that is at odds with political reality. The existence of effective ‘party’ government 
within the United Kingdom with the relative dominance of two parties alongside an 
organized whip system has done much to negate the independence of individual 
parliamentarians, ‘the overwhelming majority’ of whom ‘are elected not as 
individuals, but on the basis of party endorsement.’620 In opposition to political 
actuality, the dominant legal contention ‘that parliamentarians are (and should be) 
independent of party influences has presented a key barrier to the constitutionalisation 
of political parties.’621 
 
It is therefore evident that there exists a massive disparity between the actual 
influence of political parties within the system and the constitutional protection 
afforded to them. However, the actual consequences of a lack of constitutional 
recognition display a similar incongruence. Firstly, the absence of formal 
constitutional recognition would suggest a corresponding lack of protection for the 
right to associate for political ends. Further, the existence of a parliament dominated 
by large competitor parties with the ability to legislate in any way it seems fit, 
potentially places those parties who wish to challenge the status quo in a legally 
precarious position. Despite this seeming vulnerability, parties in the United Kingdom 
have traditionally remained free from regulation and interference. There are a number 
of reasons for this. 
 
Firstly, as indicated earlier, the dearth of constitutional recognition has led to parties 
being perceived as primarily private associations and thus being subject to little or no 
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public regulation. Next, as has been evident throughout the previous four substantive 
chapters,
622
 countries which offer constitutional protection for political parties often 
place content or ideologically based conditions on such protection. These conditions 
vary between jurisdictions but often include a commitment to democratic governance, 
the use of peaceful methods and respect for the territorial integrity of the State in 
question. The imposition of such conditions on protection thus establish legal bases 
upon which the protection of the constitution may be removed. Partly because of the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the corresponding potential for unlimited 
change, there are no formal substantive outcomes that the British Constitution either 
officially endorses or forbids. Parties in the United Kingdom have subsequently not 
been subject to content based or ideological conditions and as such those advocating 
and organizing around what may be described as extreme positions have been 
afforded the same tolerance as more mainstream manifestations. Finally, there exists 
in the political culture, a recognition of the value of both individual and collective 
dissent within a democracy. 
 
“In a democratic society, it is essential that those in authority face 
criticism and opposition and traditional views are challenged, and 
that individuals are given the opportunity to form certain ideas in 
common with others. Given the inability of most people to have 
access to the media in order to disseminate their views, the rights of 
association and assembly provide the perfect opportunity to take 
part in the democratic debate by imparting one’s views and by 
challenging the actions and views of others.”623 
 
In 1998, the United Kingdom passed legislation in the form of the Human Rights Act 
which for the first time afforded a degree of explicit recognition and protection for 
political rights. The following section will discuss its general constitutional effect and 
assess its potential impact on those rights which fuel the engine of democracy.  It will 
be argued that a similar contradictory impulse is evident. Just as the lack of formal 
constitutional recognition helped give parties a greater degree of freedom then the 
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attempt to extend formal constitutional protection for individuals and groups may 
place limitations on their ability to fully engage in the democratic process by 
establishing substantive outcomes or legitimate interests upon whose pursuit, 
interference with their political rights may be justified. 
 
5:3 The Human Rights Act 
The Human Rights Act 
624
 was passed in 1998 and came into effect in 2000. The 
purpose of the legislation is to give effect to the rights contained within the European 
Convention of Human Rights
625
within domestic law. It does so in a variety of ways. 
Firstly, it obliges Courts unless prevented by primary legislation to decide all cases 
compatibly with Convention rights.
626
 It also requires them to interpret and give effect 
to legislation in a way that is in conformity with the Convention.
627
 It then proceeds to 
mandate domestic courts to take relevant case law from Strasbourg into account.
628
 
This development has potentially massive implications. As was evident in the opening 
two substantive chapters, the European Court of Human Rights has on occasion used 
the assumptions underlying the theory of militant democracy to uphold massive legal 
interventions in democratic polities. While similar interventions have yet to be 
attempted within the United Kingdom’s political arena, there now exists both the legal 
mechanism and precedent to do so. If a Superior Court cannot interpret legislation in a 
way that is compatible with the Convention, it is empowered to issue a Declaration of 
Incompatibility.
629
 This mechanism is intended to place a degree of pressure on the 
relevant government minister who then has the option of amending the law either 
through primary legislation or remedial order.
630
 However, the government is under 
no legal requirement to amend the law in such circumstances and consequently, the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is respected.  
 
Despite the maintenance of parliamentary sovereignty, the passage of the Human 
Rights Act represents a substantial shift in constitutional law. The United Kingdom 
for the first time has a written statement detailing the rights of individuals. While the 
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UK has long been a signatory to the ECHR, the Act still represents a major 
modification of existing practice. 
 
“The Human Rights Act makes the Convention far more central to 
the practice of law in Britain. Until it came into force, there was no 
overriding presumption that Parliament intended in the past and in 
the future to legislate so as to conform with the rights protected by 
the Convention.”631 
 
However, with specific reference to those political rights intended to fuel the engine 
of democracy, it is not necessarily clear that their formal recognition under the Human 
Rights Act makes their protection any more secure than had been the case previously.  
The Act gives domestic effect to the rights of freedom of expression and association 
under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention respectively. These rights are however 
qualified and can be restricted as long as such restrictions are ‘prescribed by law’ and 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ in pursuit of a legitimate interest.632 While the 
legitimate interests listed under Articles 10 and 11 are not identical, they both include 
inter alia public goods in the form of national security, public safety and protection of 
the rights of others.  It can be argued that the Human Rights Act while formally 
extending the protection afforded to the political rights of expression and association 
has opened the door to their eventual contraction by making legally explicit the bases 
under which they may be restricted. In other words, by attempting to constitutionally 
recognise those rights which fuel democracy, the HRA has stated explicitly the 
substantive grounds upon which a brake on such rights may be applied. 
 
With respect to the principles of democracy, incongruent as it may seem, the lack 
(until recently) of a written commitment to procedural equality helped maintain 
effective procedural equality. Firstly, by adhering to a trustee model of representation, 
Constitutional law has grossly underestimated the actual influence of parties as the 
main collective organs of both popular sovereignty and representation and as such left 
them relatively free of regulation. Secondly, the principle of changeability 
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exemplified in the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has meant that even parties 
espousing extreme positions or policies are afforded the right to contest the processes 
of popular sovereignty in order to seek and achieve representation for their views. 
Ironically, the introduction of a formal commitment to such rights through the Human 
Rights Act may potentially allow for the future dilution of procedural equality by 
bringing into domestic law a list of substantive outcomes upon the pursuit of which 
such dilution may be legally justified. The remaining sections of this chapter will 
examine and evaluate the implications of attempts to subvert procedural equality in 
pursuit of some of the substantive goals listed within Articles 10 and 11. Later, 
attention will be given to legal attempts to limit dubious expression in the form of hate 
speech which potentially threatens the rights of others. Next, however, this chapter 
will assess both the efficacy and legitimacy of the UK government’s proscription of 
political groups on the grounds that they are linked to terrorism and consequently pose 
a threat to both national security and public safety.  
 
5:4 The Proscription of Terrorist Groups 
The Terrorism Act of 2000
633
allows for the proscription of groups which the Home 
Secretary believes are ‘concerned in terrorism.’634 The groups proscribed are listed in 
Schedule 2 of the Act. The addition of a group to the list requires parliamentary 
approval.
635For the purposes of the Act, ‘concerned in terrorism’ is defined as 
‘commits or participates in acts of terrorism’,636 ‘prepares for terrorism’637 or 
‘promotes or encourages terrorism.’638 The Terrorism Act of 2006 added an offence of 
glorification of Terrorism as a reason for proscription under the aegis of ‘promotes or 
encourages’.639Again for the purposes of the Act, Terrorism is defined as ‘the use or 
threat of action’640 which is designed to ‘influence the government or an international 
governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public’641for 
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the purposes of ‘advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.’642 Action in this 
context is also defined inter alia as acts which involve ‘serious violence against a 
person’643, ‘endanger a person’s life’644 and ‘creates a serious risk to the health or 
safety of the public, or section of the public…’645A person subsequently found to be a 
member of any organisation proscribed under the Act is themselves deemed to be 
guilty of an offence.
646
As of February 2012, 52 organisations were proscribed under 
the Act including two which were added under the ban on glorification added in 
2006.
647
It is worthy of note that while the original list of groups was dominated by 
those involved in the conflict in Northern Ireland, the current list betrays a 
preoccupation with Islamic fundamentalism which is evidently a response to the 
events of  the early years of the 21
st
 Century.
648
 
 
The passing of the Terrorism Act of 2006 did not occur in a political vacuum. It was a 
direct response to the events of July 7 2005. That the offence of glorification was 
partly motivated by these events was given credence by the words of the Home 
Secretary in Parliament in October of that year. 
 
“the July events indicate that there are people in this country who are 
susceptible to the preaching … of an argument or a message that 
terrorism is a worthy thing, a thing to be admired, a thing to be 
celebrated and then act on the basis of that…. What this Bill is about 
is trying to make that more difficult, that transition from people 
encouraging, glorifying to then an act being undertaken.”
649
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The emergence of global terrorism as a defining international issue has led to a shift in 
attitudes towards the balance to be struck between individual liberties and public 
safety. Tony Blair famously asserted in August 2005 that ‘the rules of the game have 
changed.’650 In this context, it has been argued that the 2006 Act is an understandable 
response to ‘the emergence of religious and ideological divisions of unprecedented 
persistence and depth and by the recent perpetration of unimaginable acts of terrorist 
violence.’651 It is clearly a legitimate substantive goal of democratic governments to 
protect their citizenry from political violence. It is therefore difficult to argue against 
the contraction of procedural equality for those who show scant or no regard for equal 
respect through their willingness to inflict violence and even death in the pursuit of 
their own substantive ends. Proscription in this regard can be viewed as a declaration 
of intent. 
 
“much of the purpose of proscription is symbolic—to express 
society‘s revulsion at violence as a political strategy as well as its 
determination to stop  it.”652 
 
With specific regard to those groups proscribed under the Terrorism Act, Clive 
Walker has stated 
 
“There is little doubt that the vast majority… listed organizations 
have in fact engaged in terrorism and are still capable of doing 
so…Many of the same groups are banned by other countries, and 
some appear in terrorism finance lists issued by either the United 
Nations or the European Union.”653 
 
However, while it may be true that the intent behind proscription is laudable in 
symbolic terms and that almost all the groups so far proscribed  have been ‘concerned 
in terrorism’, this does not necessarily imply that the introduction of the power of 
proscription is immune from substantive criticism. Indeed, it is contended that the 
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Acts of 2000 and 2006 both contain provisions that are worrisome from a democratic 
perspective. It will be argued that the introduction of ‘glorification’ as a legislative 
ground for proscription potentially allows for the removal of legitimate vehicles of 
representation in a way that may be counter-productive to the aim of proscription. 
Firstly, however, it is maintained that the original power to proscribe is not subject to 
either successful parliamentary scrutiny or effective judicial oversight. 
 
5:4:1: Proscription and De-proscription 
With regard to an original decision to proscribe, it is evident that there exists a glaring 
lack of effective parliamentary scrutiny. While it is true that a proscription order 
requires the approval of parliament, the order itself can only be accepted or rejected: 
there being no mechanism for amendment. The absence of such a mechanism  is a 
feature of delegated rule making in the UK and may be of little consequence when 
only one organisation is subject to a proscription order; However, it is of more 
concern when several organisations are being proscribed at the same time as happened 
with the original ministerial order in 2001
654
 and with several since.
655
 In such a 
scenario, members of parliament who may have legitimate concerns about the validity 
of a proscription order against a specific organization have to take into account the 
potential political consequences that a vote against proscription for one group will 
also represent a vote against proscription for all the groups named in the same order. 
 
‘…if you wanted to proscribe al-Qaeda, you had to proscribe [other 
organisations] as well. If you wanted to keep [a particular 
organisation] off the list, you were accused of not wanting to 
proscribe al- Qaeda.”656 
 
There are also major concerns
657
 about the adequacy of procedures relating to the 
judicial review of a minister’s decision to proscribe. Not only is the original decision 
to proscribe taken without the organization being given an opportunity ‘to contest the 
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reasons for the… proposed proscription’658 a subsequent High Court decision659 states 
that relevant orders are not subject to normal channels of judicial review and are only 
challengeable under the de-proscription procedure provided for in the 2000 Act.
660
 
 
The de-proscription procedure
661
 involves the making of an application against the 
decision to proscribe to the Home Office; the same department which has just sought 
and secured approval for the order which is subject to challenge 
 
“…In view of the fact that he has just proscribed the applicant 
association, and in view of the fact that he has just secured 
parliamentary approval, the chances of any such application 
succeeding are very slim.”662 
  
If, as is likely, the original request for de-proscription is unsuccessful, then the 
relevant organization has leave to appeal to an independent Proscribed Organisations 
Appeal Commission (POAC).
663
 It must be stressed, however, that what is being 
appealed is not the original decision to proscribe but the subsequent decision by the 
Home Office not to de-proscribe.
664
 The consequent gap in time between the original 
decision to proscribe and a decision to challenge the decision not to de-proscribe has 
potentially deleterious consequences for those inclined to continue a legal challenge. 
As Kenneth Ewing has noted. 
 
“But by the time it has applied to be de-proscribed, the organisation 
is illegal, and anyone bringing a case on its behalf to the POAC will 
reveal himself or herself as a member or supporter and run the risk 
of prosecution under section 11 of the Act, the procedure in this 
sense in danger of being a honey trap.”665 
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Unsurprisingly, given the procedural barriers facing them, very few proscribed groups 
have challenged their banning orders with only one to this point having been 
successful.
666
 In this particular hearing, the POAC overturned a decision by the Home 
Office not to de-proscribe the organization known as PMOI
667
 labelling such a refusal 
‘perverse’668 in the context of overwhelming evidence that the organization in 
question were now committed to the establishment of democracy in Iran and had 
surrendered any weapons previously held.  An attempt by the Home Office to appeal 
the Commission’s decision to de-proscribe was subsequently denied by the Appeal 
Court
669
 on the grounds that the relevant minister had given too wide an interpretation 
to ‘concerned in terrorism’ as a legislative ground for proscription. 
 
“We agree with POAC that an organisation that has no capacity to 
carry on terrorist activities and is taking no steps to acquire such 
capacity or otherwise to promote or encourage terrorist activities 
cannot be said to be ‘concerned in terrorism’…An organisation that 
has temporarily ceased from terrorist activities for tactical reasons is 
to be contrasted with an organisation that has decided to attempt to 
achieve its aims by other than violent means. The latter cannot be 
said to be “concerned in terrorism” even if the possibility exists that 
it might decide to revert to terrorism in the future.”670 
 
In welcoming the decision by the POAC, Adam Tomkins has argued that it can be 
viewed as an example of a developing trend. 
 
“If national security has to come to court, it follows not that the 
courts have to give way to claims made in the name of national 
security, but that claims made in the name of national security have 
to give way if they cannot satisfy the court. Where the evidence 
supports the Government's decision, so be it. But where it does not, 
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it is the constitutional duty of the court to say so and to rule 
accordingly.”671 
 
Effectively, Tomkins is arguing that attempts to dilute procedural equality in the 
pursuit of the substantive interest of protecting national security will in the main only 
be endorsed if there is sufficient evidence to do so. While such a trend is welcome, it 
is evident that the Terrorism Act places substantial procedural barriers in the way of 
effective legislative scrutiny of and judicial challenge to what may be invalid 
decisions to proscribe. Further evidence of this comes from the fact that even the 
successful application for de-proscription made in the PMOI case came from a 
collection of MPs and peers
672
 rather than members of the organization itself who had 
withdrew from the process in exasperation.
673
 By making it extremely difficult for 
relevant groups to challenge potentially erroneous proscription orders, the Terrorism 
Act runs the risk of reinforcing the sense of political impotence that may have made 
the use of violence as a political strategy attractive in the first place. This potential 
drawback is exacerbated further when it is also acknowledged that the latest 
legislative ground for proscription can if utilised carelessly potentially allow for the 
proscription of organizations which are amenable to using peaceful and democratic 
rather than violent means to achieving their political ends. 
 
5:4:2 Glorification as a ground for proscription 
In the febrile atmosphere present in the immediate aftermath of the 7/7 attacks and in 
response to Article 5 of the Convention on the prevention of terrorism’s demand that 
countries introduce domestic offences outlawing the ‘public provocation’ of terrorist 
offences,
674
sections 21 and 22 of the Terrorism Act of 2006 amended the Act of 2000. 
The 2000 Act now allows for  criminal prosecution of individuals
675
 and the 
proscription of political groups on the grounds that the relevant individual or group 
engage in ‘the unlawful glorification of the commission or preparation…of acts of 
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terrorism’676where glorification is defined as ‘any form of praise or celebration’677 and 
is unlawful if persons aware of it could be expected to infer that the actions being 
glorified are being glorified as conduct ‘that should be emulated in existing 
circumstances’678 or ‘that is illustrative of a type of conduct that should be 
emulated.’679As of July 2012, two groups have been proscribed on these grounds.680 
 
While as previously argued, it may be perfectly acceptable to dilute procedural 
equality on the grounds of national security for those groups which have used 
violence or incited the commitment of specific violent acts, it is less clear from a 
democratic perspective that mere praise of previous acts or allusion to possible future 
strategy represent grounds for massive intervention with the right to freedom of 
association. In extending ‘the basis for militant responses from deeds to words’,681 the 
2006 Act has potentially troubling implications for the pursuit of the substantive goal 
of public safety that it professes to pursue. In this regard, the example of Sinn Fein is 
instructive. As has been previously discussed, successive UK governments have 
displayed a laudable flexibility in allowing groups such as Sinn Fein the political 
space to both represent the wishes of a large percentage of nationalist opinion and to 
effect change within the relevant body of opinion towards a negotiated settlement. 
The concern with glorification as a ground for proscription is that it potentially allows 
for the future proscription of political parties like Sinn Fein who have praised or 
justified the use of violence in the past or alluded to its possible use in the future.  
 
It is contended that any such future ban on a relevant party would represent a 
retrograde step. Firstly, it would risk reinforcing or indeed exacerbating any existing 
sense of injustice and would therefore likely become a potential rallying or recruiting 
point for those determined to follow a violent path. Secondly, it would also likely 
make an eventual solution to the problem more problematic as ‘the ability to negotiate 
with terrorists becomes more difficult if the authorized face of the group is banished 
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from sight.’682 In its approach to the political rights of Sinn Fein, the United Kingdom 
showed a flexibility that was central to the achievement of a political resolution. 
Unease surrounding the provisions of the Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006 is related 
to the fact that they seem to indicate a more inflexible approach to those who even 
allude to violence as a past or future political tactic. It is important that in the desire to 
symbolically display a polity’s abhorrence with political violence, that same polity 
does not allow for the relatively easy removal of a vehicle for legitimate grievance 
which may also be central to a peaceful resolution of any conflict inspired by such 
grievance.  
 
5:5 Racial and Religious Hatred 
One of the unfortunate consequences of the emergence of Islamic terrorism has been a 
corresponding growth in offences against person and property which are motivated by 
racial or religious hatred.
683
 Some of these offences have taken the form of political 
expression by individuals or collective entities. The final substantive section of this 
chapter will examine the steps or in some cases the lack of steps the relevant 
authorities have taken to either punish or ameliorate the effects of expression based on 
hatred. It will argue that while the approach displays a similar flexibility with regard 
to freedom of association to that employed toward Sinn Fein, when taken in 
conjunction with the terrorism legislation, there is evidence of a deployment of a more 
philosophical approach which may have repercussions for the future existence of 
substantive disagreement. In respect to the expression of religious or racial 
intolerance, the most high profile recent example of a collective entity indulging in 
such behaviour has been the British National Party (BNP). 
 
Founded in 1982, the party has openly railed against the idea of a multi-cultural 
society and has condemned what it perceives as the growing ‘Islamification’ of the 
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United Kingdom.
684
 In 2010, it was forced to amend its constitution and allow non-
indigenous members after a legal challenge.
685
 
 
Despite widespread public revulsion toward the party and its policies, the UK 
authorities have done little or nothing to interfere with its right to organise and offer 
candidates for elected office. There are a number of possible factors that have 
contributed to such inaction by the authorities. Firstly, as has been previously 
indicated, there has been tendency to treat political parties as private associations 
rather than public entities and as a consequence there has been a corresponding lack 
of regulation. Next, the traditional lack of a written constitution alongside the 
existence of parliamentary sovereignty has meant that the substantive goals of racial 
and religious equality have until very recently not been formally acknowledged 
constitutionally and as such there has no requirement on parties to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of these substantive ends. However, again as previously acknowledged, the 
Human Rights Act has legally acknowledged the right of authorities to interfere with 
freedom of association in the pursuit of the legitimate aim of inter alia ‘protection of 
the rights of others.’ 686 Therefore, the refusal of the authorities to act against the BNP 
in the contemporary legal context is, it is contended, more attributable to substantively 
political rather than legal factors. One may be the recognition that support for the 
BNP is not monolithic and consequently not necessarily motivated by racial or 
religious hatred but by genuine concerns over issues such as the economic and social 
impact of immigration. These concerns deserve as much recognition and 
representation as any others and their expression through joining and/or voting for the 
BNP is consequently legally tolerated. More substantively, however, there also exists 
a fundamental belief in the importance of political parties to the democratic process. 
Any interference with their ability to operate is thus deemed more invasive and 
subsequently less legitimate than restricting an individual’s right to expression. 
 
“In most circumstances, however, the law will tolerate unpopular 
and anti-democratic bodies, provided they do not commit a breach 
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of the law, or breach of specific provisions intended to protect 
others from the worst excesses of those beliefs. Thus, although 
groups such as the BNP are not proscribed, their members are more 
vulnerable than others to prosecution for specific criminal law 
offences designed to protect the rights of others. The law is not on 
the other hand prepared to take the more draconian step of 
proscribing the group irrespective of the peacefulness or otherwise 
of its activities, believing that such a step would be an affront to 
principles of democracy and pluralism.”687 
 
It would seem that while the authorities take a relatively procedural approach to the 
expression of ideas by political parties, they employ a more substantive approach 
towards the protection of the rights of others with respect to individual expression.
688
 
This contention is afforded enhanced credibility when one examines the outcomes of 
and reasoning applied in what have become known as the Norwood cases. 
 
5:5:1: The Norwood Cases 
In 2003,
689
 Mark Norwood, a local organizer for the aforementioned BNP appealed a 
criminal conviction he received the previous year for causing alarm and distress,
690
 an 
offence aggravated by racial and religious components.
691
 The circumstances of the 
case were that the appellant had placed a poster produced by the BNP in his window 
which showed pictures from the September 11 terrorist attack alongside statements 
which read as ‘Protect the British people’ and ‘Islam out of Britain.’ The poster also 
displayed Islamic symbols such as a crescent and stars under a prohibition sign.
692
 
Despite the claim by the defence that the conviction represented an unwarranted 
interference with his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of both the 
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Human Rights Act and ECHR,
693
 the Court agreed with the prosecution that the 
appellant’s clear intent was to express the opinion that the Islamic religion was a 
threat to Britain and therefore not welcome.
694
 Consequently, the conviction was 
judged to be justified with reference to the legitimate aims under Article 10(2) of both 
preventing crime and disorder and protecting the rights of others.
695
 
 
The poster was a public expression of attack on all Muslims in this 
country, urging all who might read it that followers of the Islamic 
religion here should be removed from it and warning that their 
presence here was a threat or a danger to the British people.
696
 
 
The appellant then took his case to the European Court of Human Rights
697
and 
alleged a breach of his Article 10 rights. 
 
“… free speech includes not only the inoffensive but also the 
irritating, contentious, eccentric, heretical, unwelcome and 
provocative, provided that it does not tend to provoke violence. 
Criticism of a religion is not to be equated with an attack upon its 
followers.”
698
 
 
However, after referencing Article 17
699
 of the Convention known as the abuse of 
rights clause, the Court refused to consider the merits of the case under Article 10 
holding that the application was inadmissible under Article 17. 
 
 
 
 
‘The general purpose of Art.17 is to prevent individuals or groups 
with totalitarian aims from exploiting in their own interests the 
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principles enunciated by the Convention. The Court, and previously, 
the European Commission of Human Rights, has found in particular 
that the freedom of expression guaranteed under Art.10 of the 
Convention may not be invoked in a sense contrary to Art.17… The 
Court notes and agrees with the assessment made by the domestic 
courts, namely that the words and images on the poster amounted to 
a public expression of attack on all Muslims in the United Kingdom. 
Such a general, vehement attack against a religious group, linking 
the group as a whole with a grave act of terrorism, is incompatible 
with the values proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention, 
notably tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination. The 
applicant's display of the poster in his window constituted an act 
within the meaning of Art.17, which did not, therefore, enjoy the 
protection of Arts 10 or 14.’700 
 
The decision to remove Norwood’s expression from consideration under Article 10 
has generated a number of criticisms. Steve Foster
701
 has argued that the use of Article 
17 to justify suppression of speech instead of utilising the qualifying provisions listed 
in Article 10(2) means that the Court is likely to be prepared to allow major 
restrictions on expression purely ‘on grounds of the nature of the speech rather than 
its proven or likely harm.’702 Sophie Turenne has suggested that the absence of a 
requirement to prove the imminence or likelihood of harm sets a template for over-
invasive interventions with political rights as proof of imminent or likely harm was 
clearly absent in the Norwood case  
 
“One might rather say that Norwood was “aiming” only to further 
his cause at a local political level, for he could hardly have 
contemplated that the publication of his poster in his home in 
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Shropshire would lead to a revolution among the public which 
would lead to the expulsion of all Muslims.”703 
 
Ivan Hare has further developed these criticisms by contending that allowing for the 
suppression of expression on the grounds of the nature of the speech alone may 
potentially facilitate a massive contraction in what is considered to be legitimate 
political debate. 
 
“…the state will (especially in times of particular religious or 
cultural sensitivity) be able to restrict or prohibit with impunity the 
expression of unpopular views by those who do not espouse 
mainstream liberal positions. If this is permitted to occur, the 
essential contribution which pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness make to the definition of a democratic society 
under the Convention is substantially negated.”704 
 
In contrast to these criticisms, Richard Mullender has spoken in favour of the decision 
reached in Norwood. Whilst acknowledging that it has negative implications for 
‘rights based protection to political expression’705 Mullender argues that the 
suppression of speech intended to destroy or heavily interfere with the rights of others 
may be necessary to sustain a society where all citizens perceive that their interests 
are being considered. 
 
“But we have to set against this the consideration that the ECHR’s 
response to the defendant’s conduct underscores the importance of 
distributive justice in a society committed to militant democracy. 
For it gives expression to the view that entitlements enjoyed by 
individuals are not absolute guarantees. Rather, they are contingent 
on willingness to act in ways that serve to sustain a legal order in 
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which the fundamental interest of all the law’s addressees enjoy a 
significant measure of protection.”706 
 
In 2006, the UK government introduced a 
707
law which created a new offence of 
incitement to religious hatred. While the legislation generated much controversy, both 
supporters
708
 and opponents
709
 of it have inferred an element of linkage between its 
introduction and the recent creation of the offence of glorification of terrorism 
discussed earlier: the suggestion being that the incitement legislation represented a 
trade off with the Muslim community who had been angered by the glorification 
provisions. While critics such as Hare view such a trade-off in cynical terms and with 
‘suspicion’,710 Mullender views it again as a praiseworthy attempt to establish a 
degree of harmony within society. 
 
“In criminalizing incitement to religious hatred, the government also 
wished to demonstrate that it would balance its anti-terrorism 
legislation with a provision serving the interests of Muslims. This 
suggests a commitment…to the ideal of distributive justice. This 
ideal specifies that public institutions…should defensibly 
accommodate the interests of all society’s members. To act in 
accordance with this ideal is to adopt an approach to practical life 
that we might categorize as ‘principled’. For our aim is to establish 
basic terms of social life that all relevant persons could endorse.”711 
 
The nature of the polity described by Mullender bears a striking resemblance to that 
envisaged by the philosopher John Rawls who argued that a rational society would 
require an ‘equal right…to equal basic liberties’712 alongside the development of ‘an 
overlapping consensus’ of ‘reasonable…doctrines’.713 The problem with Rawls’s 
view is that the idea of a ‘reasonable consensus’ is (as argued in the introductory 
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chapter of this thesis)  inherently exclusionary in that  positions that are not accepted 
as reasonable are immediately deemed unreasonable and thus placed outside what is 
deemed an acceptable paradigm. This arguably represents what has begun to happen 
within the United Kingdom in the last decade or so.  In pursuit of the ideal that all 
citizens have an equal stake and interest in the success of the polity, those ideas that 
may be deemed offensive to either the majority or recognisable minorities are subject 
at least at the individual level to greater restriction than before. Hence, new 
restrictions have been placed on the expression of those who refuse to accept racial 
and religious diversity as well as those who have expressed a belief in the previous 
and possibly continuing utility of violence as a political tool. While the role of 
political parties in contributing to the processes of both collective deliberation and 
popular sovereignty remain largely unchecked, a creeping tendency to place 
restrictions on some forms of individual and collective expression inevitably places 
limitations on the extent to which fundamental disagreement is tolerated and thus 
potentially reduces the variety and quality of sources intrinsic to the epistemic quality 
of democratic governance. 
 
5:6: Conclusion: The United Kingdom and the Four Principles 
 
In conclusion, it is the contention of this chapter that in relation to the protection of 
the political rights of expression and association that while the United Kingdom has 
operated within a primarily procedural paradigm; there exists evidence of a growing 
tendency to allow restrictions for substantive ends. The formal legal context within 
which political actors have traditionally operated (in the form of parliamentary 
sovereignty and an unwritten constitution) is suggestive of a scenario where the 
protection of equal respect in the form of political rights is intensely vulnerable in the 
face of the power of parliament as the focal point of popular sovereignty to enact 
unlimited change. While it is true that throughout the 20
th
 Century, the due process 
rights of individuals who were deemed to pose a challenge to the stability of the state 
were often interfered with, the continuing ability of political organizations in the form 
of political parties to challenge and dissent from those in power continued to be 
protected. This relative freedom can partially and incongruently be explained by the 
lack of formal constitutional recognition of parties and thus a lack of a constitutional 
basis for their regulation. This is supplemented by an overriding legal attachment to a 
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concept of political representation that views parties as primarily private associations 
to which individual members of parliament ascribe their allegiance 
 
Conversely, there has been an escalation in restrictions on both individual and some 
forms of collective expression in the early years of this century. Given the absence of 
a tradition of ‘militant democracy’ in British legal discourse, it is contended that the 
restrictions provided by legislation on terrorism and ‘hate speech’ can be primarily 
attributed to the desire to achieve the substantive outcomes of protecting both public 
safety and respect for the rights of others as elements of social cohesion and stability 
rather than a desire to protect democratic governance in itself. However, these 
substantive goals were given explicit legal recognition as a justification for restricting 
political rights by legislation which was designed to give effect to those same rights 
into domestic law. Again as before, there seems to be a lack of coherence between 
legal intent and actual effect. Also, the passage of such restrictions within a similar 
time period is suggestive of an intention to establish a society premised on a 
consensual embodiment of equal respect free of fundamental disagreement and what 
are deemed to be unreasonable opinions. This scenario requires not only right based 
limitations placed on democratic outcomes to limit ‘unreasonable’ change but also 
restriction of ‘unreasonable’ manifestations of those rights to ensure that certain 
outcomes are not only not achieved but never considered 
 
However, it would be a mistake at this stage to overemphasize the overall effect of 
such intentions. The restrictions legislated for have more than often been placed on 
expression of the preferences of individuals rather than the collective articulation of 
those exemplified by political parties. Despite the lack of formal legal recognition 
afforded to parties, the authorities have shown a propensity (in the cases of Sinn Fein 
and the BNP) to protect their continued right to both articulate ideas and contest 
elections on the basis of policies well outside of the mainstream. Whether such 
tolerance has been motivated by primarily pragmatic concerns or is based on an 
acknowledgement of the fundamental role of both political parties and disagreement 
in a democracy is a matter of conjecture. Indeed, the motivations for tolerance are 
probably fluid with respect to both the specific parties in question and the composition 
of elected governments at any specific point in time. The intrinsic flexibility within 
the UK system makes it therefore uncertain as to whether the same degree of 
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tolerance will be afforded in the future and thus it is unclear whether all 
manifestations of political parties will be relatively free to operate as they have in the 
past and continue to seek political and social change by representing the views of their 
members within public discourse and at the ballot box. 
 
The final substantive chapter concerns the jurisdiction of the United States. It has at 
least a couple of similarities to the United Kingdom. Firstly, like the UK, it can be 
located within a mainly procedural paradigm in that it tends not to initiate legal 
restrictions against political parties although other collective entities may be subject to 
regulation. Secondly, the focal points of legal restrictions within the political arena 
tend to concentrate on individuals rather than parties. Where the two jurisdictions 
primarily differ is that the traditional relative lack of restrictions in the UK can be at 
least partially explained (somewhat counter-intuitively) by the absence  until fairly 
recently of formal constitutional protection and thus explicit grounds on which 
restrictions can be justified. Conversely, the lack of restrictions in the US are 
explicable because of  the formal constitutional protection that exists for rights of 
expression and association under the First Amendment which unlike the rights 
established under the ECHR and Human Rights are deemed to trump any competing 
societal interest. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The United States, Free Speech and Militant Democracy 
 
6:1 Introduction 
 
“Among western liberal democracies, the USA…appears closest to 
manifesting the attributes of a procedural view of democracy.”714 
 
The final jurisdictional context which this thesis is concerned with is the United States 
of America. The choice of placing the United States as the final substantive case study 
is influenced by two distinct yet complementary trends regarding the scope of as well 
as the intention behind legal intervention. Firstly, given that the primary focus of the 
thesis concentrates on the legitimacy or otherwise of legal restrictions on collective 
political entities such as political parties, the tendency of US constitutional law to 
primarily focus any restrictions on individuals rather than collective organisations 
locates the USA at the protective end of a sliding scale of legally sanctioned 
interventions within the political arena when compared to other polities. Next, with 
respect to the debate surrounding the efficacy or desirability of legal restrictions on 
political expression for the purpose of ensuring that ‘…democratic processes are not 
used to destroy democracy’715, the United States of America is widely acknowledged 
to represent an example of a polity where the constitutional right to free expression 
acts as a judicial trump card against attempts to legislate in order to protect 
democracy. In theoretical and practical terms, this situation tolerates not only a 
challenge to or potential displacement of ‘settled democratic norms and values’716, it 
also ‘confers a degree of latitude for political expression and extremist political 
associations far exceeding that to be found in other western liberal democracies.’717 
This chapter will acknowledge the historic and contemporary existence of a narrow 
template for legitimate restrictions and will attempt to explain the reasons for this. 
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However, it will also argue that while the US operates within a primarily procedural 
paradigm; to identify the United States as a purely procedural democracy would be to 
ignore both historic and recent decisions that veer in a more militant direction. It will 
proceed to contend that freedom of expression and association can be justified for a 
variety of reasons including being a key component of both individual autonomy and 
a well functioning democracy and consequently, their protection under the First 
Amendment should attempt to strike a balance between sometimes conflicting factors 
and consequently between the four guiding principles identified in the introduction. 
Finally, it will analyse two cases that have emerged from the Supreme Court in 2010. 
It will assess their implications in terms of both the degree of latitude afforded to free 
expression and the balance they strike between the four principles. It will argue that 
these decisions display a dual inconsistency; both in relation to previous Court 
decisions and the balance they strike between the principles fundamental to the 
epistemic quality of democracy. 
 
6:2 Free Speech and the First Amendment 
 
6:2:1 Why Free Speech? 
In regard to a justification of a right of freedom of expression, Eric Barendt has 
identified a number of compelling arguments.
718
 These include the contention that 
free expression is a necessary component of both individual autonomy
719
 and effective 
citizen participation in a democracy.
720
 There is no doubt that ideas relating to 
individual autonomy and democratic participation can be and are often mutually 
reinforcing. From the perspective of the four principles , this mutual reinforcement 
suggests a relationship of circular dependence between an autonomy based conception 
of equal respect and the processes related to popular sovereignty. The preservation of 
equal rights to autonomous free speech and association are viewed as crucial elements 
in providing arenas for collective deliberation which will help the electorate make an 
informed decision on how to cast their vote. Similarly, the power to remove temporal 
representatives afforded to the people through the processes of popular sovereignty 
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makes those wishing to represent or continue to represent the people potentially wary 
of interfering with or advocating interference with their autonomous political rights. 
“Public discussions of public issues, together with the spreading 
of information and opinion bearing on those issues, must have a 
freedom unabridged by our agents. Though they govern us, we, 
in a deeper sense, govern them. Over our governing, they have no 
power. Over their governing we have sovereign power.”721 
 
The constitutional provision which has most relevance for concerns relating to 
establishing such a symbiotic relationship is the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  
 
6:2:2 The First Amendment 
 
The First Amendment states 
 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
               Government for a redress of grievances”722 
 
Two things are immediately apparent from a reading of the amendment. Firstly, it 
appears absolutist in tone. The phrase ‘Congress shall make no law…’ suggests at the 
very least a basic unwillingness to tolerate legislative restriction of free expression 
enacted by popularly elected representatives. As we have seen with reference to those 
countries considered earlier, while the United States Supreme Court has qualified the 
formal absolutism of the text, it is legitimate to contend that it is and has been 
generally more protective of free speech than the courts of other comparable 
democracies. Samuel Issacharoff has described this tendency as evidence of an 
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‘American Exceptionalism’.723 With respect to the specific issue of party prohibition, 
what is also immediately apparent is that the First Amendment does not explicitly 
guarantee freedom of association. As we shall again see, however, the Supreme Court 
has read a right  to associate for political ends  into the First Amendment and 
consequently enacted restrictions on political association have  been challenged under 
the individual right to freedom of expression.
724
 A less obvious but as important 
matter of relevance is that the jurisprudential approach applied to restrictions on 
political advocacy is primarily derived from principles of criminal rather than 
constitutional law.
725
 This has a number of consequences. Firstly, the focus of 
restrictions tends to be on the individual rather than the group. It is therefore more 
likely that individual membership of a particular group will be made illegal rather 
than the existence of the group itself. 
 
“On a deeper level, US constitutional law is committed to principles 
of individual responsibility…When the government claims that a 
political party or group threatens democracy, the individualistic 
tendency in U.S. Constitutional law almost instinctively shifts from 
the group to its individual members.”726 
 
Next, this emphasis on individual responsibility has made the courts suspicious of any 
attempt to validate restrictions on the premise of ‘guilt by association’727 and 
therefore, membership of a subversive organization has not, in the absence of illegal 
action, been deemed to constitute sufficient grounds for imposing restrictions. 
Consequentially, the Courts therefore tend to disallow any restrictions on free speech 
or association rights which are independent of criminal sanctions. 
 
“Put another way, satisfying the standards for criminal liability is a 
predicate for the imposition of any sanction or disability.”728 
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However, these factors as well as the apparent symbiosis between autonomy and 
democratic participation do not necessarily imply that freedom of expression has 
always been or always is well protected. Later, it will be argued that a proper balance 
between ideas of autonomy and citizen participation is necessary for a consistent level 
of protection to be achieved. More specifically and practically, the level of protection 
that the condition to satisfy the standards of criminal liability requires is directly 
related not only to judicial doctrine but also to how wide or narrow is the range of 
speech or behaviour that relevant legislation imposes criminal sanctions upon. As the 
next section shows, the journey to an approach protective of free speech rights has 
neither been linear nor completely consistent. 
 
6:2:3 Subversive Advocacy Cases 
The first important decisions taken by the Supreme Court with regard to subversive 
advocacy arose out of the United State’s involvement in World War I and its 
subsequent attempt to intervene militarily against the new Communist regime in 
Russia. In Schenck
729
 and Abrams
730
, the Supreme Court upheld prosecutions for 
‘conspiracy’. The specific conduct deemed to constitute ‘conspiracy’ was obstruction 
of military planning and interference with war production and respectively took the 
form of the distribution of pamphlets and the making of critical speeches. Justice 
Holmes argued 
 
“The character of every act depends on the circumstances in which 
it is done…The question in every case is whether the words are used 
in such circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and 
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and 
degree.” 731 
 
Effectively, the prosecutions were upheld on the basis that the actions of the 
defendants amounted to a clear and present danger of bringing about the substantive 
evil of a military defeat. The importance of these cases with respect to freedom of 
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political expression is that the Court acknowledged that Congress, as the primary 
organ of popular sovereignty, had the right to qualify equal protection in order to 
prevent such a substantive evil from occurring. Subsequently, relevant First 
Amendment cases concerned themselves with what exactly a determination of the 
existence of a clear and present danger required. Just as the original cases arose out 
of the United State’s military involvement in the First World War, subsequent 
jurisprudential clarifications of clear and present danger emerged from cases 
concerned with legislative restrictions that were passed on the brink of further military 
involvement; this time relating to World War II. In 1940, Congress passed the Smith 
Act.
732
 While this Act was directed at both Fascist and Communist groups, its 
subsequent application in the post-war Cold War era tended to be invoked against 
members of Communist organizations. Although, primarily concerned with the 
actions of individuals rather than the status of groups, it criminalized advocacy by any 
individual who 
“ …knowingly or wilfully advocates, abets, advises or teaches the 
duty, necessity, desirability or propriety of overthrowing the 
government of the United States…[or] organizes or helps to 
organize any group[to do so]; or becomes or is a member or…any 
such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes 
thereof.”733 
 
While it can be argued that the motivations behind the passage of the Smith Act were 
similar to those behind the prosecutions pursued in the earlier cases; in that they were 
both undertaken within the shadow of existing or impending military conflict, the 
Smith Act undoubtedly widened the interpretative scope of advocacy constitutive of a 
clear and present danger. It represented an attempt by Congress to restrict advocacy 
which challenged the continuing existence and validity of democratic government. In 
doing so, it placed limits on the advocacy of change. In the subsequent case, Dennis, 
734
the Court in upholding the conviction of eleven members of the Communist Party 
of the USA under the Smith Act focussed on whether it was constitutional to 
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criminalize advocacy of the overthrow of the government when such advocacy was 
not accompanied by concrete action.
735
 Chief Justice Vinson argued that 
 
“In each case, [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the evil, 
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free 
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”736 
 
The Court proceeded to argue that because the gravity of the threat (namely the 
overthrow of the government) was so serious that ‘only a slight probability of its 
realization was necessary to justify the invasion of speech rights.’737 
 
“The Government need not wait until the putsch is about to be 
executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited. If 
Government is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is 
attempting to indoctrinate its members and to commit them to a 
cause whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the 
circumstances permit, action by the government is required.”738 
 
The preservation of democratic government was thus perceived as an ultimate value 
to which the protection of free speech was subordinate.
739
Consequently, the equal 
procedural protection of political advocacy could be diluted if and when specific 
advocacies were held to be incompatible with the substantive goal of the maintenance 
of a democratic system of government. The adoption of ‘a rule that the gravity of a 
danger could compensate for its lack of imminence’740 set a potentially wide template 
for future highly restrictive interventions; especially in the context of the Cold War. 
 
“… when few believed that a Communist takeover was near at 
hand-the evil was quite improbable-but such a takeover if it 
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occurred, would be enormously harmful. The test allowed the 
government to punish people who posed an extremely small risk of 
very great harm.”741 
 
However, only six years later, the Court began a long and substantive retreat from the 
wide latitude afforded by Dennis. In Yates
742
, the Court overturned convictions 
achieved under the Smith Act by reinterpreting the notion of the gravity of an implied 
danger. It did so by making a clear distinction between advocacy as abstract doctrine 
and advocacy as a direct incitement to unlawful action. The Smith Act could not be 
construed as allowing the prohibition of 
 
“ advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract 
principle, divorced from any effort to instigate action to that end, so 
long as such advocacy or teaching is engaged in, with[out] evil 
intent.”743 
 
In Brandenburg, 
744
the Court moved beyond the distinction utilized in Yates. In 
striking down the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader under a criminal syndicalism 
statute, the Court argued that for a restriction to be legitimate, the relevant speech 
must not only be directed at producing unlawful action but  the said action must also 
display a degree of imminence. 
 
“…the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not 
permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or 
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting 
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or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.”745 
 
In practical terms, while the cases of Schenck and Dennis acknowledge the right of 
legislators to place limits on the advocacy of undesirable change, the cases of Yates 
and Brandenburg shift focus away from the content of proposed change to the means 
and methods employed to achieve it.  
 
“The Court has thus set the mould for contemporary United States 
Jurisprudence, which puts the emphasis on the means used by the 
group, while…opposing any restrictions on a group based on its 
goals or platform.”746  
 
This shift reflects an adjustment of judicial perception relating to the protections 
afforded by the First Amendment. Instead of identifying such protections as factors 
which are subordinate to the protection of substantive outcomes such as democratic 
procedures, they are perceived as a procedural check on the substantive legislative 
outcomes which may emerge from such procedures. By contrast, the following section 
will analyse relevant legislation and jurisprudence whose primary concerns relate to 
neither the continued existence of the processes of popular sovereignty nor to the 
potential iniquities that such processes may produce but rather to the continued right 
of citizens both individually and collectively to participate within them. 
 
6:2:4 the Regulation of Political Parties 
While it is evident that the focus of legislative restrictions on potentially subversive 
advocacy has been on individual membership of an organization rather than the 
existence of the organization itself, this does not mean that political parties have been 
immune from legislative attempts to restrict their operation. The main method by 
which individual states have attempted to restrict the operation of potentially 
subversive parties has lain in their power to regulate access to the ballot.
747
As Bradley 
Smith has pointed out, States have utilized numerous requirements such as petition 
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drives, early filing deadlines and loyalty oaths to restrict access.
748
 In a similar fashion 
to subversive advocacy cases post Yates, the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence 
demonstrates suspicion of, if not downright hostility to, attempts to restrict ballot 
access. With respect to the requirements of petition drives and early filing deadlines, 
the case of Williams v Rhodes
749
 is instructive. 
 
In 1948, the Ohio legislature passed legislation that set restrictive requirements for 
granting prospective candidates access to the Presidential ballot. These included the 
filing of petitions requiring the signatures of citizens quantifying at least 15% of the 
votes cast at the previous gubernatorial election and the filing of such petitions at least 
nine months before Election Day.
750
 In 1968, the presidential candidate, George 
Wallace was initially denied a place on the Ohio presidential ballot because although 
his supporters in the American Independent Party had managed to acquire a petition 
containing the requisite number of signatures, it was filed well after the statutory 
deadline.
751
 In the subsequent case, the Supreme Court overturned the Ohio Statute 
and ordered Wallace’s name to appear on the ballot. It argued that the relevant Ohio 
statute violated both the First Amendment and the ‘equal protection’ clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
752
 This was because the relevant law placed an unreasonable 
burden on ‘two different but overlapping kinds of rights.’753These were the ‘right of 
individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs’ and the ‘right of 
qualified voters…to cast their votes effectively.’754 The Ohio Statute was deemed to 
be constitutionally invalid because it diluted both the right of political parties to 
present candidates for legislative or executive office and, as a consequence, the right 
of the individual voter to exercise a meaningful ballot. 
 
“Though Ohio did not prohibit the formation of political parties, the 
right of association could be rendered meaningless by prohibiting 
parties from appearing on the ballot. Likewise, the right to vote 
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would lose its meaning if voters were limited to just one or two 
government approved parties.”755 
 
With regard to the specific issue of a loyalty oath, the Supreme Court also found such 
a requirement to constitute a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In 
Communist Party of Indiana v Whitcomb
756
, the Court was faced with the question 
whether an Indiana Statute explicitly requiring political parties to renounce advocacy 
of the forcible overthrow of the government before access to the ballot was granted 
was constitutional.
757
 The Court found that the principles expounded in Brandenburg 
with respect to subversive advocacy applied also to the ability of political parties to 
both argue their case and contest elections. 
 
“The principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and 
free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of 
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to produce such action, applies to state regulation burdening 
access to the ballot, rights of association in the political party of 
one’s choice, casting an effective ballot, and in running for office, 
which are interests as substantial as those in other areas… For 
purposes of determining whether to grant a place on the ballot, a 
group advocating violent overthrow as abstract doctrine need not be 
regarded as necessarily advocating unlawful action.”758 
 
The common thread linking these two cases is that both interpret the First Amendment 
in a way that not only protects an equal right to autonomous expression but protects 
the right of a citizen to participate meaningfully within the processes of popular 
sovereignty. This requires, first of all, protection of the right of individuals to 
associate for political ends. It also requires an acknowledgement of the right of each 
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individual citizen to cast a meaningful ballot. The effective realization of each right 
depends in large part on the protection of the other. In recognition of this, the 
Supreme Court placed limits on the ability of elected representatives to themselves 
place limits on which candidates and/or ideas can be afforded representation through 
the processes of popular sovereignty. Ian Cram argues that the adoption of such an 
approach makes the prohibition of a political party within the United States extremely 
unlikely. 
 
“…the proposition that the state might compel the closure of a 
political party on account of its professed non-conformity with 
substantive democratic principles is plainly a non-starter. The 
majority are simply not permitted to deny the minority the right to 
be represented.”
759
 
 
It is evident therefore that the characterisation of the United States as a primarily 
procedural democracy at least partially emanates from the balance the Court has (with 
exceptions) struck between the protection of an equal right to autonomous expression 
and an equal right to participate fully in the processes of democratic government.  
The remainder of this chapter will attempt to achieve a number of objectives. Later, it 
will argue that the balance that has been struck between the complementary yet 
potentially conflicting values of individual autonomy and democratic participation has 
been potentially undermined by two recent cases. Next however, it will move beyond 
acknowledgement of a relative lack of successful militant democratic measures within 
the American polity to attempt to provide an explanation for this reality.  
 
6:3 Explanations for lack of restrictions 
There are numerous factors which have contributed to a relative lack of restrictive 
measures within the contemporary American polity. Firstly, from a purely legal 
perspective, it is difficult to enforce them. As has already been discussed, attempts to 
restrict political speech or enforce political prohibitions have largely been exercised 
through the criminal code.  Thus, subsequent measures regulating rights of political 
speech and association ‘… [have] become inextricably bound up with the standards of 
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criminal prosecution, including burdens of proof or heightened specificity 
requirements’.760 One of the reasons why this may be the case is that there exist 
structural factors within the American political system which ‘provide a buffer against 
anti-democratic forces.’761The consequent weakness of anti-democratic forces may 
therefore explain why ‘…American law is decidedly directed to the truly marginal 
behaviour that might give rise to a criminal offense.’762 Samuel Issacharoff has 
identified at least two components of the American political system which contribute 
to both a lack of extremism and a subsequent degree of stability. The first component 
is that the First Past the Post electoral system utilised within the United States makes 
it extremely difficult for extremist candidates to gain office. As has long been 
acknowledged in political theory,
763
 the existence of a single district, single winner 
electoral system has a propensity to ‘produce two and only two relatively stable, 
relatively centrist parties.’764 
 
“Because districted elections force the prospective governing 
coalitions to form before the election and to run as political parties, 
the inclusion of extreme candidates discredits the entire slate and 
forces such candidates to the margin. As a result, extreme 
candidates face formidable hurdles to attaining legislative office.”765 
 
Secondly, Issacharoff argues that the existence of a Presidential rather than a 
parliamentary system of government provides a further degree of stability. Even if 
anti-democratic parties were to overcome the barrier of the electoral system and 
achieve some degree of representation in Congress, the Presidential system would 
ensure that their ability to disrupt the work of government would be limited. As 
opposed to some countries with purely parliamentary systems
766
, small parties could 
neither ‘leverage their small presence into significant commands on public policy’767 
nor subsequently bring down fragile coalition governments. 
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“There are many reasons to be wary of presidentialism, but it does 
serve as a buffer to the threat posed by marginal parties’ ability to 
insinuate themselves into parliament and disrupt governance from 
within.”768 
 
In addition to practical explanations for the relative lack of restrictive actions, there 
exists a fundamental reason inherent to the Constitution itself. This is the fact that the 
United States Constitution within a paradigm of liberal individualism is legally neutral 
with regard to the pursuit of and attachment to ideological goals by individuals or 
collective groups of individuals. This neutrality is in direct contrast to other 
democracies such as Germany whose Constitution is specifically committed to the 
protection of principles such as ‘human dignity’769 and the ‘free democratic basic 
order.’770 This has two consequences.  Firstly, while in Germany, the pursuit of 
specific goals which are contrary to the principles referenced above may render a 
party constitutionally invalid. In the US, because the Constitution is legally neutral 
towards the achievement of substantive outcomes, the pursuit of specific goals is 
legally irrelevant as long as they are sought by legal means or not striven for through 
the incitement of illegal acts. Therefore, there is no constitutional basis for diluting 
procedural equality in the name of protecting the Constitution and accordingly, a 
political party cannot therefore be rendered constitutionally invalid by its desire to 
overthrow the existing system of government. 
 
“American constitutional neutrality is almost a logical necessity: 
there is no right of revolution because there are no substantive limits 
on procedurally lawful change under the American Constitution. If 
realisation of certain political goals is precluded by the Constitution, 
revolution would become, if not a right, then a practical necessity 
for proponents of those goals.”771 
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Such assertions illustrate the constitutional incoherence of earlier cases such as 
Dennis. In justifying restrictions on the advocacy of overthrowing the government by 
referring to the danger that such advocacy posed to ‘government’, it was effectively 
placing a protective wall around a Constitution which by its own neutral logic is 
potentially subject to unlimited change. 
 
“Yet ‘Government’ if taken to mean a set of institutions has no 
‘self’ to preserve. The American Court has invoked the right of 
government to preserve a ‘self’ that the justices themselves see as 
mutable without limit.”772 
 
Secondly, with specific reference to free speech, the aforementioned neutrality 
towards ideological goals means that in cases concerned with political expression, 
arguments for a limitation or qualification of absolute freedom based on the necessity 
or desirability of a relevant competing interest are placed at a significant 
disadvantage. 
 
“…the absence of constitutionally specifically protecting human 
dignity or cognate ideas means that the only constitutional interest at 
play is the interest in free expression, and balancing a constitutional 
interest against non-constitutional ones systematically produces 
rules protective of speech.”773 
  
It is evident, therefore, that the relative lack of restrictive provisions can be partially 
explained in terms of the both overall stability of the American political system and 
within the logic of its own Constitution. This primarily procedural approach has also 
been underpinned by judicial reasoning which has attempted to establish a 
relationship of, if not mutual dependence, certainly peaceful co-existence between 
ideas relating to both individual autonomy and popular sovereignty. Such a 
relationship is not, however, automatic. An interpretation of political rights which 
relies too heavily on one conception poses a theoretical and potentially practical threat 
to maintenance of a sustainable balance between the two. The following section will 
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establish theoretical tensions and contradictions between them and will conclude by 
discussing recent cases which have dealt with such tensions by favouring one 
principle at the expense of the other thus endangering the balance necessary for 
effective protection of political rights. 
 
6:4 Imbalanced Principles 
 
6:4:1 Popular Sovereignty as an impediment to Autonomy 
The ‘argument from democracy’774 can be summarised in the following way.775 
Effective democratic accountability depends upon an informed electorate able to 
assess a government’s performance. Such an assessment is contingent upon the 
electorate having access to information that has a bearing on government 
performance. Consequently, there should be no restrictions on expression which can 
potentially contribute to such an assessment. As Barendt has noted, such an argument 
is ‘firmly utilitarian or consequentialist’.776 Freedom of expression is justified in terms 
of its potential contribution to democracy and it subsequently echoes Dennis in that it 
places freedom of expression in a subordinate relationship to democracy. This has 
potentially profound repercussions. Firstly, if the role of free speech is to safeguard or 
advance democracy then it is logical to argue that expression which threatens 
democracy should not be protected. This is exactly the position taken by the Court in 
Dennis. Secondly, if freedom of expression is subordinate to the maintenance of 
democracy, could it not be argued that the suppression of speech by a democratically 
elected majority is legitimate? 
 
 
“…the very notion of popular sovereignty supporting the argument 
from democracy argues against any limitation on that sovereignty, 
and thereby argues against recognition of an independent principle 
of freedom of speech.”777 
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This potential challenge to speech and association rights may acquire enhanced 
legitimacy if the act of suppression is itself supported by the majority of the electorate 
as well as a majority of their elected representatives. 
 
6:4:2 Autonomy as an impediment to Popular Sovereignty 
The existence of the First Amendment as an integral component of the Constitution   
represents both a symbolic and practical refutation of the idea that free speech is 
subordinate to democracy. Thus, it is clear that the principle of a constitutionally 
protected right of freedom of expression cannot be grounded solely on its contribution 
to a system of democratic governance. By contrast, the narrow template for 
restrictions established by cases such as Brandenburg suggests a commitment to a 
conception of political rights which values them as a structural support to  the 
protection of an individual autonomy which is both independent of and protected from 
the processes and outcomes of popular sovereignty. However, the commitment to 
such a principle raises legitimate questions. Firstly, there is the question of whether it 
is democratically legitimate to allow an unelected judiciary’s interpretation of rights 
to act as an obstacle to the wishes of the people in the form of their elected 
representatives.
778
 Secondly, and more pertinently, it raises the question of whether 
the desire of the Court to protect individual autonomy has led it to preclude regulating 
spheres of private behaviour which although not undemocratic in intent have 
deleterious effects on the effective functioning  of democracy. As Mark Tushnet has 
argued 
 
“The typical targets of ‘militant democracy’ regulations are 
extremist groups, but the concept does not have any necessary 
connection to extremism. Threats to the democratic process from the 
exercise of constitutional rights closely associated with democracy 
can emanate from a variety of sources.”779 
 
One of the perceived threats to the effective functioning of a democracy through an 
application of an autonomy centred interpretation of political rights is the potentially 
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distorting effect of money on the electoral and legislative process. This issue is not 
unique to the United States but is undoubtedly most associated with it. It has sparked 
wide debate between those who wish to regulate campaign finance in order to protect 
the fairness of electoral procedures and those who equate measures to regulate 
campaign expenditure with attempts to censor political speech. The debate 
surrounding this issue illustrates the potential conflict that exists between reading the 
First Amendment as a protector of individual autonomy or as a structural component 
of a competitive democracy. 
 
“Viewed solely as a means of disabling government, a purely 
"autonomy centered" First Amendment can be affirmatively hostile 
to democracy by insulating private activity from regulation despite 
its deleterious effect on democracy. [Any]  decision to leave 
campaign financing hostage to the sum of unregulated private 
spending decisions is a classic example of the collision between a 
First Amendment preoccupied with autonomy and a concern for a 
fair democratic process.”780 
 
The final section of this Chapter will examine two 2010 cases in which the Supreme 
Court has made bold and highly controversial judgements which have potentially 
profound repercussions for the issues discussed in this section and for the ability to 
strike an appropriate balance between the four principles of democracy.  Firstly, in 
Holder v Humanitarian Law Project et al, the decision to uphold a restriction of First 
Amendment rights and qualify the equal right to autonomous free speech is at least 
partially based on the identification of a competing public interest alongside a 
subsequent deference to the other branches of government in pursuit of that interest. 
Secondly, in Citizens United, a decision to overturn legislation which seeks to 
regulate campaign finance invokes the equal right to autonomous speech to invalidate 
legislative attempts to equalize the conditions under which the processes of popular 
sovereignty operate. 
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6:5 Holder v Humanitarian Law Project et al
781
 
In this case, the Supreme Court upholds legislation that makes it a federal crime to 
‘knowingly provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist 
organization.’782 For the purposes of the legislation, ‘material support or resources’ is 
defined as 
 
“…any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including 
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial 
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, 
false documentation or identification, communications equipment, 
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or 
more individuals who may be or include oneself), and 
transportation, except medicine or religious materials.”783 
 
With respect to the prohibitions on providing training and expert advice or assistance, 
the plaintiffs argued that these represented a violation of their First Amendment rights 
to speech and association. More specifically they argued that the legislation prohibits 
them providing  legitimate support to two organizations ( the PKK and LTTE)
784
 who 
despite having been designated as ‘foreign terrorist organizations’ by the Secretary of 
State hold the legitimate political objectives of gaining independence for the Kurds 
and Tamils from Turkey and Sri Lanka respectively. They further argued that the 
assistance they sought to provide was both intended and likely to move the relevant 
organizations away from violence and towards an embracement of legitimate political 
methods. This assistance was proposed to take the form of training members of these 
organizations to use international law for the peaceful resolution of disputes and to 
teach them how to petition representative bodies such as the United Nations for relief. 
Consequently, the plaintiffs concluded by arguing that the relevant statute’s definition 
of material support should only apply to conduct that were intended to further the 
groups’ illegal objective. However, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments 
regarding freedom of speech in both general and specific terms. 
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6:5:1 Reasoning of Court 
Firstly, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the relevant statute’s 
definition of material support should apply only to conduct intended to further illegal 
objectives by arguing that knowledge about the recipients’ involvement in terrorism 
was enough to warrant a criminal prosecution 
 
“The Court cannot avoid the constitutional issues in this litigation 
by accepting plaintiffs’ argument that the material-support statute, 
when applied to speech, should be interpreted to require proof that a 
defendant intended to further a foreign terrorist organization’s 
illegal activities. That reading is inconsistent with §2339B’s text, 
which prohibits “knowingly” providing material support and 
demonstrates that Congress chose knowledge about the 
organization’s connection to terrorism, not specific intent to further 
its terrorist activities, as the necessary mental state for a 
violation.”785  
 
In more general terms, it proceeded to assert that all manifestations of material 
support are fungible in that they can be used for and diverted to different purposes. 
 
“Moreover, material support meant to promote peaceable, lawful 
conduct can be diverted to advance terrorism in multiple ways. The 
record shows that designated foreign terrorist organizations do not 
maintain organizational firewalls between social, political, and 
terrorist operations, or financial firewalls between funds raised for 
humanitarian activities and those used to carry out terrorist 
attacks.”786 
 
With specific regard to the types of speech that the plaintiffs proposed to undertake, 
the Court argued that training organizations to use international law for dispute 
resolution would ‘…provide that group with information and techniques that it could 
use as part of a broader strategy to promote terrorism, and to threaten, manipulate, and 
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disrupt’ and that teaching such organizations to petition international bodies for relief 
‘could help [them] obtain funding [they] could redirect to violent activities.”787 These 
assertions relating to fungibility were based entirely on the opinion of the executive 
branch. The Court found that the executive branch’s experience in combating 
terrorism meant that its evaluation ‘…like Congress’s assessment is entitled to 
deference, given the sensitive national security and foreign relations interests at 
stake.’788 Finally, the Court also rejected the plaintiff’s claim that their right of 
freedom of association had been violated by asserting that just as the right to freedom 
of association can be read into the First Amendment’s protection of free speech so 
could any burden on those rights.  
 
“Any burden on plaintiffs’ freedom of association caused by 
preventing them from supporting designated foreign terrorist 
organizations, but not other groups, is justified for the same reasons 
the Court rejects their free speech challenge”789 
 
6:5:2 Implications of Court’s reasoning 
The reasoning applied by the majority on the Court can be criticised in relation to both 
the facts of the case and its implications. The contention made by the Court that 
material support in the form of speech is fungible poses numerous questions regarding 
the ability of individuals and groups to participate meaningfully to democratic 
government. Firstly, the refusal to protect the specific speech proposed by the 
plaintiffs does not meet the requirement of imminent illegality or incitement to 
imminent illegality found in Brandenburg. 
 
In his dissent
790
, Justice Stephen Breyer opined 
 
“Here the plaintiffs seek to advocate peaceful, lawful action to 
secure political ends; and they seek to teach others how to do the 
same. No one contends that the plaintiffs’ speech to these 
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organizations can be prohibited as incitement under 
Brandenburg.”791 
 
Next, Breyer criticises the assessment made by the executive branch on the fungibility 
of the specific speech proposed by the plaintiffs arguing that there is a lack of 
evidence or reasonable argument identifying potential mechanisms for the redirection 
of such speech into the creation of resources for more nefarious purposes. 
 
“The proposition that the two very different kinds of “support” are 
“fungible,” however, is not obviously true. There is no obvious way 
in which undertaking  advocacy for  political change through 
peaceful means or teaching the PKK and LTTE, say, how to petition 
the United Nations for political change is fungible with other 
resources that might be put to more sinister ends in the way that 
donations of money, food, or computer training are fungible. It is far 
from obvious that these advocacy activities can themselves be 
redirected, or will free other resources that can be directed, towards 
terrorist ends”792 
 
 More generally, the notion of fungibility itself potentially establishes a precedent 
which facilitates increasingly wide latitude for the suppression of speech which while 
innocent in intent may be deemed to be available for use by its recipients for other 
less legitimate purposes. 
 
“…the risk that those who are taught will put otherwise innocent 
speech or knowledge to bad use is omnipresent, at least where that 
risk rests on little more than (even informed) speculation. Hence to 
accept this kind of argument without more and to apply it to the 
teaching of a subject such as international human rights law is to 
adopt a rule of law that, contrary to the Constitution’s text and First 
Amendment precedent, would automatically forbid the teaching of 
any subject in a case where national security interests conflict with 
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the First Amendment. The Constitution does not allow all such 
conflicts to be decided in the Government’s behaviour.”793  
 
Finally, the implications of the Court’s reasoning extend beyond simply the 
acceptance of the notion of fungibility but also involve the process by which such a 
notion was adopted. The refusal by the majority on the Court to subject the 
assessment of fungibility to independent scrutiny on the basis that the relative 
expertise of both the executive and legislative branches in combating terrorism means 
that their assessment should be afforded deference  has potentially profound 
implications. By deferring to the executive and legislative branch in matters relating 
to national security and foreign relations, could it not be argued that the Court is 
potentially establishing a precedent by which the equal protection of free speech can 
be qualified by the wishes of the majority simply because the fight against terrorism is 
temporally deemed to be of especially significant value? Such a precedent would 
potentially place a competing interest, namely national security, in a position to 
challenge if not the constitutional primacy of free political expression but the present 
wide interpretation of its scope exemplified by Brandenburg.  
 
6:5:3 Humanitarian Law Project and the four principles 
With respect to the balance struck between the four guiding principles, a number of 
considerations emerge from this decision. With regard to the principle of 
representation, these are relatively minor. Although the legislation in question directly 
affects the ability of the plaintiffs to assist the relevant groups in petitioning 
representative bodies on the international stage, it does not deny anyone the right to 
contest an election or profess an ideological goal. With regard to changeability, the 
criminalization of material support in the form of speech has substantial implications. 
Firstly, it inhibits the ability of groups such as Humanitarian Law Project to assist the 
relevant political groups from challenging the status quo within their own polities by 
peaceful means. More worryingly, the criminalisation of such assistance may make it 
less likely that a successful transition from violent to peaceful methods can be 
achieved. With respect to the principles of equal respect and popular sovereignty, it is 
clear that the decision to uphold the relevant legislation signifies a significant 
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readjustment. The equal right to autonomous speech is qualified in deference to 
assessments made by agents of popular sovereignty where it is deemed that they 
possess the necessary expertise in pursuit of a vital public interest Whether the vital 
public interest in combating terrorism constitutes sufficient grounds for the 
qualification of political rights is a complex question that has been discussed in detail 
in an earlier chapter.
794
 However, in relation to this specific case, it is contended that 
the Court did not convincingly establish a sufficient relationship between the 
proposed speech and terrorism to warrant criminalisation. Also the prospect that 
criminalisation may place impediments to the pursuit of peaceful change with regard 
to both goals and methods leads to a conclusion that the decision to uphold the 
relevant legislation is unjustified both in terms of its own goals and with reference to 
the four principles. 
 
6:6 Citizens United
795
 
In 2010, the Supreme Court found that legislation
796
 prohibiting corporations and 
unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures 
which expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate to be unconstitutional. 
This decision directly overruled an earlier decision known as Austin
797
which upheld 
the constitutionality of a Michigan act that had previously banned corporations from 
making such expenditures. These legislative provisions are at least partly motivated 
by a desire to remove the potentially distorting effects of massive corporate 
expenditure on the electoral process. Such expenditure potentially allows the 
existence of massive financial disparities to influence the electoral process in a way 
which removes the substance from the rights to associate and cast a meaningful ballot.  
 
“…the First Amendment should be read to protect the right to cast a 
meaningful ballot as the ultimate act of political expression. The 
First Amendment should be read to protect the right to associate 
with like-minded people in an effort to influence public policy by 
running for public office…Contrary to Buckley, however, the First 
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Amendment should not be read to protect unlimited campaign 
spending that vests disproportionate political power in the very 
rich.”798 
 
In denying this desire, the Citizens United decision echoes of the previous Buckley v 
Valeo
799
 decision which stated that with respect to the electoral process, massive 
resource imbalance can only be rectified by ‘…subsidising weak voices but not 
limiting strong ones.’800 
 
6:6:1 Reasoning of Court 
In stating that ‘speech is an essential mechanism of democracy’801, the Court argues 
that ‘…the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavour certain subjects or 
viewpoints or to distinguish among different speakers, which may be a means to 
control content.’802 Therefore, in the context of political speech, ‘there is no basis for 
the proposition that…the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavoured 
speakers.’803  Consequently, the Supreme Court argued that although corporate speech 
in the form of independent expenditure may affect or even distort electoral outcomes, 
this contention cannot be utilized to restrict a fundamental right such as free speech. 
 
“The First Amendment prohibits Congress from fining or jailing 
citizens, or associations of citizens, for engaging in political speech, 
but Austin’s anti-distortion rationale would permit the Government 
to ban political speech because the speaker is an association with a 
corporate form. Political speech is “indispensable to decision-
making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech 
from corporations based on the latter’s special advantages of, e.g., 
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limited liability, does not suffice to allow laws prohibiting speech. It 
is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes that corporate funds may 
“have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
Corporation’s political ideas.”804 
 
In taking this view, the Supreme Court has as it also did in Buckley defined the 
conception of equal respect underlying the First Amendment as an equal right to 
autonomous speech. The ability to spend money advocating the election or defeat of a 
candidate is viewed as a legitimate form of autonomous speech. Consequently, the 
freedom of an individual or corporation to spend unlimited amounts of money is 
judged as ‘crucial to maintaining the autonomous capacity to decide for yourself 
whether and how to speak.’805 While such a contention may contain a degree of 
validity in isolation, its uncontested application in a competitive electoral context 
contain serious implications for the basic fairness of such procedures 
 
6:6:2 Implications 
Firstly, at a general level, to interpret the First Amendment as merely an instrument of 
autonomy completely independent of democracy allows not only speech which 
ideologically challenges the validity of democracy
806
 but also contested 
manifestations of ‘expression’ which harm its effective functioning. 
 
“The prevailing conception of the First Amendment as a check on 
democracy leads to creation of a regulatory vacuum in which the 
"speaker" may engage in privileged behavior free from government 
interference. Most of the time, the privileged behavior reinforces 
democracy, but, as with any powerful autonomy norm, private 
actors are free to operate in the regulatory dead space in ways that 
harm democracy…”807 
 
This is particularly the case with regard to the ability to spend money during election 
campaigns. Unlimited campaign spending by one side may drown out legitimate 
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voices in a competitive process and thus establish conditions of inequality and 
unfairness. A failure to regulate such spending constitutes, it is contended, a much 
more effective method of controlling content than regulating to establish conditions of 
relative equality. Electoral Campaigns fought on unregulated financial disparities are 
likely to skew the political agenda and thus have a disproportionate affect on political 
outcomes.   
“The legal structure of corporations allows them to amass and 
deploy financial resources on a scale few natural persons can 
match…In a[n] election…the interests of non-resident corporations 
may be fundamentally averse to the interests of local voters. 
Consequently, when corporations grab up the prime broadcasting 
slots on the eve of elections, they can flood the market with 
advocacy that bears ‘little or no correlation’ to the ideas of natural 
persons or to any broader notion of the public good. The opinions of 
real people may be marginalised.”808 
It is in response to and against such marginalization that legislative attempts to 
enforce regulation of campaign finance are partially motivated. They can also be 
viewed as an attempt to provide substance to the rights to associate and cast a 
meaningful ballot referenced in the Williams and Communist Party cases.
809
 The 
decision of the Court in Citizens United to overturn such legislation undermines the 
ability of the American citizenry to govern themselves. 
“At bottom, the Court's opinion is thus a rejection of the common 
sense of the American people, who have recognized a need to 
prevent corporations from undermining self government since the 
founding, and who have fought against the distinctive corrupting 
potential of corporate electioneering since the days of Theodore 
Roosevelt. It is a strange time to repudiate that common sense… 
While American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority 
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of this Court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of 
corporate money in politics.”810 
 
6:6:3 Citizens United and the four guiding principles 
This case takes on a different form than the majority of cases which will be analysed 
throughout this thesis. Firstly, it is concerned not with the content of advocacy but the 
form that advocacy takes through the spending of money. Secondly, the relevant legal 
measures seek not to regulate institutions such as political parties who are viewed as 
intrinsic to the democratic process but the actions of corporations whose role within 
the democratic process is subject to substantive contestation. Finally and as a result of 
this, the legal measures relevant to this case do not involve the dilution of procedural 
equality in pursuit of and/or protection of particular goals; they involve regulation of 
specific manifestations of expression as a means of achieving procedural equality. 
Despite these differences, this case raises as many fundamental questions in relation 
to the balance to be struck between the four principles as any other. The decision 
made by the Supreme Court in Citizens United protects a specifically autonomy 
centred conception of equal respect at the expense of a satisfactory balance. 
 
In protecting the right of corporations to spend an unlimited amount of money during 
electoral campaigns, it is contended that the Court has undermined all four principles 
to some degree. With regard to the principles of representation, the ability of all 
citizens to have their views heard during the election campaign and as a consequence 
their interests considered by those elected is adversely affected by the presence of 
potential massive resource imbalances between candidates and parties contesting 
specific elections. Next, with regard to the principles of equal respect and popular 
sovereignty, the decision invokes a specific autonomy based conception of equality to 
invalidate measures designed to equalize the conditions under which the mechanisms 
of popular sovereignty operate and thus give essence to the rights closely associated 
with such processes. Finally, with regard to changeability, protecting the right of the 
wealthy to use their wealth in order to affect electoral outcomes is likely to produce 
elected representatives who are not only beholden to special interests but who are 
unlikely to challenge the economic and social structures which facilitate the accrual of 
                                                 
810
 Stevens  J, Dissenting Opinion, Op cit, 90 
205 
 
such enormous wealth. Protecting the autonomy of the wealthy to dominate the 
political process not only undermines all four principles, it also potentially 
undermines the peoples’ faith in democracy. Such disenchantment is dangerous in a 
system of government premised on popular participation. 
 
“In addition to this immediate drowning out of non corporate voices, 
there may be deleterious effects that follow soon thereafter. 
Corporate ‘domination’811 of electioneering…can generate the 
impression that corporations dominate our democracy. When 
citizens turn on their televisions and radios before an election and 
hear only corporate electioneering, they may lose faith in their 
capacity, as citizens, to influence public policy. A Government 
captured by corporate interests, they may come to believe, will be 
neither responsive to their needs nor willing to give their views a 
fair hearing. The predictable result is cynicism and disenchantment: 
an increased perception that large spenders ‘call the tune’812 and a 
reduced ‘willingness of voters to take part in democratic 
governance.’ 813 
 
6:7 Conclusion: The US and the four guiding principles 
 
The identification of the United States as primarily a procedural democracy is 
suggestive of an unyielding commitment to the principle of equal respect in the form 
of an autonomous right to free speech independent of and protected from specific 
manifestations of the other three principles. The approach taken by the Supreme Court 
in cases such as Yates where restrictions can only be justified in reference to advocacy 
directed at inciting illegal action and latterly, Brandenburg which imposes the 
additional prerequisite of imminence lends this estimation a degree of validity.  
However, other evidence presented in this chapter indicates that such a contention is 
too simplistic and fails to grasp the complexity of the relevant First Amendment 
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jurisprudence. While the principle of equal respect has often been utilised at the 
expense of the other three principles, there have been notable examples of these 
principles being applied to dilute the seemingly unbreakable commitment to equal 
respect. Also, there are examples of equal respect being applied in a manner 
consistent with the reinforcement and maintenance of the other three. 
  
 While the early cases of Schenck and Abrams  indicate a belief that a qualification of 
the equal right to free expression can be justified on the basis of protecting the State 
from internal or external enemies irrespective of their commitment or otherwise to 
democracy. The Smith Act of 1940 with its focus on those who adhered to totalitarian 
ideologies constituted a reflection of a perceived need to restrict equal rights for the 
purpose of protecting the continued existence of democratic government and 
elections. Limitations were to be placed on the tolerance of short term advocacy of 
radical change and its subsequent potential representation in order to protect those 
structures which facilitated in the long term, both the survival of representative 
government and the availability of change. It is noteworthy that the subsequent case, 
Dennis implied that the potential gravity of such a danger was sufficient to justify an 
invasion of relevant rights irrespective of probability or imminence.  
 
Next, with regard to popular sovereignty, the idea that judicial reasoning on these 
matters is immune from popular pressure does not bear scrutiny. The Schenck and 
Abrams cases
814
 reflected popular misgivings with respect to the tolerance of 
advocacy perceived as hostile to a war effort while the potentially wide template for 
restrictions afforded by Dennis took place within a political context dominated by 
McCarthyism and anti-Communist paranoia.
815
It is also surely no coincidence that the 
jurisprudential retreat from Dennis exemplified by Yates occurred within a time frame 
consistent with the discrediting of McCarthyism and its tactics.  
 
Finally, the principle of equal respect has been given jurisprudential recognition in 
ways that extend beyond an identification of purely autonomous behaviour 
independent of popular sovereignty. With respect to the explicit issue of regulating the 
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access of political parties to the electoral arena, the cases of Williams and Communist 
Party display a reading of the First Amendment which interprets equal rights of 
speech and association as structural contributors to the processes of popular 
sovereignty rather than simply constituting bulwarks against their outcomes. These 
cases established an equal right to advocate change potentially inconsistent with the 
maintenance of democratic structures and to have those views represented at a 
legislative level through success at the ballot box. 
 
It is contended that the balance between an ‘autonomy’ centred reading of the First 
Amendment as exemplified in Brandenburg and a ‘democracy’ centred approach 
given recognition in Communist Party is a valuable one with regard to the facilitation 
of the existence of continuing disagreement as well as a functioning balance between 
the four principles. The continued right to challenge the desirability of democratic 
government and offer an alternative through representative elections is a crucial 
element of a collective deliberation premised on fundamental disagreement and the 
availability of change. The equal right also to contribute to processes which provide a 
temporary resolution of substantive disagreement is a vital factor in popular 
acceptance of the temporal legitimacy of democratic outcomes if not their enduring 
validity.  
 
Such a balance while valuable is also precarious and it is from this perspective that 
there exist concerns about the judicial reasoning applied in both Humanitarian Law 
Project and Citizens United. In the former, the Court dilutes the equal right to 
autonomous speech by identifying a competing public interest in the form of 
protecting the homeland from terrorism and subsequently affording deference to 
relevant assessments made by both direct and indirect agents of popular sovereignty. 
In the latter, the Court invokes the same right to autonomous free speech it qualified 
in Humanitarian Law Project to invalidate an attempt by elected representatives to 
equalize the conditions of popular sovereignty under which they are chosen and thus 
give practical effect to the rights relevant to this area. These decisions negatively 
affect the balance necessary to the continued existence of substantive disagreement. 
Humanitarian Law Project seems to suggest that any dialogue with foreign 
organizations deemed by the State Department to have connections with terrorism can 
be criminalized even when such dialogue is peaceful in both content and intent. This 
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has negative implications for the representation of views which may be deemed to be 
temporally unpopular and places limits on those wishing to pursue change in the 
direction of US foreign policy. The Citizens United decision allows for an unregulated 
right to buy expression within the electoral arena. While such a situation is respectful 
of formal equality, its practical effect might be to drown out alternative voices and 
thus produce both an ideological and legislative consensus which does not effectively 
represent the real interests and preferences of ordinary citizens  and thus potentially 
eliminates even the prospect of substantive change.  Such a scenario may potentially 
lead to disaffection with democracy amongst the American citizenry. If such 
disenchantment were to emerge, its effects could pose long term questions regarding 
the attitude of the populace regarding their continued participation within the system 
and their willingness to abide by the outcomes that it produces. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
7:1 Introduction 
 
The substantive chapters of this thesis have attempted to accomplish a dual goal. 
Firstly, they have described the legislative and constitutional measures available 
within each jurisdictional context to those willing to permit short term deviations from 
democratic norms in the pursuit of the goal of both the long term survival and 
sustainability of democracy. Next, they have evaluated both the constitutional 
existence and practical application of these provisions in the light of previously 
identified guiding principles . The purpose of each evaluation is to ascertain whether 
the balance struck between these principles within each jurisdiction and specific case 
is such as to continue to facilitate the twin goals of protecting democracy and 
allowing the continuation of real substantive disagreement. Similarly, the conclusion 
will pursue a two-fold strategy. Firstly, it will attempt to place each jurisdiction and 
its relevant jurisprudence within a continuum of legal intervention at least partially 
inspired by previous attempts at classification. Then, it will conclude by evaluating 
which (if any) of the legal interventions can be justified with reference to the four 
guiding principles and consequently establish a template for the future with regard to 
future dilemmas. 
 
7:2 A classification of arrangements 
The best known work with respect to classifying democratic jurisdictions in relation 
to their propensity to use short term restrictive measures for the long term stability of 
democratic government was written by Fox and Nolte
816
 in 1995. Using the 
suspension of elections in Algeria in 1991
817
 as a starting point for discussion, Fox 
and Nolte succinctly describe the dilemma at the heart of questions relating to party 
prohibition. 
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“Even though tolerance is bedrock of democratic government, it 
may be argued that where the survival of democracy itself is 
threatened, survival takes precedence over tolerance. On the other 
hand, the exclusion or suppression of political parties based on their 
allegedly subversive nature goes to the heart of the democratic 
process. Whilst preservation of a democratic process is a laudable 
goal, experience suggests that the power to exclude groups from the 
political process is often exercised arbitrarily and in a fashion that 
detracts from rather than enhances the democratic character of the 
state.”818 
 
Referencing also the experience of Weimar Germany and the rise of the Nazis,
819
 the 
authors proceed to apply the terms procedural, substantive, tolerant and militant to 
classify both the extent of measures legally available as well as the incidence within 
specific jurisdictions. The terms procedural and substantive are defined in an identical 
matter to those described in the introductory chapter of this thesis. Procedural 
democracies are those which provide a mechanism (through majority rule) for the 
collective resolution of disputes but which place no limits on the substantive decisions 
which can be made.
820
 Substantive democracies by contrast view democracy as not 
only a system to ‘[ascertain…] the preferences of political majorities, but as a society 
in which majority rule is made meaningful.’821 The procedures of democracy cannot 
be used as a mechanism to destroy those rights and freedoms which are at its 
essence.
822
 
 
Fox and Nolte then further subdivide democratic countries by assigning the adjectives 
tolerant and militant to said democracies with respect to how passive or active they 
are in enforcing restrictive provisions against actors within the democratic arena. 
Subsequently, they come up with four typologies to describe and encompass state 
practice in this field. These are tolerant procedural democracy; militant procedural 
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democracy; tolerant substantive democracy and finally militant substantive 
democracy. 
 
7:2:1 Jurisdictional Classification 
 
In applying these typologies to the jurisdictions covered within this thesis, it becomes 
evident that while some jurisdictions can be placed obviously within particular 
categories, in others the discrepancy between symbolic measures on one hand and 
actual practice on the other make for a less comfortable fit.  
 
The first case study of Turkey represents clear evidence of a militantly substantive 
approach. Turkish authorities have consistently dissolved parties that are deemed to 
threaten substantive goals such as the country’s territorial integrity and the secular 
nature of the State. For the most part, the approach of the European Court has been 
consistent with a mainly tolerant and procedural approach in that it has declined to 
uphold the vast majority of dissolutions. However, in the case of Refah, the Court 
adopts a militantly substantive approach towards political Islam out of kilter with its 
own guidelines. By contrast, the next jurisdiction, Spain finds itself sitting 
uncomfortably within the typologies suggested by Fox and Nolte. While the relevant 
authorities actively and successfully sought the prohibition of a specific political party 
in the case of Batasuna and can thus be accurately described as deploying a militant 
approach, the party in question were banned as a result not of ideological attachment 
to specific substantive goals but in their refusal to condemn a violent act perpetrated 
by a closely aligned terrorist group. Therefore, the decision by the European Court of 
Human Rights to uphold the prohibition (whatever its evidentiary merits) is consistent 
with the Venice Commission’s guidelines that dissolution of a party can only properly 
be applied when the relevant party advocates the use of or uses ‘…violence as a 
political means to overthrow the existing democratic constitutional order.’823  Those 
who ‘advocate a peaceful change of the constitution’824 should not be subject to 
dissolution. In this regard, the Strasbourg Court can be argued to applying an active 
yet mainly procedural approach in that attachment to substantive goals is not 
considered a sufficient ground for dissolution. 
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The third case study considers those polities which recently emerged from the ashes 
of totalitarianism. Post Nazi Germany and many of the countries which emerged from 
Communist rule in the early 1990s have all established substantive objectives within 
their constitutions which are deemed of sufficient importance that parties who profess 
antipathy towards or actively campaign against these objectives potentially find 
themselves subject to legal restrictions up to and including prohibition. However, 
there has also been a noticeable lack of attempts at enforcing these measures in recent 
years. Those prohibitions successfully pursued have tended to occur relatively early 
within the post-totalitarian era and have been motivated (as in the cases of SRP and 
KPD in Germany) by symbolic and geopolitical factors. Therefore, while Germany in 
particular has been classified as a militant substantive democracy, 
825
 recent rather 
than historic practice suggests a trend towards a more tolerant if symbolically 
substantive approach. A similar dynamic is evident in regard to the fourth case study 
of Israel in that the typology applied by Fox and Nolte does not fit easily with relevant 
case law. With reference to Israeli practice, Fox and Nolte apply the typology of 
‘militant substantive’. 826 Their rationale for doing so includes recognition that within 
Basic Law 7A, there exist substantive objectives such as ‘denial of the existence of 
the State of Israel as the State of the Jewish nation’827 and ‘incitement to racism’828 
upon which exclusion of a party list from the electoral arena can be legally justified. 
They also reference the disqualification of the Kach Party in 1988
829
  as evidence that 
disqualification on substantive grounds is both actively pursued and often upheld. 
While such an assertion may have merit in that politically motivated groups have 
often utilised the Central Elections Committee as a mechanism for the marginalisation 
of political opponents, the approach adopted by the Israeli Supreme Court in recent 
cases suggest (at least at the judicial level) evidence of a more tolerant approach to the 
rights of anti-system parties in seeking to achieve electoral recognition of their views.   
 
By contrast, with regard to the penultimate case study, the assignation by Fox and 
Nolte of the United Kingdom as a tolerant procedural democracy is one with which 
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this thesis would concur.
830
 While the introduction of the Human Rights Act may 
suggest a tentative step in a more substantive direction, the continuing existence of 
parliamentary sovereignty alongside the proclivity of UK governments to allow 
‘extreme’ parties to continue to organise and contest elections make such an 
assignation more or less accurate. The final case study is however a little more 
problematic. Fox and Nolte place the United States within the militant procedural 
category
831
arguing that while the absence of any rule which ‘…precludes the remote 
possibility of amending the Constitution to abolish a republican form of 
government’832 places it firmly within a procedural orbit, the tendency exemplified 
inter alia in the Smith Act of 1940
833
 to place restrictions on those deemed a threat to 
national security allow for an assignation of militancy. While it is undoubtedly true 
that restrictions were legislated for and judicially upheld during and in the aftermath 
of World War II and there have lately been creeping signals of militancy with regard 
to groups tenuously linked to terrorism; the overwhelming propensity since 
Brandenburg has been for the judicial branch to give political expression wide 
latitude unless it incites or is directed at inciting impending illegal activity. This 
pattern it is argued places the United States more comfortably in a tolerant context.  
.  
While the typology adopted by Fox and Nolte has value, there are evident problems 
associated with it.  The primary weakness is that it fails to recognise the complexities 
inherent within as opposed to between jurisdictions. For example, as just discussed, 
the assignation of militant substantive status to both Israel and Germany failed to take 
account of the emergence of growing jurisprudential and political tolerance 
respectively. An alternative approach is offered by Otto Pfersmann.
834
 Pfersmann 
argues that all democracies can be classified as either more or less militant.
835
 He 
contends that in reality, most functioning democracies can be contrasted with the idea 
of a pure open democracy where there are no effective limits on what can be done in 
the name of a democratically elected majority. 
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“All things being equal, the competence of the open democratic 
legislator is unrestricted. This means that any possible human 
behaviour can be the target of such normative provisions, including 
the abolition of the open democratic procedures and their 
replacement by more oligarchic decision making or even 
dictatorship. In such a structure, democracy is legally contingent on 
the democratic stances of the majority of …voters. If they are in 
favour of maintaining the system as it goes, it will be maintained; if, 
for, whatever reason, discontent becomes majoritarian, open 
democracy will openly and democratically disappear.”836 
 
Pfersmann contends that all democracies are more or less militant in contrast to the 
entirely open democracy described above. Those polities which place more limits on 
structural and constitutional change are described as more militant in contrast to those 
which utilise less restrictive measures. With reference to the order of this thesis, it can 
be argued that it has deployed an effectively ‘pfersmannian’ approach in that the 
substantive chapters have been place in a ‘more or less’ linear order from the 
militancy of secular Turkey to the constitutional proceduralism of the United States. 
While it may seem counter-intuitive to adopt an approach which seems relatively 
simple while being critical of Fox and Nolte for their failure to grasp the complexities 
within jurisdictions; it is the very simplicity of a ‘more or less’ approach which allows 
the flexibility to study the different ways in which legal provisions, jurisprudence and 
political culture interact within any jurisdiction at any specific times. Thus Turkey and 
Spain are the first two substantive case studies as both countries have recently 
deployed highly invasive interventions within the political arena which have been 
upheld by the European Court of Human Rights. Post- Nazi Germany and other post-
totalitarian polities as well as Israel have been placed in the middle of the thesis 
because while they symbolically display a façade of militancy, recent practice informs 
a more tolerant procedural approach. Finally, the last two substantive chapters within 
the thesis are the United Kingdom and the United States as they have (with 
exceptions) tended to allow a greater degree of latitude to political actors than within 
the other case studies.  
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However, while this ‘more or less’ approach is useful as a tool to inform the 
placement of substantive chapters; it does not represent the main focus of the thesis. 
Indeed, it is the opinion of this thesis that such an approach asks the wrong question. 
As Samuel Issacharoff has argued, ‘the key point is not the ubiquity of prohibitions 
but the rationale for them.’837 Rather than simply concern itself with applying 
classifications to the approach applied by different jurisdictions in relation to party 
prohibition, the primary focus is to assess the legitimacy of these approaches in light 
of the four identified principles of democracy and the need to continually facilitate 
substantive disagreement and identify the circumstances when, if ever, party 
prohibition is morally, legally and democratically justified. 
 
7:3 An assessment of legitimacy 
Each substantive chapter has analysed the extent to which the jurisdiction or specific 
case in question has struck a satisfactory balance between the four identified 
principles of democracy. Taking each chapter in order, the following general 
observations can be made. Evidently, it is within the opening two case studies of 
Turkey and Spain and more specifically the cases of Refah Partisi and Batasuna that  
the most grievous imbalances and thus challenges to democratic disagreement can be 
located; an assertion aggravated by the fact that both decisions were upheld by the 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. In the former case, the dissolution of a party 
who were the focal point of a great degree of popular support was upheld because the 
Court decided that the said party was ideologically indisposed towards democracy 
despite the lack of any convincing episode for such an assertion. The equal right to 
propose change and achieve representation for such views was violated on the basis of 
assumptions which lacked intellectual depth and thus credibility. In the former case, a 
vehicle for the articulation and aggregation of preferences of a national minority was 
removed from the polity not for its own advocacies or actions but primarily for its 
refusal to condemn terrorist actions in a specific context.  
 
With regard to Germany and other post-totalitarian societies, there is growing 
evidence of the emergence of an uneasy if appropriate balance between the four 
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guiding principles. While the relevant polities all have constitutional provisions 
allowing for party prohibition for advocacy of or attachment to what are deemed 
illegitimate substantive goals, recent practice suggests that the importance of such 
provisions are primarily symbolic and that toleration of such advocacies have 
increased as the relevant democracies have matured and consolidated. A similar 
balance seems also to be emerging within Israel. If reference is only made to relevant 
legislation pertaining to a party’s right to contest elections, the four guiding principles 
seem well out of balance with each other. Effectively, the equal right to contest the 
processes of popular sovereignty can be restricted by temporal opponents on the 
grounds that the substantive goals of relevant parties are illegitimate. Such a step 
undoubtedly narrows the range of views represented within the Knesset and at least 
temporarily places limits on the type of change that can be legislatively pursued. 
However, the actions of the main unelected body in this process, the Supreme Court 
have facilitated a restoration of equilibrium between the four principles by 
establishing a high evidentiary threshold for disqualification resting on the 
identification of concrete actions taken towards rather than simply ideological 
attachment to the relevant goals.  
 
In the penultimate case of the United Kingdom, the dominance of the constitutional 
norm of parliamentary sovereignty has left individuals and political parties relatively 
free to pursue their visions of change. While passage of the Human Rights Act has 
perhaps unintentionally laid down a tentative legal framework for restriction of the 
rights necessary to democratic deliberation and contestation, the prevailing political 
climate favours a tolerant if disapproving approach to those parties which espouse 
what can be considered as extreme positions and thus the four principles continue to 
interact in such a way as to maintain the existence of substantive disagreement and the 
continued possibility of change With regard to the final example of the United States, 
the dominant interpretation of clear and present danger established under 
Brandenburg
838
 facilitates the continuation of substantive disagreement. 
Representatives elected under the processes of popular sovereignty are 
constitutionally unable to pass legislation which restricts the equal rights of 
individuals and political parties to advocate change and seek representation for their 
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views through the mechanism of regular elections. While the Humanitarian Law 
Project
839
case is suggestive of a creeping militancy towards groups linked to current 
or former terrorist organisations, it is contended that the most obvious threat to a 
balance between the four guiding principles  comes from the influence of money on 
the political process; an influence strengthened by the implications of Citizens United. 
 
In summary, it is contended that the final four case studies maintain a generally 
satisfactory balance between the four principles whether through accident or design 
while the first two jurisdictions exhibit a hastiness to protect the relevant polities from 
the perceived threats of terrorism and political Islam. In making such rash decisions, 
there is a danger that they have undermined the very democratic foundations they 
were intending to protect. 
 
7:4 Is Prohibition ever necessary? 
The assertion that the prohibitions of both Batasuna and Refah are illegitimate on 
democratic grounds does not necessarily mean that all party prohibitions are without 
redeeming value. In his 2007 article, ‘Fragile Democracies’,840Samuel Issacharoff 
distinguished between three types of party that may be legitimately subject to 
attempted prohibitions. These are insurrectionary, separatist parties and anti-
democratic majoritarian parties. Issacharoff defines insurrectionary parties as those  
 
‘…who participate in the electoral process for the purpose of 
propagandizing their views but without any real prospect of 
competing for political office.’841Their main challenge to the 
established political order is not that they may gain power but that 
‘they use the electoral arena as an organizing forum for 
insurrectionary attacks on the State.’842  
 
Issacharoff references the KPD in Germany as an example of such a party. He then 
proceeds to define ‘separatist’ parties as organisations which ‘invariably fuel their 
support by opposing the perceived oppression of a distinct regional or ethnic subset of 
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the population.
843
 Referencing Batasuna, Isacharoff argues that separatist parties 
present similar challenges to democracies as those of an insurrectionary nature and as 
such any attempt to legally dissolve them should meet a similar legal standard. The 
test which he applies to both is the clear and present danger test. 
 
“…separatist parties, like insurrectionary parties [should be] given a 
broad swathe of protection so long as they are not engaged in actual 
incitement or violent acts against the democratic regime. In the case 
of separatist parties, the overlay with the claims of an embattled 
minority should enhance the level of judicial solicitude for these 
parties and restrict the ambit of permissible state repression.”844 
 
It is difficult to argue with Issacharoff in this regard. In the absence of a collective 
incitement to or the collective commission of illegal and/or violent acts, the 
prohibition of an entire political party represents an unwarranted and disproportionate 
step. In this regard, it is of relevance to point out that many of the other parties 
referenced within this thesis would meet the criteria of insurrectionary or separatist 
applied by Issacharoff. To give a couple of examples, Batasuna , Sinn Fein and Balad 
can be described as both insurrectionary and separatist whereas avowedly racist or 
anti-immigration parties such as the BNP in the UK, Kach in Israel and the workers 
party in the Czech republic can be  placed firmly within the insurrectionary category.  
 
Consequently, any attempt to legally dissolve such parties should be based on their 
incitement or commission of illegal conduct and not simply because their ideological 
goals inspire distaste within the majority of the population. Issacharoff then discusses 
what he describes as anti-democratic majoritarian parties. He argues that democratic 
states should have a right of self-defence against those parties which both inspire 
popular support and display an avowed antipathy towards democracy and in doing so 
references part of the Court’s reasoning in the Refah case. 
 
“[A] State cannot be required to wait, until intervening, until a 
political party has seized power and begun to take concrete steps to 
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implement a policy incompatible with the standards of the 
Convention and democracy, even though the danger of that policy 
for democracy is sufficiently established and imminent…”845 
 
There is a degree of merit in the Court’s reasoning here. The possibility of an 
avowedly anti-democratic party taking power through democratic means and then 
abolishing democracy has historical resonance and immense implications. States 
should indeed have the right to legally prohibit those parties who pose a dual threat to 
democracy. However, this dual threat must include both an acknowledged ideological 
antipathy towards the continuation of democratic government and a level of 
popularity such that the realisation of that goal through the mechanism of forthcoming 
elections is a realistic prospect. If a party has an anti-democratic ideology but has no 
realistic prospect of gaining power then prohibition is a measure disproportionate to 
the danger posed and a barrier to the embracement of democratic norms by those 
ambivalent to its value. If a party is popular but not clearly anti-democratic then 
prohibition sends a signal to a large amount of voters that their specific concerns are 
not valid and worthy of representation. It is difficult to think of an alternative measure 
more likely to provoke disenchantment amongst a general populace concerning the  
continuing value of democratic norms. The reasoning applied by the Court here has 
two main flaws. Firstly, as evidenced in the first substantive chapter, the Court was 
incorrect in its assumption that Refah were intrinsically anti-democratic mistakenly 
assigning policies that it deemed illiberal as proof of anti-democratic credentials. This 
is further evidenced by the fact that the Court argued that policies incompatible with 
the Convention as well as democracy may serve as grounds for prohibition. Indeed, 
one of the fundamental weaknesses of many of the legal provisions and subsequent 
cases discussed within this thesis is that they were not instigated and enforced to 
protect democratic government as a whole but a specifically liberal version of 
democratic government. 
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7:5 Conclusion: The limits of Liberalism and the necessity of Pluralism 
 
In his book, Two faces of Liberalism, 
846
John Gray argues that liberalism as a 
philosophy wrestles with two contradictory impulses. One is the pursuit of a rational 
consensus on the ideal way of life while the other validates a system which allows 
differing conceptions of the ideal life to co-exist. 
 
“Liberalism has always had two faces. From one side…is the pursuit 
of an ideal form of life. From the other, it is the search for terms of 
peace among different ways of life.”847   
 
A pattern which emerges from such contradictory impulses is that proponents of a 
liberal form of democracy (in a desire to protect the equal autonomy of individuals) 
place limits on change by moving certain decisions of social importance beyond the 
realm of collective decision makers elected through the mechanism of popular 
sovereignty. Party prohibition can in some cases be viewed as endeavouring to fulfil 
the same task by a radically different method in that it attempts to ensure that potential 
collective decisions of which it disapproves are not even attempted as those who 
would wish to enforce such decisions are not afforded the right to seek  
representation. While paying lip service to the principles of popular sovereignty and 
equal respect, liberalism comes down heavily in favour of the latter. 
 
“Their move consists in reformulating the democratic principle of 
popular sovereignty in such a way as to eliminate the dangers that it 
could pose to liberal values. It is the consciousness of those dangers 
that have often made liberals wary of popular participation and keen 
to find ways to discourage or limit it.”848 
  
What then can constitute an alternative to liberal democracy and maintain a sufficient 
balance between the four guiding principles that disproportionate measures are not 
utilised against political parties. Michel Rosenfeld argues that an approach known as 
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comprehensive pluralism is one that can fundamentally maintain the conditions 
necessary for the continued existence of substantive disagreement. He argues that the 
sole intention of comprehensive pluralism is to promote a plurality of views on all 
topics of social importance. 
 
“…it is good to protect and promote as many competing 
conceptions of the good as possible and that justice is inextricably 
linked to pursuit of the pluralist good. From the pluralist standpoint, 
no religion is inherently superior to, or ‘truer’ than, any other, and 
no ideology, culture, or lifestyle is prima facie better than any 
other.”849 
 
While liberal democracies do afford a healthy degree of tolerance to views which 
oppose their fundamental tenets, the advantage of a comprehensively pluralist 
approach is not that it tolerates a plurality of views but that it is essentially defined by 
it. 
“Ultimately, comprehensive pluralism depends for its survival on 
the availability of conceptions of the good that differ from its own 
views. Liberalism, in contrast, does not depend on illiberal world 
view for its vindication, though it can afford limited tolerance to the 
latter… Comprehensive pluralism is a conception of the good but it 
differs from all others in being both open toward, and dependent 
upon, other conceptions of the good.”850 
 
Rosenfeld also argues that if polities face major crises such as the prospect of civil 
war or foreign invasion or even civil war, then a temporary suspension or dilution of 
some political rights may be appropriate.
851
 However, he categorises situations such 
as the commission of terrorist acts or peaceful secession as merely stresses within a 
polity that should be absorbed with the need to resort to disproportionate 
prohibitions.
852
 The challenges posed by the relevant political groups discussed 
throughout this thesis merely represent stresses within their own polity rather than 
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elements contributing to a full blown crisis. With a nod to the four guiding principles, 
it is the final conclusion of this thesis that in order for there to be a satisfactory 
balance maintained between them, then prohibition can only be considered when there 
is convincing evidence that the party in question poses both an ideological and 
sufficiently practical and imminent threat to the continuing existence of both 
democratic government and the fundamental disagreement required to sustain it. The 
prohibitions (successful or otherwise) that have constituted much of this thesis’s 
subject matter have not met these criteria. They have in general terms placed a 
primarily autonomy based view of equal respect ahead of representation, popular 
sovereignty and changeability. Such actions signal either an actual or proposed 
reduction to the arena of democratic contestation. Further steps in this direction may 
potentially lead to growing disaffection with democratic norms and a desire to resolve 
disputes that should properly be the subject of democratic contestation with the 
adoption of less peaceful methods. 
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